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Author: Bo Chen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 45
Book Description
We study the design of information disclosure in a dynamic multi-agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete for a winner-takes-all prize. We find that although submission is a onetime event for each agent, different disclosure policies on the agents' submissions induce different equilibrium behavior, making the design of disclosure a useful instrument for the contest sponsor. We characterize equilibrium behavior in a public contest where submissions are immediately revealed and in a hidden contest where no submission information is revealed to the agents. In addition, for contests with indefinite duration, the public disclosure policy is an optimal policy among a natural set of disclosure policies.
Author: Bo Chen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 45
Book Description
We study the design of information disclosure in a dynamic multi-agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete for a winner-takes-all prize. We find that although submission is a onetime event for each agent, different disclosure policies on the agents' submissions induce different equilibrium behavior, making the design of disclosure a useful instrument for the contest sponsor. We characterize equilibrium behavior in a public contest where submissions are immediately revealed and in a hidden contest where no submission information is revealed to the agents. In addition, for contests with indefinite duration, the public disclosure policy is an optimal policy among a natural set of disclosure policies.
Author: Anastasia Antsygina Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We study optimal information disclosure in static contests where players do not know their own values of winning but can learn them, publicly or privately, from the designer. The designer chooses a disclosure policy that maximizes the total expected effort, and commits to it before observing the realized value profile. A distinct feature of our model is that conditional on receiving private information from the designer, contestants are allowed to communicate with each other by sending informative (truthful) or uninformative (empty) messages. As our results show, the contestants have incentives to share their private information with each other if and only if the values of winning are positively correlated. At the same time, learning is rarely perfect because mixing between the two types of messages leads to higher expected payoff in the communication game. Since with a positive probability communication results in an asymmetric contest associated with lower expected effort, the designer prefers concealment to any other disclosure policy available. This result is in a stark contrast with the no communication benchmark where private disclosure is best when the values of winning are sufficiently positively correlated.
Author: Jesal Sheth Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The theory of voluntary disclosure of information posits that market forces lead senders to disclose information through a process of unravelling. This prediction requires that receivers hold correct beliefs and, in equilibrium, make adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Previous research finds that receivers do not sufficiently infer non-disclosure as bad news, leading to the failure of complete unravelling. This paper experimentally examines whether competition between senders when receivers strongly prefer disclosed over nondisclosed information increases unravelling. We further examine whether receivers' naivety about non-disclosed information decreases with competition between senders. We find that complete unravelling fails to occur without competition. However, with competition, there is significantly higher unravelling such that it increases receivers' overall welfare. Interestingly, receivers' welfare increases despite no significant difference in their guesses or beliefs about non-disclosed information relative to the treatment without competition. We conclude that competition between senders positively affects disclosure of information and receivers' welfare.
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on the Constitution Publisher: ISBN: Category : Freedom of information Languages : en Pages : 1160
Author: Leon A. Petrosyan Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 3030519414 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 294
Book Description
This book includes papers presented at the ISDG12-GTM2019 International Meeting on Game Theory, as a joint meeting of the 12th International ISDG Workshop and the 13th "International Conference on Game Theory and Management”, held in St. Petersburg in July 2019. The topics cover a wide range of game-theoretic models and include both theory and applications, including applications to management.
Author: Ming Hu Publisher: Springer ISBN: 3030018636 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 536
Book Description
This edited book examines the challenges and opportunities arising from today’s sharing economy from an operations management perspective. Individual chapter authors present state-of-the-art research that examines the general impact of sharing economy on production and consumption; the intermediary role of a sharing platform; crowdsourcing management; and context-based operational problems. Sharing economy refers to a market model that enables and facilitates the sharing of access to goods and services. For example, Uber allows riders to share a car. Airbnb allows homeowners to share their extra rooms with renters. Groupon crowdsources demands, enabling customers to share the benefit of discounted goods and services, whereas Kickstarter crowdsources funds, enabling backers to fund a project jointly. Unlike the classic supply chain settings in which a firm makes inventory and supply decisions, in sharing economy, supply is crowdsourced and can be modulated by a platform. The matching-supply-with-demand process in a sharing economy requires novel perspectives and tools to address challenges and identify opportunities. The book is comprised of 20 chapters that are divided into four parts. The first part explores the general impact of sharing economy on the production, consumption, and society. The second part explores the intermediary role of a sharing platform that matches crowdsourced supply with demand. The third part investigates the crowdsourcing management on a sharing platform, and the fourth part is dedicated to context-based operational problems of popular sharing economy applications. “While sharing economy is becoming omnipresence, the operations management (OM) research community has begun to explore and examine different business models in the transportation, healthcare, financial, accommodation, and sourcing sectors. This book presents a collection of the state-of-the-art research work conducted by a group of world-leading OM researchers in this area. Not only does this book cover a wide range of business models arising from the sharing economy, but it also showcases different modeling frameworks and research methods that cannot be missed. Ultimately, this book is a tour de force – informative and insightful!” Christopher S. Tang Distinguished Professor and Edward Carter Chair in Business Administration UCLA Anderson School of Management
Author: Vanessa Mak Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: 1788111303 Category : Language Arts & Disciplines Languages : en Pages : 499
Book Description
The use of data in society has seen an exponential growth in recent years. Data science, the field of research concerned with understanding and analyzing data, aims to find ways to operationalize data so that it can be beneficially used in society, for example in health applications, urban governance or smart household devices. The legal questions that accompany the rise of new, data-driven technologies however are underexplored. This book is the first volume that seeks to map the legal implications of the emergence of data science. It discusses the possibilities and limitations imposed by the current legal framework, considers whether regulation is needed to respond to problems raised by data science, and which ethical problems occur in relation to the use of data. It also considers the emergence of Data Science and Law as a new legal discipline.
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on the Constitution Publisher: ISBN: Category : Freedom of information Languages : en Pages : 1172
Author: Bo Chen
Author: Bo Chen
Author: Jos Jansen
Author: Anastasia Antsygina
Author: Jesal Sheth
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on the Constitution
Author: Leon A. Petrosyan
Author: 
Author: Ming Hu
Author: Vanessa Mak
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on the Constitution