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Author: Stephen Lenkey Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
I model the effect of disclosure on the trade-off between information risk, liquidity risk, and price risk for a well-informed, risk-averse insider. Revealing some information before trading decreases the variability of the insider's information advantage and thus reduces his information risk. Disclosure also lowers adverse selection costs for market makers, which reduces the insider's liquidity risk by increasing his trading flexibility. However, disclosure increases price risk for the insider because the price fully reflects the revealed information. The reduction in information and liquidity risks outweigh the rise in price risk when the insider is less risk averse because a less risk-averse insider's information-based motive for trading is stronger than his hedging motive. The opposite relation holds when the insider is more risk averse. Therefore, a less (more) risk-averse insider experiences an increase (decrease) in welfare when he discloses some information before trading. Cost of capital and policy implications are identified.
Author: Stephen Lenkey Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
I model the effect of disclosure on the trade-off between information risk, liquidity risk, and price risk for a well-informed, risk-averse insider. Revealing some information before trading decreases the variability of the insider's information advantage and thus reduces his information risk. Disclosure also lowers adverse selection costs for market makers, which reduces the insider's liquidity risk by increasing his trading flexibility. However, disclosure increases price risk for the insider because the price fully reflects the revealed information. The reduction in information and liquidity risks outweigh the rise in price risk when the insider is less risk averse because a less risk-averse insider's information-based motive for trading is stronger than his hedging motive. The opposite relation holds when the insider is more risk averse. Therefore, a less (more) risk-averse insider experiences an increase (decrease) in welfare when he discloses some information before trading. Cost of capital and policy implications are identified.
Author: Klaus J. Hopt Publisher: Springer ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
The general problems regarding the timely topic of regulation of insider dealing and timely disclosure of new facts are discussed in a comparative fashion in this lecture in the light of the EC Directive of 13 November 1989 And The German Securities Exchange Act. In particular, attention is given to efforts to harmonize German law with the EC Directive.
Author: Paul U. Ali Publisher: CRC Press ISBN: 1420074032 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 452
Book Description
Insider trading has long been considered an endemic feature of the world's financial markets. It is unsurprising that the recent growth in mergers and acquisitions worldwide has been accompanied by a growth in insider trading, on a scale not witnessed since the 1980's takeovers boom. Insider Trading: Global Developments and Analysis brings together the latest law and finance research on insider trading. It provides expert coverage on the established US, European, and Asia-Pacific securities markets, as well as the key emerging markets of Brazil and the greater China region. Providing high interest and up-to-date content, the book features several recent cases, including that of Martha Stewart.
Author: Stephen M. Bainbridge Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: 0857931857 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 498
Book Description
In most capital markets, insider trading is the most common violation of securities law. It is also the most well known, inspiring countless movie plots and attracting scholars with a broad range of backgrounds and interests, from pure legal doctrine to empirical analysis to complex economic theory. This volume brings together original cutting-edge research in these and other areas written by leading experts in insider trading law and economics. The Handbook begins with a section devoted to legal issues surrounding the USÕs ban on insider trading, which is one of the oldest and most energetically enforced in the world. Using this section as a foundation, contributors go on to discuss several specific court cases as well as important developments in empirical research on the subject. The Handbook concludes with a section devoted to international perspectives, providing insight into insider trading laws in China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the European Union. This timely and comprehensive volume will appeal to students and professors of law and economics, as well as scholars, researchers and practitioners with an interest in insider trading.
Author: Ashraf A. Jaffer Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 38
Book Description
While tradable securities remain a popular means of compensating managers, there is constant discussion on the need for tighter regulation, including disclosure requirements, to prevent employees from actually being able to gain from trading these securities based on their private information. The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the role and economic consequences of disclosures aimed at reducing the ability to gain from insider trading. Using the principal-agent framework I show that in some situations allowing the agent to trade anonymously on his private information increases production and, more importantly, generates a Pareto improvement compared to the case where the agent's trades are required to be publicly disclosed. The intuition for this result is that the bid-ask spread imposed by the market maker makes it costly for the agent to sell his shares and get full insurance if he has taken a low-cost action. As a consequence, the agent takes the high-cost action with higher probability, which in turn makes the overall economy better off.
Author: Michael D. Guttentag Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 56
Book Description
Determining when the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information should trigger insider trading liability is a deeply problematic aspect of insider trading doctrine.The current rule is that a selective disclosure can only trigger insider trading liability if “the insider [making the selective disclosure] personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.” Dirks v. SEC introduced this “personal benefit” test in 1983 to balance four competing rationales for determining when a tip should trigger insider trading liability. Two developments since Dirks have made problems with this personal benefit test insurmountable. First, the SEC's enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000 supplanted federal common law regulation of selective disclosures by public companies and, more pointedly, prohibited public companies from making precisely the types of selective disclosures to Wall Street analysts that the Dirks personal benefit test was designed to protect. Second, in United States v. O'Hagan the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory, which greatly expanded the types of deceptive conduct that could trigger insider trading liability.After Regulation FD and O'Hagan, only a test for when a selective disclosure triggers insider trading liability based directly on the statutory prohibition against deceptive conduct makes sense. Receipt of a personal benefit should be a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for finding that a selective disclosure is deceptive enough to trigger insider trading liability.
Author: Ralph C. Ferrara Publisher: Law Journal Press ISBN: 9781588520692 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 960
Book Description
The authors analyze the impact of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and SEC regulations regarding selective disclosure and insider trading.
Author: Stephen Lenkey
Author: Stephen Lenkey
Author: Klaus J. Hopt
Author: Paul U. Ali
Author: Stephen M. Bainbridge
Author: Ashraf A. Jaffer
Author: James Hamilton
Author: Marc I. Steinberg
Author: Michael D. Guttentag
Author: Ralph C. Ferrara
Author: