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Author: Sreekumar R. Bhaskaran Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
In spite of the fact that many durable products are sold through dealers, the literature has largely ignored the issue of how product durability affects the interactions between a manufacturer and her dealers. We seek to fill this gap by considering a durable goods manufacturer that uses independent dealers to get her product to consumers. In contrast to much of the literature, we specifically consider the possibility that if the manufacturer sells her product, then the dealers can either sell or lease it to the final consumer. One of our more interesting findings is that, when the level of competition among dealers is high, the manufacturer prefers to lease the product to her dealers, which forces them to lease to consumers. This complements existing results that show that when suppliers of durable goods interact directly with consumers, selling is the dominant strategy for high levels of competitive intensity. In addition, our results help to explain differences in the selling / leasing policies that are observed in the office equipment and automobile industries.
Author: Sreekumar R. Bhaskaran Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
In spite of the fact that many durable products are sold through dealers, the literature has largely ignored the issue of how product durability affects the interactions between a manufacturer and her dealers. We seek to fill this gap by considering a durable goods manufacturer that uses independent dealers to get her product to consumers. In contrast to much of the literature, we specifically consider the possibility that if the manufacturer sells her product, then the dealers can either sell or lease it to the final consumer. One of our more interesting findings is that, when the level of competition among dealers is high, the manufacturer prefers to lease the product to her dealers, which forces them to lease to consumers. This complements existing results that show that when suppliers of durable goods interact directly with consumers, selling is the dominant strategy for high levels of competitive intensity. In addition, our results help to explain differences in the selling / leasing policies that are observed in the office equipment and automobile industries.
Author: Sreekumar R. Bhaskaran Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We explore the interactions between channel structure and mode of operations (leasing versus selling) and their implications for a manufacturer's willingness to invest in making her product more durable. Using a centralized manufacturer who leases her product as a point of reference, we find that an isolated change in either the channel structure (centralized to decentralized), or the operational mode (leasing to selling) can decrease the manufacturer's willingness to provide durability. However, if combined, these two changes together may strengthen the manufacturer's willingness to invest in durability. Consequently, a manufacturer who sells through an intermediary may invest more in durability than one who leases directly to end consumers. This result challenges the conventional wisdom in two different paradigms. First, from the perspective that durability is a dimension of quality, it challenges the conventional view that decentralization will decrease a manufacturer's incentive to provide a high quality product. Second, from the perspective of the externality that is created when a firm sells a durable product to strategic consumers who anticipate declining prices, it challenges the conventional view that a manufacturer who leases will provide more durability than one who sells.
Author: Vera Tilson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
In durable goods markets, such as those for automobiles or computers, the coexistence of selling and leasing is common as is the existence of both corporate and individual consumers. Leases to the corporate consumers affect the price of used goods on the second-hand market which in turn affect the buying and leasing behavior of individual consumers. The setting of prices (or volumes) for sale and lease to individual and corporate consumers is a complicated problem for manufacturers. We consider a manufacturer who concurrently sells and leases a finitely durable good to both individual and corporate consumers. The interaction between the manufacturer and consumers is modeled as a dynamic sequential game, where each player seeks to maximize its own payoff over an infinite horizon. We study how the corporate channel and substitutability of new goods and used goods affect the manufacturer's pricing decisions, consumer behavior and social welfare in the retail market. Making a number of simplifying assumptions including two-period lifetime for the finitely durable goods, we show that all individual consumers follow Markov Perfect consumption strategies and based on their individual willingness to pay choose one of four two-period product bundles. They either (1) lease a new product every period, (2) repeatedly buying a new good and use it for two periods, (3) always buy used goods, and (4) do not participate in the market. We show that when used goods are poor substitutes for new goods, as the manufacturer increases her leasing volume in the corporate channel, she optimally raises her leasing price to individual consumers, but may not necessarily adjust the selling price of new goods. As the retail lease price rises, retail consumers that prefer leasing experience a loss in surplus. However, aggregate consumer surplus increases with increase in corporate leasing. On the other hand, when used goods are close substitutes for new goods, with increased corporate leasing, the manufacturer stops leasing to individual consumers and raises retail sales prices.
Author: Charles A. Ingene Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: 0857938606 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 599
Book Description
Distribution channels are the most complex element of the marketing mix to fully grasp and to profitably manage. In this Handbook the authors present cutting-edge research on channel management and design from analytical, conceptual, and empirical perspectives. The breadth of this Handbook makes it appropriate for use in a doctoral course on distribution channels, or as a knowledge-broadening resource for faculty and researchers who wish to understand types of channels research that are outside the scope of their own approach to distribution.
Author: Philip Kotler Publisher: Pearson UK ISBN: 1292248467 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 1199
Book Description
The classic Marketing Management is an undisputed global best-seller – an encyclopedia of marketing considered by many as the authoritative book on the subject.
Author: Ilkyeong Moon Publisher: Springer ISBN: 3319997076 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 518
Book Description
The two-volume set IFIP AICT 535 and 536 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the International IFIP WG 5.7 Conference on Advances in Production Management Systems, APMS 2018, held in Seoul, South Korea, in August 2018. The 129 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 149 submissions. They are organized in the following topical sections: lean and green manufacturing; operations management in engineer-to-order manufacturing; product-service systems, customer-driven innovation and value co-creation; collaborative networks; smart production for mass customization; global supply chain management; knowledge based production planning and control; knowledge based engineering; intelligent diagnostics and maintenance solutions for smart manufacturing; service engineering based on smart manufacturing capabilities; smart city interoperability and cross-platform implementation; manufacturing performance management in smart factories; industry 4.0 - digital twin; industry 4.0 - smart factory; and industry 4.0 - collaborative cyber-physical production and human systems.
