Author: Michael A. Crew Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 1461527821 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 222
Book Description
This book is based on two seminars held at Rutgers on October 22, 1993, and May 6, 1994 entitled `Incentive Regulation for Public Utilities'. These contributions by leading scholars and practitioners represent some of the best new research in public utility economics and include topics such as the theory of incentive regulation, dynamic pricing, transfer pricing, issues in law and economics, pricing priority service, and energy utility resource planning.
Author: Kurt A. Strasser Publisher: Praeger ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 224
Book Description
This book proposes a new approach to the government regulation of utilities. Arguing that traditional command-and-control regulation does not encourage efficient performance, Strasser and Kohler advocate the use of an incentive-based regulatory system and offer a practical, realistic strategy for the successful implementation of such plans within the context of utility regulation. The analysis is supported by a comprehensive survey of the relevant legal materials, an overview of the literature on organization theory and institutional economics, and a survey of the latest thinking on how incentives can most effectively be paid. Strasser and Kohler begin by identifying problems associated with current regulatory techniques, demonstrating that disincentives are often built into the regulatory system. When that system has tried incentives, the authors show they have been applied in an ad hoc manner, further exacerbating the problem. In presenting the case for incentive-based regulation, the authors review the history of comprehensive incentive plans, look at what organization theory can teach us about using incentives as a regulatory strategy, and explore the effective use of incentive compensation by nonregulated companies. Strasser and Kohler then develop a strategy for implementing incentive plans in regulated utilities, showing that, in order to work, the plans must include the installation of clearly defined bonuses and penalties, specific standards of performance, the payment of bonuses to managers rather than shareholders, and reliable and complete measures of company performance. Policymakers, economists, public utility regulators, and attorneys involved in the complex arena of utility regulation will find Regulating Utilities with Management Incentives indispensable reading.
Author: Michael A. Crew Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 1461535867 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 169
Book Description
This book is distilled from articles presented at two seminars held at Rutgers -- The State University of New Jersey on October 25, 1991, and May 1, 1992, entitled 'Economic Innovations in Public Utility Regulations'. These contributions represent the best new research on various topics in public utility regulation, including topics in antitrust law, the environmental impact of public utility regulation, incentive regulation, price-cap regulation, and contractual relationships.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 43
Book Description
In contemplating a regulatory approach, the challenge for regulators is to develop a model that provides incentives for utilities to engage in socially desirable behavior. In this primer, we provide guidance on this process by discussing (1) various models of economic regulation, (2) problems implementing these models, and (3) the types of incentives that various models of regulation provide electric utilities. We address five regulatory models in depth. They include cost-of-service regulation in which prudently incurred costs are reflected dollar-for-dollar in rates and four performance-based models: (1) price-cap regulation, in which ceilings are placed on the average price that a utility can charge its customers; (2) revenue-cap regulation, in which a ceiling is placed on revenues; (3) rate-of-return bandwidth regulation, in which a utilitys̀ rates are adjusted if earnings fall outside a {open_quotes}band{close_quotes} around equity returns; and (4) targeted incentives, in which a utility is given incentives to improve specific components of its operations. The primary difference between cost-of-service and performance-based approaches is the latter sever the tie between costs and prices. A sixth, {open_quotes}mixed approach{close_quotes} combines two or more of the five basic ones. In the recent past, a common mixed approach has been to combine targeted incentives with cost-of-service regulation. A common example is utilities that are subject to cost-of-service regulation are given added incentives to increase the efficiency of troubled electric-generating units.
Author: Gregory B. Enholm Publisher: Public Utilities Reports ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 516
Book Description
Learn from this collection of thought-provoking commentary on change and electric regulatory reform from executives, state regulators, and federal commissioners in the regulatory community. Plus, perspectives from other players -- the utilities governed by these regulators, the financial community (rating agencies), independent power producers, and public power.
Author: Nancy L. Rose Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 022613816X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 619
Book Description
The past thirty years have witnessed a transformation of government economic intervention in broad segments of industry throughout the world. Many industries historically subject to economic price and entry controls have been largely deregulated, including natural gas, trucking, airlines, and commercial banking. However, recent concerns about market power in restructured electricity markets, airline industry instability amid chronic financial stress, and the challenges created by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which allowed commercial banks to participate in investment banking, have led to calls for renewed market intervention. Economic Regulation and Its Reform collects research by a group of distinguished scholars who explore these and other issues surrounding government economic intervention. Determining the consequences of such intervention requires a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of imperfect regulation. Moreover, government interventions may take a variety of forms, from relatively nonintrusive performance-based regulations to more aggressive antitrust and competition policies and barriers to entry. This volume introduces the key issues surrounding economic regulation, provides an assessment of the economic effects of regulatory reforms over the past three decades, and examines how these insights bear on some of today’s most significant concerns in regulatory policy.
Author: Glenn Blackmon Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 1461527066 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 138
Book Description
The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm's costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The "regulatory problem" was reduced to a mere pricing problem: the regulator's goal was to align price with marginal cost, subject to the constraint that revenues must cover costs. Elegant and important insights ensued. The most important was that regulation was inevitably a struggle to achieve second-best outcomes. (Ramsey pricing was a splendid example. ) Reality proved harsh to regulatory theory. The fmn's costs are by no means known to the regulator. At best, the regulator may know how much is currently spent to provide services, but hardly what costs would be if the fmn vigorously pursued effIciency. Even if the current cost curve were known to the regulator, technologies change so swiftly that today's costs are a very poor indicator of tomorrow's, and those are the costs that will determine the fIrm's future decisions. With the burgeoning attention to information considerations and game theory in economics, the regulator's problem of eliciting host information about cost has received considerable attention. In most cases, however, it has been in context that are both static and stylized; such analyses rarely capture many of the essential elements of real world regulatory issues. This volume represents a fresh approach. It reflects Glenn Blackmon's twin strengths, a keen analytic mind and important experience in the regulatory arena.