Author: Eric McCarthyPublisher: American Bar Association
ISBN: 9781590318003
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 390
Book Description
Indirect Purchaser Lawsuits
Author: Eric McCarthyPublisher: American Bar Association
ISBN: 9781590318003
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 390
Book Description
Indirect Purchaser Litigation Handbook
Author: Elizabeth A. N. HaasPublisher:
ISBN: 9781634254533
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Illinois Brick that "indirect purchasers" that is, purchasers who do not buy directly from the alleged coconspirators, may not sue under federal law. This Handbook seeks to explain both the framework for indirect purchaser claims and the issues that commonly arise in indirect purchaser litigation. The book begins with an analysis of the Illinois Brick decision, along with the federal, state, and scholarly responses. Then, it considers questions of liability and standing for indirect purchaser claims and reviews procedural aspects of indirect purchaser litigation--jurisdiction, discovery, case management, and class certification issues. It also addresses the financial aspects--damages and settlements. Finally, the book takes a look northward to seek lessons from Canada's somewhat different experience with indirect purchaser claims. This Handbook takes no position on whether Illinois Brick was rightly decided or whether the benefits of indirect purchaser litigation are worth its costs. Rather, the Indirect Purchaser Litigation Handbook is intended as a guide for practitioners and courts, working in the world as it is today. The book also describes the different states' reactions over the past two decades to the U.S. Supreme Court's Illinois Brick decision.
Apple V. Pepper
Author: Herbert HovenkampPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In Apple v. Pepper the Supreme Court held that consumers who allegedly paid too much for apps sold on Apple's iStore could sue Apple for antitrust damages because they were “direct purchasers.” The decision reflects some bizarre complexities that have resulted from the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Illinois Brick, which held that only direct purchasers could sue for overcharge injuries under the federal antitrust laws. The indirect purchaser rule was problematic from the beginning. First, it was plainly inconsistent with the antitrust damages statute, which gives an action to “any person who shall be injured in his business or property” by an antitrust violation.Second, the Court exaggerated the difficulty of “tracing” indirect purchaser damages. By using the most common “yardstick” methods of estimating damages, an expert can compute indirect purchaser damages by engaging in two relatively simple horizontal comparisons.Third, if we were going to give the overcharge to a single set of buyers it should be the end users, not the direct purchasers. End users bear most of the brunt of an unlawful overcharge. Further, they are the only persons in the distribution chain who are unable to pass anything on. In fact, intermediaries, including direct purchasers, typically are not injured by the “overcharge” at all. Their injury results from loss of sales volume that the cartel imposes. Thus the correct damages rule in indirect purchaser cases is lost profit damages for intermediaries, including the direct purchaser, and overcharge damages for the end user.The Supreme Court's Daubert decision, which came fifteen years after Illinois Brick, should be the controlling mechanism for evaluating expert models rather than anything as blunt, categorical, and frankly wrong as the indirect purchaser rule. Daubert rulings, which are generally not subject to jury control, should provide judges with an adequate mechanism for ensuring that expert damages reports are based on reliable and relevant assumptions, methodologies, and data. Antitrust damage formulations, even for indirect purchasers, need be no more complex or speculative than damages for a large number of business violations, including such things as patent infringement and breach of contract.The Apple dissenters adopted a distinctively noneconomic approach that dispensed entirely with analysis of pass-on. They reasoned that only the direct purchaser had an injury that was “proximately caused” by the defendant's antitrust violation. This view harkens back to a nineteenth century tort law concept that was widely used by courts to limit tort liability, particularly in railroad cases. Under this rule only a single entity could be said to have an injury that was proximately caused by the defendant's conduct. That rule was properly abandoned in tort cases and should be laid to rest. It makes even less sense in antitrust cases. In an effort to identify some conception of “proximity” it typically awards damages to those who were injured the least, or in some cases not at all.
