Increasing Efficiency and Incentives for Performance in the Army's Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Increasing Efficiency and Incentives for Performance in the Army's Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program PDF full book. Access full book title Increasing Efficiency and Incentives for Performance in the Army's Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program by Beth J. Asch. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Beth J. Asch Publisher: ISBN: 9781977407535 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 124
Book Description
This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Special and Incentive Pays in the Army, sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The purpose of the project was to help the Army determine how to best increase incentives for higher performance among enlisted members and to more efficiently achieve Army retention objectives.
Author: Beth J. Asch Publisher: ISBN: 9781977407535 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 124
Book Description
This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Special and Incentive Pays in the Army, sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The purpose of the project was to help the Army determine how to best increase incentives for higher performance among enlisted members and to more efficiently achieve Army retention objectives.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Military discharge Languages : en Pages : 44
Book Description
"In this study the effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) on Army reenlistments over the 1990-2000 period at Zones A, B, and C at three levels of occupational aggregation - all Army, career management field (CMF), and military occupational specialty (MOS) - were re-estimated to explicitly control for the drawdown in the mid-1990s as well as labor market conditions. In general, the results for Zone A at all levels of occupational aggregation indicate that reenlistment bonuses have a positive and statistically significant effect on Zone A reenlistments. A one-level increase in SRB at Zone A typically increases the reenlistment rate by 3 to 7 percentage points, depending upon the occupation. The results for Zone B are also solid at both the CMF and MOS levels. Results for Zone C, where reenlistment rates are typically very high, were reasonably solid but not quite as good as the Zone A and B results. The results provide the Army with estimates of reenlistment responsiveness to bonus changes for all three zones for all MOS. We also estimated the effect of SRBs on the reenlisting Soldier's choice of length of reenlistment. Increases in the SRB level not only increase reenlistments, but also increase the length of reenlistment. The length of reenlistment effects were incorporated into the SRB Management System to better predict program costs and the additional staff years of contracted service provided by the bonus program."--Stinet.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 35
Book Description
In order to manage its Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program effectively, the U.S. Army needs reliable information about the effects of SRBs on reenlistment rates at the Military Occupational Speciality (MOS) level. Until recently, research has not addressed the reenlistment decision, bias due to population heterogeneity, and interaction between compensation policy and retention. This research examines these fundamental issues and suggests techniques for their application at the MOS level. It highlights the importance of (1) understanding institutional details of compensation policy, including the role of SRBs; (2) defining random error terms in the empirical analyses; and (3) using longitudinal research data.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 20
Book Description
The United States military frequently has difficulty retaining enlisted personnel beyond their initial enlistment. A bonus program within each service, called a Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program, seeks to enhance reenlistments and thus reduce personnel shortages in critical military occupational specialties (MOSs). The amount of bonus is set by assigning "SRB multipliers" to each MOS. We develop a nonlinear integer program to select multipliers which minimize a function of deviations from desired reenlistment targets. A Lagrangian relaxation of a linearized version of the integer program is used to obtain lower bounds and feasible solutions. The best feasible solution, discovered in a coordinate search of the Lagrangian function, is heuristically improved by apportioning unexpended funds. For large problems, a heuristic variable reduction is employed to speed model solution. U.S. Army data and requirements for FY87 yield a 0-1 integer program with 12,992 binary variables and 273 constraints, which is solved within 0.00002% of optimality on an IBM 3033AP in less than 1.7 seconds. More general models with up to 463,000 binary variables are solved, on average, to within 0.009% of optimality in less than 1.8 minutes. The U.S. Marine Corps has used a simpler version of this model since 1986.
Author: Beth J. Asch Publisher: RAND Corporation ISBN: 9780833049667 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
"This monograph provides an empirical analysis of the enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment effects of bonuses, applying statistical models that control for such other factors as recruiting resources, in the case of enlistment and deployments in the case of reenlistment, and demographics. Enlistment and attrition models are estimated for the Army and our reenlistment model approach is twofold. The Army has greatly increased its use of reenlistment bonuses since FY 2004, and we begin by providing an in-depth history of the many changes in its reenlistment bonus program during this decade. We follow this with two independent analyses of the effect of bonuses on Army reenlistment. As we show, the results from the models are consistent, lending credence to the robustness of the estimates. One approach is extended to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, to obtain estimates of the effect of bonuses on reenlistment for all services. We also estimate an enlistment model for the Navy. The estimated models are used to address questions about the cost-effectiveness of bonuses and their effects in offsetting other factors that might adversely affect recruiting and retention, such as changes in the civilian economy and frequent deployments"--P. iii.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 29
Book Description
This review was conducted to determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) is effectively managing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program. The specific objectives were to (1) ascertain whether reenlistment bonuses were being paid to enlisted servicemembers in skill categories that were not experiencing significant personnel shortages or skills that were also receiving separation incentives and (2) assess the oversight of the program by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OsD). The SRB program is one means DOD is using to achieve its force manning objectives as the services downsize. The General Accounting Office has previously reported that the services have been successful in maintaining high aggregate personnel levels throughout the drawdown. This report looks below aggregate personnel levels and focuses on personnel levels within occupational specialties. The SRB program is authorized by 37 U.S.C. 308 to help maintain an adequate level of experienced and qualified enlisted personnel. The program authorizes bonuses of up to $45,000 to personnel in critical skills who have between 21 months and 14 years of active duty service and who reenlist or extend their reenlistments for at least 3 years. The intent of the program, according to DOD, is to focus reenlistment incentives on critical skills that are in short supply and have high training costs. (KAR) p. 2.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 78
Book Description
A logit model was applied to estimate the effect of selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs) on the retention rates of Army Soldiers. The model was estimated separately by occupational group and by first (zone A), second (zone B) and third term (zone C) reenlistment decisions. An "annualized cost of leaving" (ACOL) variable was constructed to estimate the net financial returns to reenlisting in the Army compared to leaving for the civilian sector. The model was estimated using data on actual reenlistments from the period FYl99O tlirough FY2OOO. The effects of SRBs on reenlistments at Zones A, B, and C were estimated at three levels of occupational aggregation-all Army, CMF, and MOS. After out-of-sample testing, we re-specified and re-estimated the model. In general, the results for Zone A at all levels of occupational aggregation indicate that reenlistment bonuses have a positive and statistically significant effect on Zone A reenlistments. The magnitude of the effect varied by occupation, but a one-level increase in SRB at Zone A typically increases the reenlistment rate by three to seven percentage points, depending upon the occupation. The results for Zone B are also solid at both the CMF and MOS levels. Results for Zone C, where reenlistment rates are typically very high, were reasonably solid but not as good as the Zone A and B results. We were unable to obtain positive, statistically significant ACOL parameter estimates for a small number of occupation groups. Statistically significant effects for demographic control variables and labor market conditions were also obtained.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 63
Book Description
As part of a larger research project examining the behavioral effects of changes in selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) levels on reenlistments, ARI designed and developed a modeling system that permits users to project changes in the number of SRB takers and in program cost for alternative SRB plans. This report provides a functional description of the system's underlying algorithms and also includes user documentation for the two system components - the web-based Army SRB Model and the Data Utility.
Author: Beth J. Asch
Author: Beth J. Asch
Author: 
Author: 
Author: 
Author: Sheldon E. Haber
Author: 
Author: Beth J. Asch
Author: 
Author: 
Author: