Author: David Bushnell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 136
Book Description
History of the Office of Research Analyses
The History of CIA's Office of Strategic Research, 1967-81
Author: Robert Vickers
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781782669432
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description
Insightful study from the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. Provides a detailed history of the Office of Strategic Research from establishment in 1967 to abolition in 1981.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781782669432
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description
Insightful study from the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. Provides a detailed history of the Office of Strategic Research from establishment in 1967 to abolition in 1981.
Foreign Intelligence
Author: Barry Kātz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 278
Book Description
Much has been written about the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)--the forerunner of the CIA--and the exploits of its agents during World War II. Virtually unknown, however, is the work of the extraordinary community of scholars who were handpicked by "Wild Bill" Donovan and William L. Langer and recruited for wartime service in the OSS's Research and Analysis Branch (R&A). Known to insiders as the "Chairborne Division," the faculty of R&A was drawn from a dozen social science disciplines and challenged to apply its academic skills in the struggle against fascism. Its mandate: to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence about the enemy. Foreign Intelligence is the first comprehensive history of this extraordinary behind-the-scenes group. The R&A Branch assembled scholars of widely divergent traditions and practices--Americans and recent European émigrés; philosophers, historians, and economists; regionalists and functionalists; Marxists and positivists--all engaged in the heady task of translating the abstractions of academic discourse into practical politics. Drawing on extensive, newly declassified archival sources, Barry M. Katz traces the careers of the key players in R&A, whose assessments helped to shape U.S. policy both during and after the war. He shows how these scholars, who included some of the most influential theorists of our time, laid the foundation of modern intelligence work. Their reports introduced the theories and methods of academic discourse into the workings of government, and when they returned to their universities after the war, their wartime experience forever transformed the world of scholarship. Authoritative, probing, and wholly original, Foreign Intelligence not only sheds new light on this overlooked aspect of the U.S. intelligence record, it also offers a startling perspective on the history of intellectual thought in the twentieth century.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 278
Book Description
Much has been written about the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)--the forerunner of the CIA--and the exploits of its agents during World War II. Virtually unknown, however, is the work of the extraordinary community of scholars who were handpicked by "Wild Bill" Donovan and William L. Langer and recruited for wartime service in the OSS's Research and Analysis Branch (R&A). Known to insiders as the "Chairborne Division," the faculty of R&A was drawn from a dozen social science disciplines and challenged to apply its academic skills in the struggle against fascism. Its mandate: to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence about the enemy. Foreign Intelligence is the first comprehensive history of this extraordinary behind-the-scenes group. The R&A Branch assembled scholars of widely divergent traditions and practices--Americans and recent European émigrés; philosophers, historians, and economists; regionalists and functionalists; Marxists and positivists--all engaged in the heady task of translating the abstractions of academic discourse into practical politics. Drawing on extensive, newly declassified archival sources, Barry M. Katz traces the careers of the key players in R&A, whose assessments helped to shape U.S. policy both during and after the war. He shows how these scholars, who included some of the most influential theorists of our time, laid the foundation of modern intelligence work. Their reports introduced the theories and methods of academic discourse into the workings of government, and when they returned to their universities after the war, their wartime experience forever transformed the world of scholarship. Authoritative, probing, and wholly original, Foreign Intelligence not only sheds new light on this overlooked aspect of the U.S. intelligence record, it also offers a startling perspective on the history of intellectual thought in the twentieth century.
History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. 1, 1942-1962
Author: Charles R. Shrader
Publisher: Department of the Army
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Operations research (OR) emerged during World War II as an important means of assisting civilian and military leaders in making scienti?cally sound improvements in the design and performance of weapons and equipment. OR techniques were soon extended to address questions of tactics and strategy during the war and, after the war, to matters of high-level political and economic policy. Until now, the story of why and how the U.S. Army used OR has remained relatively obscure, surviving only in a few scattered o?cial documents, in the memories of those who participated, and in a number of notes and articles that have been published about selected topics on military operations research. However, none of those materials amounts to a comprehensive, coherent history. In this, the ? rst of three planned volumes, Dr. Charles R. Shrader has for the ?rst time drawn together the scattered threads and woven them into a well-focused historical narrative that describes the evolution of OR in the U.S. Army, from its origins in World War II to the early 1960s. He has done an admirable job of ferreting out the surviving evidence, shaping it into an understandable narrative, and placing it within the context of the overall development of American military institutions. Often working with only sparse and incomplete materials, he has managed to provide a comprehensive history of OR in the U.S. Army that o?ers important insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth of Army OR organizations, the use (and abuse) of OR techniques, and, of course, the many important contributions that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and improvement of the Army since 1942. In this volume, Dr. Shrader carries the story up to 1962, the beginning of the McNamara era and of America’s long involvement in Vietnam. The subsequent volumes will cover Army OR during the McNamara era; its application in support of military operations in Vietnam; and its significant contributions to the Army’s post–Vietnam recovery and reorganization, ultimately leading to a victory (after only 100 hours of combat) in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the emergence of the U.S. Army as second to none in modern weaponry, tactical prowess, and strategic vision.