'Your Honor, Tear Down that Illinois Brick Wall!' The National Movement Toward Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer Justice
Author: Daniel KaronPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Agreements to fix prices violate state and federal antitrust laws. When price fixing occurs, the price fixed products' direct purchasers have standing to pursue claims for their overcharges under the federal antitrust laws. Many states' consumers (indirect purchasers) also have standing to pursue claims under state antitrust or consumer fraud laws. Customarily, only about half the states' consumers pursue indirect purchaser price fixing claims, while the remaining states' consumers go uncompensated believing no standing to pursue these claims exists. But these latter states' consumers actually have standing to pursue price fixing claims under their states' antitrust or consumer fraud laws; they just do not realize it or their states' courts have wrongly denied them standing. These latter states' consumers need to recognize their standing to pursue indirect purchaser litigation. This Article explains all states' indirect purchasers' rights so virtually all, not merely some, states' indirect purchasers can pursue and obtain damages resulting from price fixing. Only this way can essentially all states' consumers exercise their rightful standing to pursue claims for illegal overcharges, help stem price fixing and ensure they derive the privileges and benefits of a free, open and competitive marketplace.
Rebuilding Illinois Brick
Author: Barak D. RichmanPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The landmark case of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, which denied standing to indirect purchasers to sue antitrust violators, has been subjected to steady and widespread criticism since it was decided in 1977. Despite three decades of dissatisfaction, however, debate over indirect purchaser standing has failed to generate satisfying solutions that meet the objectives of antitrust law and reflect its underlying principles. We attribute the lack of creative alternatives to an undue emphasis on legal formalism, fostered both by the Supreme Court's elaboration of the indirect purchaser rule and the doctrine's failure to recognize the pervasiveness of multilayer supply chains. In this Article, we argue for a return to functionalist antitrust objectives. We review the development of the doctrine, explain its descent into formalism, identify its significant shortcomings, and offer a comprehensive framework that addresses the difficult problem of antitrust standing. Building off that framework, and drawing on lessons from securities law, we propose a mechanism that opens antitrust suits to indirect purchasers, consolidates multiple claims into a single proceeding, and designates a presumptive lead plaintiff. Such a mechanism will enhance the impact of underenforced antitrust laws, restore compensation to injured parties, and reduce the administrative and agency costs of parallel litigation.
New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation
Author: Robert H. LandePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Illinois Brick held that only direct purchasers successfully can sue for damages under federal antitrust law. Since this left most true victims of antitrust violations without an effective remedy, most states enacted Illinois Brick Repealers (IBRs), to give indirect purchasers the right to sue for damages when firms violate analogous state laws. Although many benefits would arise if national legislation overturned Illinois Brick, to date every attempt to achieve a comprehensive federal solution has failed. Because this thirty year stalemate is almost certain to continue, this article instead focused on reform at the state level, where reform is much more achievable. This article presents a large number of IBR options that address the spectrum of a state's potential needs, together with commentary giving the major effects, advantages and disadvantages of each. As its Conclusion, this article suggests its own Model State Illinois Brick Repealer legislation.
Indirect Purchaser Litigation Handbook
Author: Publisher: American Bar Association
ISBN: 9781590318683
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 428
Book Description
In Re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation
Author: American Law Reports
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law reports, digests, etc
Languages : en
Pages : 774
Book Description
Illinois Walls
Author: Maarten Pieter SchinkelPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted standing to sue for recovery of damages suffered from a breach of federal antitrust law to direct purchasers only. Even though typically antitrust injury is, at least in part, passed on to firms lower in the production chain and ultimately to consumers, Illinois Brick is binding precedent in a majority of states. In this paper, we draw attention to a strategic abuse of the rule as a shield against antitrust damages claims. We show that Illinois Brick facilitates upstream firms to engage horizontally in a collusive arrangement by focussing concealed vertical side-payments to discourage civil action on their direct purchasers only. Downstream firms are passed part of the upstream cartel profits through a symmetric rationing of their inputs at low prices. This 'Illinois Wall' arrangement sustains collusion in the production chain, substantially reducing total welfare. The more competitive the up- and downstream industries otherwise are, the more scope there is for the arrangement. Illinois Walls are shown to be resilient to entry, as well as to variations in the legal system. Several recent U.S. cartel cases display Illinois Wall symptoms.