Author: Preyas S. Desai Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
A large literature in economics and marketing studies the problem of manufacturer's designing contracts that give a retailer appropriate incentives to make decisions that are optimal from the manufacturer's point of view (see, for example, Spengler 1950, Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin 1983, Lal 1990, Rao and Srinivasan 1995, Desai 1997, among others). An important result from this literature is that the manufacturer can coordinate retail price decisions by choosing a two-part tariff in which the wholesale price equals the manufacturer's marginal cost and the fixed fee extracts all the rents from the retailer. In other words, the manufacturer sells the firm to the retailer for the fixed fee and, thus, eliminates the double-marginalization problem. Although this result is well established for non-durables, researchers have not analyzed the coordination issue for durable goods manufacturers who have the added complexity of competition from used goods in secondary markets. In this paper, we show how the coordination problem for a durable goods manufacturer is fundamentally different from the traditional coordination problem of a non-durables manufacturer. In particular, the durable goods manufacturer has to solve not only the coordination problem but also the time-consistency problem (see, for example, Coase 1972, Bulow 1982, Purohit 1995). Our objectives in this paper are to investigate whether or not the insights from the channel coordination literature, that has developed principally with non-durable goods in mind, are also applicable to durable goods. In order to do this, we develop a dynamic, two-period model in which a manufacturer sells its products to a retailer who sells the product to consumers. Products sold in the first period become used goods in the second period and compete with sales of new units. Starting from consumer utilities, we derive inverse demand functions for new and used goods and consider a number of different contracts between the manufacturer and the retailer. We start with a simple contract in which the manufacturer offers a wholesale price for a period at the beginning of that period. As one would expect, this contract does not solve either the channel coordination problem or the time-consistency problem. We then consider a number of two-part tariff contracts. Given the well-established results from the existing channel coordination literature, we begin with a contract in which the manufacturer offers per-period two-part tariffs in which all wholesale prices are set at marginal cost. We find that not only does this contract fail to achieve channel coordination, but the retailer sells a higher quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell. This is in contrast to the traditional double marginalization problem in which the retailer sells a lower quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell. We then allow the wholesale prices to be different from marginal costs. We show that using this more general two-part tariff contract, the manufacturer can achieve channel coordination. That is, the total channel profit is the same as the profit of an integrated seller. However, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the marginal cost. Next, we consider a contract in which the manufacturer uses a single fixed fee, announced at the beginning of the first period. The per-period wholesale prices are still at the marginal cost level in this contract. This contract is identical to "selling the firm to the retailer" at the price of the fixed fee. Here we find that the contract can achieve channel coordination. However, the contract is not an equilibrium solution. In particular, the manufacturer increases wholesale prices to above marginal cost levels. Although some of the contracts above solve the double marginalization problem, none of them mitigates the time consistency problem. In order to solve both these problems, the contract must yield total channel profit equal to an integrated renter's profit. Because the renter does not have a problem with time consistency, an integrated renter earns the highest profits in a durable goods channel. We derive a contract that solves both of these problems. In this contract, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and two per-period wholesale prices, both of which turn out to be strictly above the marginal cost. Interestingly, with this contract, the manufacturer makes more money by selling through the retailer rather than selling directly to consumers. We contribute to the coordination literature by examining coordination issues in a dynamic, durable goods context and identifying a new coordination problem - unlike the traditional coordination models, a durable goods manufacturer may have to provide the retailer incentives to sell less rather than to sell more. Clearly, the traditional "selling the firm to the retailer," approach does not solve this new problem. We also contribute to the durable goods literature by showing how a durable goods manufacturer can sell its product and solve its time consistency problem. Effectively, this allows the manufacturer to earn the same profits as it would get if it could commit to prices or if it could rent its product. When committing to individual consumers or renting can only be achieved through additional costs, our solution is the optimal strategy for a durable goods manufacturer.
Author: Barton A Weitz Publisher: SAGE ISBN: 9781412921206 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 618
Book Description
The 'Handbook of Marketing' presents a major retrospective and prospective overview of the field of marketing when many of the traditional boundaries and domains within marketing have been subject to change.
Author: Miltiadis Chalikias Publisher: MDPI ISBN: 3039433806 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 182
Book Description
This book, Applications of Operational Research and Mathematical Models in Management, includes all the papers published in the Mathematics Special Issue with the same title. All the published papers are of high quality and were subjected to rigorous peer review. Mathematics is included in the Science Citation Index (Web of Science), and its current Impact Factor is 1.747. The papers in this book deal with on R&D performance models, methods for ranking the perspectives and indicators of a balance scorecard, robust optimization model applications, integrated production and distribution problem solving, demand functions, supply chain games, probabilistic optimization and profit research, coordinated techniques for order preference, robustness approaches in bank capital optimization, and hybrid methods for tourism demand forecasting. All the papers included contribute to the development of research.
Author: Houbing Song Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 3030727955 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 780
Book Description
This two-volume set constitutes the refereed post-conference proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Simulation Tools and Techniques, SIMUTools 2020, held in Guiyang, China, in August 2020. Due to COVID-19 pandemic the conference was held virtually. The 125 revised full papers were carefully selected from 354 submissions. The papers focus on simulation methods, simulation techniques, simulation software, simulation performance, modeling formalisms, simulation verification and widely used frameworks.
Author: Sreekumar R. Bhaskaran
Author: Sreekumar R. Bhaskaran
Author: Sreekumar R. Bhaskaran
Author: Vera Tilson
Author: Charles A. Ingene
Author: Philip Kotler
Author: Ilkyeong Moon
Author: Preyas S. Desai
Author: Barton A Weitz
Author: Miltiadis Chalikias
Author: Houbing Song