Publisher: Department of the Army
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Operations research (OR) emerged during World War II as an important means of assisting civilian and military leaders in making scienti?cally sound improvements in the design and performance of weapons and equipment. OR techniques were soon extended to address questions of tactics and strategy during the war and, after the war, to matters of high-level political and economic policy. Until now, the story of why and how the U.S. Army used OR has remained relatively obscure, surviving only in a few scattered o?cial documents, in the memories of those who participated, and in a number of notes and articles that have been published about selected topics on military operations research. However, none of those materials amounts to a comprehensive, coherent history. In this, the ? rst of three planned volumes, Dr. Charles R. Shrader has for the ?rst time drawn together the scattered threads and woven them into a well-focused historical narrative that describes the evolution of OR in the U.S. Army, from its origins in World War II to the early 1960s. He has done an admirable job of ferreting out the surviving evidence, shaping it into an understandable narrative, and placing it within the context of the overall development of American military institutions. Often working with only sparse and incomplete materials, he has managed to provide a comprehensive history of OR in the U.S. Army that o?ers important insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth of Army OR organizations, the use (and abuse) of OR techniques, and, of course, the many important contributions that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and improvement of the Army since 1942. In this volume, Dr. Shrader carries the story up to 1962, the beginning of the McNamara era and of America’s long involvement in Vietnam. The subsequent volumes will cover Army OR during the McNamara era; its application in support of military operations in Vietnam; and its significant contributions to the Army’s post–Vietnam recovery and reorganization, ultimately leading to a victory (after only 100 hours of combat) in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the emergence of the U.S. Army as second to none in modern weaponry, tactical prowess, and strategic vision.
History of operations research in the United States Army, V. I: 1942-62
Author:
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160873379
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Operations research (OR) emerged during World War II as an important means of assisting civilian and military leaders in making scienti?cally sound improvements in the design and performance of weapons and equipment. OR techniques were soon extended to address questions of tactics and strategy during the war and, after the war, to matters of high-level political and economic policy. Until now, the story of why and how the U.S. Army used OR has remained relatively obscure, surviving only in a few scattered o?cial documents, in the memories of those who participated, and in a number of notes and articles that have been published about selected topics on military operations research. However, none of those materials amounts to a comprehensive, coherent history. In this, the ? rst of three planned volumes, Dr. Charles R. Shrader has for the ?rst time drawn together the scattered threads and woven them into a well-focused historical narrative that describes the evolution of OR in the U.S. Army, from its origins in World War II to the early 1960s. He has done an admirable job of ferreting out the surviving evidence, shaping it into an understandable narrative, and placing it within the context of the overall development of American military institutions. Often working with only sparse and incomplete materials, he has managed to provide a comprehensive history of OR in the U.S. Army that o?ers important insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth of Army OR organizations, the use (and abuse) of OR techniques, and, of course, the many important contributions that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and improvement of the Army since 1942. In this volume, Dr. Shrader carries the story up to 1962, the beginning of the McNamara era and of America’s long involvement in Vietnam. The subsequent volumes will cover Army OR during the McNamara era; its application in support of military operations in Vietnam; and its significant contributions to the Army’s post–Vietnam recovery and reorganization, ultimately leading to a victory (after only 100 hours of combat) in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the emergence of the U.S. Army as second to none in modern weaponry, tactical prowess, and strategic vision.
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160873379
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Operations research (OR) emerged during World War II as an important means of assisting civilian and military leaders in making scienti?cally sound improvements in the design and performance of weapons and equipment. OR techniques were soon extended to address questions of tactics and strategy during the war and, after the war, to matters of high-level political and economic policy. Until now, the story of why and how the U.S. Army used OR has remained relatively obscure, surviving only in a few scattered o?cial documents, in the memories of those who participated, and in a number of notes and articles that have been published about selected topics on military operations research. However, none of those materials amounts to a comprehensive, coherent history. In this, the ? rst of three planned volumes, Dr. Charles R. Shrader has for the ?rst time drawn together the scattered threads and woven them into a well-focused historical narrative that describes the evolution of OR in the U.S. Army, from its origins in World War II to the early 1960s. He has done an admirable job of ferreting out the surviving evidence, shaping it into an understandable narrative, and placing it within the context of the overall development of American military institutions. Often working with only sparse and incomplete materials, he has managed to provide a comprehensive history of OR in the U.S. Army that o?ers important insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth of Army OR organizations, the use (and abuse) of OR techniques, and, of course, the many important contributions that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and improvement of the Army since 1942. In this volume, Dr. Shrader carries the story up to 1962, the beginning of the McNamara era and of America’s long involvement in Vietnam. The subsequent volumes will cover Army OR during the McNamara era; its application in support of military operations in Vietnam; and its significant contributions to the Army’s post–Vietnam recovery and reorganization, ultimately leading to a victory (after only 100 hours of combat) in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the emergence of the U.S. Army as second to none in modern weaponry, tactical prowess, and strategic vision.
History of operations research in the United States Army
Author: Charles R. Shrader
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 380
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 380
Book Description
History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. 2: 1961-1973 (Paperback)
Author:
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160872853
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 400
Book Description
NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price This second of three volumes on the history of operations research identifies, describes, and evaluates the ideas, people, organizations, and events that influenced the development of ORSA in the Army from the inauguration of President Kennedy in 1961 to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973. Related products: History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. I: 1942-62 -- Print Paperback format --can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00433-0 History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. 3, 1973-1995 --Print Paperback format -- can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00473-9"
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160872853
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 400
Book Description
NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price This second of three volumes on the history of operations research identifies, describes, and evaluates the ideas, people, organizations, and events that influenced the development of ORSA in the Army from the inauguration of President Kennedy in 1961 to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973. Related products: History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. I: 1942-62 -- Print Paperback format --can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00433-0 History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. 3, 1973-1995 --Print Paperback format -- can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00473-9"
History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The test of War, 1950-1953
Author: Alfred Goldberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 752
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 752
Book Description