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Author: Joseph R. Mason Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 56
Book Description
This paper provides the first comprehensive econometric analysis of the causes of bank distress during the Depression. We assemble bank-level data for Fed member banks, and combine those data with county-level, state-level, and national-level economic characteristics to capture cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the fundamental determinants of bank failure. We find that fundamentals explain most of the incidence of bank failure, and argue that quot;contagionquot; or quot;liquidity crisesquot; were a relatively unimportant influence on bank failure risk prior to 1933. At the national level, we find that the first two banking crises identified by Friedman and Schwartz in 1930 and 1931 are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or with changes in the importance of liquidity measures for forecasting bank failures. The third banking crisis they identify is a more ambiguous case, but even if one views it as a bona fide liquidity crisis, the size of the contagion effect could not have been very large. The last banking crisis they identify - at the beginning of 1933 - is associated with important, unexplained increases in bank failure risk. We also investigate the potential role of regional or local contagion and illiquidity for promoting bank failure and find some evidence in support of such effects, but these are of small importance in the aggregate.
Author: Joseph R. Mason Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 56
Book Description
This paper provides the first comprehensive econometric analysis of the causes of bank distress during the Depression. We assemble bank-level data for Fed member banks, and combine those data with county-level, state-level, and national-level economic characteristics to capture cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the fundamental determinants of bank failure. We find that fundamentals explain most of the incidence of bank failure, and argue that quot;contagionquot; or quot;liquidity crisesquot; were a relatively unimportant influence on bank failure risk prior to 1933. At the national level, we find that the first two banking crises identified by Friedman and Schwartz in 1930 and 1931 are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or with changes in the importance of liquidity measures for forecasting bank failures. The third banking crisis they identify is a more ambiguous case, but even if one views it as a bona fide liquidity crisis, the size of the contagion effect could not have been very large. The last banking crisis they identify - at the beginning of 1933 - is associated with important, unexplained increases in bank failure risk. We also investigate the potential role of regional or local contagion and illiquidity for promoting bank failure and find some evidence in support of such effects, but these are of small importance in the aggregate.
Author: Charles W. Calomiris Publisher: ISBN: Category : Bank failures Languages : en Pages : 84
Book Description
This paper provides the first comprehensive econometric analysis of the causes of bank distress during the Depression. We assemble bank-level data for virtually all Fed member banks, and combine those data with county-level, state-level, and national-level economic characteristics to capture cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the determinants of bank failure. We construct a model of bank survival duration using these fundamental determinants of bank failure as predictors, and investigate the adequacy of fundamentals for explaining bank failures during alleged episodes of nationwide or regional banking panics. We find that fundamentals explain most of the incidence of bank failure, and argue that contagion' or liquidity crises' were a relatively unimportant influence on bank failure risk prior to 1933. We construct upper-bound measures of the importance of contagion or liquidity crises. At the national level, we find that the first two banking crises identified by Friedman and Schwartz in 1930 and 1931 are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or with changes in the importance of liquidity measures for forecasting bank failures. The third banking crisis they identify is a more ambiguous case, but even if one views it as a bona fide national liquidity crisis, the size of the contagion effect could not have been very large. The last banking crisis they identify at the beginning of 1933 is associated with important, unexplained increases in bank failure risk. We also investigate the potential role of regional or local contagion and illiquidity crises for promoting bank failure and find some evidence in support of such effects, but these are of small importance in the aggregate. We also investigate the causes of bank distress measured as deposit contraction, using county-level measures of deposits of all commercial banks, and reach similar conclusions about the importance of fundamentals in determining deposit contraction.
Author: Charles W. Calomiris Publisher: ISBN: Category : Bank failures Languages : en Pages : 46
Book Description
Bank failures during banking crises, in theory, can result either from unwarranted depositor withdrawals during events characterized by contagion or panic, or as the result of fundamental bank insolvency. Various views of contagion are described and compared to historical evidence from banking crises, with special emphasis on the U.S. experience during and prior to the Great Depression. Panics or "contagion" played a small role in bank failure, during or before the Great Depression-era distress. Ironically, the government safety net, which was designed to forestall the (overestimated) risks of contagion, seems to have become the primary source of systemic instability in banking in the current era.
