Author: Giacomo MangiantePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Thèse. HEC. 2023
Four Essays in Monetary Economics and Heterogeneity
Author: Giacomo MangiantePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Thèse. HEC. 2023
Essays on Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy and Firm Heterogeneity
Author: Claire ThürwächterPublisher:
ISBN: 9789180142663
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Essays on Monetary Economies with Heterogeneous-agents
Author: Hoonsik YangPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three essays in monetary economics. Although the topic of each chapter differs, the approach is shared: I extend a random matching model of money by augmenting the set of money holdings, and compute socially desirable allocations in the spirit of mechanism design analysis. The augmentation is not just technically improving the model, but making the model rich enough to think about the economic problem that each chapter delves into. I document some interesting properties of the desirable allocations, and highlight the differences generated by the extension.Chapter 1. "A beneficial role of government bonds"I study a random matching model of money to show that the existence of bonds can be beneficial to a society, compared to having only money. In the model, anonymous agents randomly meet in pairs to produce and consume, hence money becomes essential. I compare two identical economies except the availability of bonds, in the sense that people can use any available assets as payments. Following the mechanism design approach, I define implementable allocations and the optimum. Under the notion of the implementability, social planner can devise trading mechanisms that induce people to hold both assets without exogenously given advantages of money as means of payment. I find that having both bondsand money in the economy can improve social welfare over having only money. This role of bonds is associated with a beneficial effect of inflation produced by lump-sum transfers, and it is achieved differently from the previously documented mechanism.Chapter 2. "Optimal intervention in a random-matching model of money" (joint with Wataru Nozawa)Wallace [2014] conjectures that there generically exists an inflation-financed transfer scheme that improves welfare over no intervention in pure-currency economies. We investigate this conjecture in the Shi-Trejos-Wright model with different upper bounds on money holdings. The choice of an upper bound affects the results as some potentially beneficial transfer schemes cannot be studied under small upper bounds. Numerical optima are computed for different degrees of discounting rate and risk aversion. As the upper bound on money holdings increases, optima are more likely to have positive money creation (and inflation),and this result is in line with the conjecture.Chapter 3. "Optimal inflation in a model of inside money: A further result" (joint with Wataru Nozawa)We extend the Deviatov and Wallace [2014] model of inside money in which they find some examples where inflation is beneficial. Their model is restrictive in that it cannot address policies that provide interests on cash (Friedman rule). With a higher upper bound on money holdings than what they use, such policies can be engineered without inflation and resulting allocations are potentially better than what they find, in which case positive inflation is not a property of good allocation. We investigate this possibility and confirm their results in a more generalized setting for some parameters. At optima for the examples, interest on cash is not provided and positive inflation arises in a similar manner to their work. Welfareat optimum increases monotonically with respect to discount factor and public monitoring capacity of a society, but other variables change in a more complex way.
Essays in the Economics of Heterogeneity
Author: Laurent E. CalvetEssays in Financial Economics on Heterogeneity in the Marginal Propensity to Consume
Author: Jan Wedigo RadermacherPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The Architecture of Illegal Markets
Author: Jens BeckertPublisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198794975
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 330
Book Description
This book makes a contribution to understanding the structure of markets on which such illegal transactions occur. The authors apply the tools of economic sociology to develop conceptual frames allowing to understand the organization of such markets and present case studies that provide insights into the illegal side of the economy.
Essays on the Economics of Heterogeneity
Author: Nils-Holger GudatEssays on Heterogeneity in Economic Networks
Author: Malte CherdronSocial and Economic Factors in Decision Making under Uncertainty
Author: Kinga PosadzyPublisher: Linköping University Electronic Press
ISBN: 9176854213
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description
The objective of this thesis is to improve the understanding of human behavior that goes beyond monetary rewards. In particular, it investigates social influences in individual’s decision making in situations that involve coordination, competition, and deciding for others. Further, it compares how monetary and social outcomes are perceived. The common theme of all studies is uncertainty. The first four essays study individual decisions that have uncertain consequences, be it due to the actions of others or chance. The last essay, in turn, uses the advances in research on decision making under uncertainty to predict behavior in riskless choices. The first essay, Fairness Versus Efficiency: How Procedural Fairness Concerns Affect Coordination, investigates whether preferences for fair rules undermine the efficiency of coordination mechanisms that put some individuals at a disadvantage. The results from a laboratory experiment show that the existence of coordination mechanisms, such as action recommendations, increases efficiency, even if one party is strongly disadvantaged by the mechanism. Further, it is demonstrated that while individuals’ behavior does not depend on the fairness of the coordination mechanism, their beliefs about people’s behavior do. The second essay, Dishonesty and Competition. Evidence from a stiff competition environment, explores whether and how the possibility to behave dishonestly affects the willingness to compete and who the winner is in a competition between similarly skilled individuals. We do not find differences in competition entry between competitions in which dishonesty is possible and in which it is not. However, we find that due to the heterogeneity in propensity to behave dishonestly, around 20% of winners are not the best-performing individuals. This implies that the efficient allocation of resources cannot be ensured in a stiff competition in which behavior is unmonitored. The third essay, Tracing Risky Decision Making for Oneself and Others: The Role of Intuition and Deliberation, explores how individuals make choices under risk for themselves and on behalf of other people. The findings demonstrate that while there are no differences in preferences for taking risks when deciding for oneself and for others, individuals have greater decision error when choosing for other individuals. The differences in the decision error can be partly attributed to the differences in information processing; individuals employ more deliberative cognitive processing when deciding for themselves than when deciding for others. Conducting more information processing when deciding for others is related to the reduction in decision error. The fourth essay, The Effect of Decision Fatigue on Surgeons’ Clinical Decision Making, investigates how mental depletion, caused by a long session of decision making, affects surgeon’s decision to operate. Exploiting a natural experiment, we find that surgeons are less likely to schedule an operation for patients who have appointment late during the work shift than for patients who have appointment at the beginning of the work shift. Understanding how the quality of medical decisions depends on when the patient is seen is important for achieving both efficiency and fairness in health care, where long shifts are popular. The fifth essay, Preferences for Outcome Editing in Monetary and Social Contexts, compares whether individuals use the same rules for mental representation of monetary outcomes (e.g., purchases, expenses) as for social outcomes (e.g., having nice time with friends). Outcome editing is an operation in mental accounting that determines whether individuals prefer to first combine multiple outcomes before their evaluation (integration) or evaluate each outcome separately (segregation). I find that the majority of individuals express different preferences for outcome editing in the monetary context than in the social context. Further, while the results on the editing of monetary outcomes are consistent with theoretical predictions, no existing model can explain the editing of social outcomes.
Author: Roberta Distante