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Author: Jun Zhang Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 31
Book Description
We examine optimal information disclosure through Bayesian persuasion in a two-player contest. One contestant's valuation is commonly known and the other's is his private information. The contest organiser can precommit to a signal to in uence the uninformed contestant's belief about the informed contestant. We show that to search for the optimal signal when the informed contestant's valuation follows a binary distribution, it is without loss of generality to compare no disclosure with full disclosure; otherwise, such a restriction causes loss of generality. We propose a simple method to compute the optimal signal, which yields explicit solutions in some situations.
Author: Jun Zhang Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 31
Book Description
We examine optimal information disclosure through Bayesian persuasion in a two-player contest. One contestant's valuation is commonly known and the other's is his private information. The contest organiser can precommit to a signal to in uence the uninformed contestant's belief about the informed contestant. We show that to search for the optimal signal when the informed contestant's valuation follows a binary distribution, it is without loss of generality to compare no disclosure with full disclosure; otherwise, such a restriction causes loss of generality. We propose a simple method to compute the optimal signal, which yields explicit solutions in some situations.
Author: Anastasia Antsygina Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We study optimal information disclosure in static contests where players do not know their own values of winning but can learn them, publicly or privately, from the designer. The designer chooses a disclosure policy that maximizes the total expected effort, and commits to it before observing the realized value profile. A distinct feature of our model is that conditional on receiving private information from the designer, contestants are allowed to communicate with each other by sending informative (truthful) or uninformative (empty) messages. As our results show, the contestants have incentives to share their private information with each other if and only if the values of winning are positively correlated. At the same time, learning is rarely perfect because mixing between the two types of messages leads to higher expected payoff in the communication game. Since with a positive probability communication results in an asymmetric contest associated with lower expected effort, the designer prefers concealment to any other disclosure policy available. This result is in a stark contrast with the no communication benchmark where private disclosure is best when the values of winning are sufficiently positively correlated.
Author: Bo Chen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 45
Book Description
We study the design of information disclosure in a dynamic multi-agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete for a winner-takes-all prize. We find that although submission is a onetime event for each agent, different disclosure policies on the agents' submissions induce different equilibrium behavior, making the design of disclosure a useful instrument for the contest sponsor. We characterize equilibrium behavior in a public contest where submissions are immediately revealed and in a hidden contest where no submission information is revealed to the agents. In addition, for contests with indefinite duration, the public disclosure policy is an optimal policy among a natural set of disclosure policies.
Author: Christian Ewerhart Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly asymmetric, then full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog reveals her type in an attempt to moderate the favorite while, similarly, the strongest type of the favorite tries to discourage the underdog - so that the contest unravels. This strong-form disclosure principle is robust with respect to correlation, partitional evidence, randomized disclosures, sequential moves, and continuous type spaces. Moreover, the assumption of uniform asymmetry is not needed when incomplete information is one-sided. However, the principle breaks down when contestants are potentially too similar in strength, possess commitment power, or when information is unverifiable. In fact, cheap talk will always be ignored, even if mediated by a trustworthy third party.
Author: Carmen Beviá Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1009504436 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 239
Book Description
Contest theory is an important part of game theory used to analyse different types of contests and conflicts. Traditional microeconomic models focus on situations where property rights are well defined, and agents voluntarily trade rights over goods or produce rights for new goods. However, much less focus has been given to other situations where agents do not trade property rights, but rather fight over them. Contests: Theory and Applications presents a state-of-the art discussion of the economics of contests from the perspective of both core theory and applications. It provides a new approach to standard topics in labour, education, welfare and development and introduces areas like voting, industrial organisation, mechanism design, sport, and military conflict. Using elementary mathematics, this book provides a versatile framework for navigating this growing area of study and serves as an essential resource for its wide variety of applications in economics and political science.
Author: Jesal Sheth Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The theory of voluntary disclosure of information posits that market forces lead senders to disclose information through a process of unravelling. This prediction requires that receivers hold correct beliefs and, in equilibrium, make adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Previous research finds that receivers do not sufficiently infer non-disclosure as bad news, leading to the failure of complete unravelling. This paper experimentally examines whether competition between senders when receivers strongly prefer disclosed over nondisclosed information increases unravelling. We further examine whether receivers' naivety about non-disclosed information decreases with competition between senders. We find that complete unravelling fails to occur without competition. However, with competition, there is significantly higher unravelling such that it increases receivers' overall welfare. Interestingly, receivers' welfare increases despite no significant difference in their guesses or beliefs about non-disclosed information relative to the treatment without competition. We conclude that competition between senders positively affects disclosure of information and receivers' welfare.
Author: Jun Zhang
Author: Jun Zhang
Author: Anastasia Antsygina
Author: Luke Boosey
Author: Bo Chen
Author: United States. Federal Communications Commission
Author: Christian Ewerhart
Author: Carmen Beviá
Author: James T. O'Reilly
Author: Thomas Rieck
Author: Jesal Sheth