Author: Susan Estabrook Kennedy Publisher: University Press of Kentucky ISBN: 0813163307 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 280
Book Description
On March 6, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt, less than forty-eight hours after becoming president, ordered the suspension of all banking facilities in the United States. How the nation had reached such a desperate situation and how it responded to the banking "holiday" are examined in this book, the first full-length study of the crisis. Although the 1920s had witnessed a wave of bank failures, the situation worsened after the 1929 stock market crash, and by the winter of 1932-1933, complete banking collapse threatened much of the nation. President Hoover's stopgap measures proved totally inadequate, the author shows, and by March 4, the day of Roosevelt's inauguration, thirty-four states had declared banking moratoriums. Of special interest in this study is Ms. Kennedy's examination of relations between Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Author: Elmus Wicker Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 9780521663465 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 196
Book Description
This is the first study of five US banking panics of the Great Depression. Wicker's findings challenge many of the commonly held assumptions about the events of 1930 and 1931, and will be of use to monetary and financial historians and macroeconomists.
Author: R. Glenn Hubbard Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 9780226355887 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 420
Book Description
Warnings of the threat of an impending financial crisis are not new, but do we really know what constitutes an actual episode of crisis and how, once begun, it can be prevented from escalating into a full-blown economic collapse? Using both historical and contemporary episodes of breakdowns in financial trade, contributors to this volume draw insights from theory and empirical data, from the experience of closed and open economies worldwide, and from detailed case studies. They explore the susceptibility of American corporations to economic downturns; the origins of banking panics; and the behavior of financial markets during periods of crisis. Sever papers specifically address the current thrift crisis—including a detailed analysis of the over 500 FSLIC-insured thrifts in the southeast—and seriously challenge the value of recent measures aimed at preventing future collapse in that industry. Government economists and policy makers, scholars of industry and banking, and many in the business community will find these timely papers an invaluable reference.
Author: Gary Richardson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Banks and banking Languages : en Pages : 57
Book Description
During the contraction from 1929 through 1933, the Federal Reserve System tracked changes in the status of all banks operating in the United States and determined the cause of each bank suspension. This essay introduces quarterly series derived from that hitherto dormant data and presents aggregate series constructed from it. The new data series will supplement, and in some cases, supplant the data currently used to study banking panics of the Great Depression, which was published by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in 1937.
Author: Mr.Stijn Claessens Publisher: International Monetary Fund ISBN: 1475561008 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 66
Book Description
This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.
Author: Peter Temin Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262261197 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 220
Book Description
Lessons from the Great Depression provides an integrated view of the depression, covering the experience in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Do events of the 1930s carry a message for the 1990s? Lessons from the Great Depression provides an integrated view of the depression, covering the experience in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. It describes the causes of the depression, why it was so widespread and prolonged, and what brought about eventual recovery. Peter Temin also finds parallels in recent history, in the relentless deflationary course followed by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and the British government in the early 1980s, and in the dogged adherence by the Reagan administration to policies generated by a discredited economic theory—supply-side economics.
Author: Itay Goldstein Publisher: ISBN: 9781680830842 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 80
Book Description
In this monograph, we review three branches of theoretical literature on financial crises. The first deals with banking crises originating from coordination failures among bank creditors. The second deals with frictions in credit and interbank markets due to problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. The third deals with currency crises. We discuss the evolutions of these branches in the literature, and how they have been integrated recently to explain the turmoil in the world economy during the East Asian crises and in the last few years. We discuss the relation of the models to the empirical evidence and their ability to guide policies to avoid or mitigate future crises.
Author: Joseph R. Mason
Author: Joseph R. Mason
Author: Charles W. Calomiris
Author: Charles W. Calomiris
Author: Susan Estabrook Kennedy
Author: Elmus Wicker
Author: R. Glenn Hubbard
Author: Gary Richardson
Author: Mr.Stijn Claessens
Author: Peter Temin
Author: Itay Goldstein