Game Theory and Mutual Misunderstanding PDF Download

Author: Mamoru Kaneko
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9783540222958
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 264

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Book Description
This book consists of five acts and two interludes, which are all written as dialogues between three main characters and other supporting characters. Each act discusses the epistemological, institutional and methodological foundations of game theory and economics, while using various stories and examples. A featured aspect of those discussions is that many forms of mutual misunderstanding are involved in social situations as well as in those fields themselves. One Japanese traditional comic story called the Konnyaku Mondo is representative and gives hints of how our thought is constrained by incorrect beliefs. Each dialogue critically examines extant theories and common misunderstanding in game theory and economics in order to find possible future developments of those fields.

Author: Quiming Huang
Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN: 953307132X
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 190

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Book Description
Game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework that can accommodate the preferences and requirements of various stakeholders in a given process as regards the outcome of the process. The chapters' contents in this book will give an impetus to the application of game theory to the modeling and analysis of modern communication, biology engineering, transportation, etc...

Author: Roger A Mccain
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814417416
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 236

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Book Description
This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.

Author: John Cirace
Publisher: Lexington Books
ISBN: 1498549098
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 393

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Book Description
This book considers three relationships: law and economics; economics and game theory; and game theory and law. Economists teach lawyers that economic principles cut across and integrate seemingly different legal subjects such as contracts, torts, and property. Correspondingly, lawyers teach economists that legal rationality is a separate and distinct decision-making process that can be formalized by behavioral rules that are parallel to and comparable with the behavioral rules of economic rationality, that efficiency often must be constrained by legal goals such as equal protection of the laws, due process, and horizontal and distributional equity, and that the general case methodology of economics vs. the hard case methodology of law for determining the truth or falsity of economic theories and theorems sometimes conflict. Economics and Game Theory: Law and economics books focus on economic analysis of judges’ decisions in common law cases and have been mostly limited to contracts, torts, property, criminal law, and suit and settlement. There is usually no discussion of the many areas of law that require cooperative action such as is needed to provide economic infrastructure, control public “bad” type externalities, and make legislation. Game theory provides the bridge between competitive markets and the missing discussion of cooperative action in law and economics. How? Competitive markets are examples (subset) of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, which explains the conflict between individual self-interested behavior and cooperation both in economic markets and in legislative bodies and demonstrates the need for social infrastructure and regulation of pollution and global warming. Game Theory and Law: Lawsuits usually involve litigation between two parties, not the myriad participants in markets, so the assumption of self-interest constrained by markets does not carry over to legal disputes involving one-on-one bargaining in which the law gives one party superior bargaining power. Game theory models predict the effect of different legal institutions, rights, and rules on the outcome of such bargaining. Game theory also has a natural four-model framework which is used in this book to analyze the law and economics of civil obligation, which consists of torts (negligence), contracts, and unjust enrichment.

Author: Alessandro Citanna
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540271929
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 278

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Book Description
In the area of dynamic economics, David Cass’s work has spawned a number of important lines of research, including the study of dynamic general equilibrium theory, the concept of sunspot equilibria, and general equilibrium theory when markets are incomplete. Based on these contributions, this volume contains new developments in the field, written by Cass's students and co-authors.

Author: Vesna Pasetta
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540277846
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 248

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Book Description
This is an introduction to the foundations of economic property rights t- ory (EPRT). In this volume, a ?rst step in the EPRT research program, rules concerningeconomicpropertyrights(e. p. r. s),entrepreneurialagreements,and enterprises are discussed. Introduced concept of e. p. r. s is an extension of the traditional concept of pairing of residual rights of control and residual rights of returns in the economic theory. Its importance in economics is generated fromageneralimpossibilityofmakingacompletecontract,concerninge. p. r. s, for any nontrivial economic transaction. The volume o?ers a theoretical - tension of mathematical economics, applying recent results of Hopf algebras, quasi-Hopf algebras, representation theory, theory of categories, and defor- tion theories, in looking for suitable mathematical methodology of economic property rights theories and foundations of general theory of economic agr- ments. The idea is to construct a kind of mathematical application in which any fundamental formal entity and/or operation has an empirical economic interpretation. This approach is seen as a way to cope with an extreme c- plexity of economic phenomena under consideration and requests for precise formulationofmodelswheremeaningfulanswersandsolutionsofproblemsare only those which are obtained rigorously. The proposed extensions in ma- ematical economics and property rights theory are to provide rich enough foundations to follow complexity of economic property rights in the exact way, and to identify where there is an appropriate method providing a- quate solution, and also to ?nd problems where in general there is no such methodology.

Author: Talbot J. Taylor
Publisher: Duke University Press
ISBN: 9780822312499
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 284

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Book Description
Do others understand what we say or write? Do we understand them? Theorists of language and interpretation claim to be more concerned with questions about "what" we understand and "how" we understand, rather than with the logically prior question "whether" we understand each other. An affirmative answer to the latter question is apparently taken for granted. However, in Mutual Misunderstanding, Talbot J. Taylor shows that the sceptical doubts about communicational understanding do in fact have a profoundly important, if as yet unacknowledged, function in the construction of theories of language and interpretation. Mutual Misundertanding thus presents a strikingly original analysis of the rhetorical patterns underlying Western linguistic thought, as exemplified in the works of John Locke, Jacques Derrida, Gottlob Frege, Jonathan Culler, Noam Chomsky, Ferdinand de Saussure, H. Paul Grice, Michael Dummet, Stanley Fish, Alfred Schutz, Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Harold Garfinkel, and others. This analysis reveals how, by the combined effect of appeals to "commonsense" and anxieties about implications of relativism, scepticism has a determining role in the discursive development of a number of the intellectual disciplines making up the "human sciences" today, including critical theory, literary hermeneutics, philosophy of language and logic, communication theory, discourse and conversation analysis, pragmatics, stylistics, and linguistics. Consequently, this provocative study will be of value to readers from a wide variety of disciplinary backgrounds.

Author: Katri K. Sieberg
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540277625
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 213

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Book Description
An analysis of criminal behavior from the perspectives of rational choice theory leading to suggestions for a criminal policy. Previous edition sold 900 copies world wide since its release in June 2001.

Author: Gabriele Camera
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540295003
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 268

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Book Description
Assembles theoretical contributions to monetary theory, banking and finance. This book includes papers spanning themes from monetary policy to the optimal design of financial systems, and from the study of the causes of financial crises to payment systems design. It serves as a reference to researchers interested in the study of financial systems.

Author: Christian Schultz
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540281614
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 380

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Book Description
Competition and efficiency is at the core of economic theory. This volume collects papers of leading scholars, which extend the conventional general equilibrium model in important ways: Efficiency and price regulation are studied when markets are incomplete and existence of equilibria in such settings is proven under very general preference assumptions. The model is extended to include geographical location choice, a commodity space incorporating manufacturing imprecision and preferences for club-membership, schools and firms. Inefficiencies arising from household externalities or group membership are evaluated. Core equivalence is shown for bargaining economies. The theory of risk aversion is extended and the relation between risk taking and wealth is experimentally investigated. Other topics include determinacy in OLG with cash-in-advance constraints, income distribution and democracy in OLG, learning in OLG and in games, optimal pricing of derivative securities, the impact of heterogeneity at the individual level for aggregate consumption, and adaptive contracting in view of uncertainty.