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Financial Analysis of Incentive Mechanisms to Promote Energy Efficiency

Financial Analysis of Incentive Mechanisms to Promote Energy Efficiency PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 109

Book Description
Many state regulatory commissions and policymakers want utilities to aggressively pursue energy efficiency as a strategy to mitigate demand and energy growth, diversify the resource mix, and provide an alternative to building new, costly generation. However, as the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (NAPEE 2007) points out, many utilities continue to shy away from aggressively expanding their energy efficiency efforts when their shareholder's fundamental financial interests are placed at risk by doing so. Thus, there is increased interest in developing effective ratemaking and policy approaches that address utility disincentives to pursue energy efficiency or lack of incentives for more aggressive energy efficiency efforts. New regulatory initiatives to promote increased utility energy efficiency efforts also affect the interests of consumers. Ratepayers and their advocates are concerned with issues of fairness, impacts on rates, and total consumer costs. From the perspective of energy efficiency advocates, the quid pro quo for utility shareholder incentives is the obligation to acquire all, or nearly all, achievable cost-effective energy efficiency. A key issue for state regulators and policymakers is how to maximize the cost-effective energy efficiency savings attained while achieving an equitable sharing of benefits, costs and risks among the various stakeholders. In this study, we modeled a prototypical vertically-integrated electric investor-owned utility in the southwestern US that is considering implementing several energy efficiency portfolios. We analyze the impact of these energy efficiency portfolios on utility shareholders and ratepayers as well as the incremental effect on each party when lost fixed cost recovery and/or utility shareholder incentive mechanisms are implemented. A primary goal of our quantitative modeling is to provide regulators and policymakers with an analytic framework and tools that assess the financial impacts of alternative incentive approaches on utility shareholders and customers if energy efficiency is implemented under various utility operating, cost, and supply conditions. We used and adapted a spreadsheet-based financial model (the Benefits Calculator) which was developed originally as a tool to support the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (NAPEE). The major steps in our analysis are displayed graphically in Figure ES- 1. Two main inputs are required: (1) characterization of the utility which includes its initial financial and physical market position, a forecast of the utility?s future sales, peak demand, and resource strategy to meet projected growth; and (2) characterization of the Demand-Side Resource (DSR) portfolio? projected electricity and demand savings, costs and economic lifetime of a portfolio of energy efficiency (and/or demand response) programs that the utility is planning or considering implementing during the analysis period. The Benefits Calculator also estimates total resource costs and benefits of the DSR portfolio using a forecast of avoided capacity and energy costs. The Benefits Calculator then uses inputs provided in the Utility Characterization to produce a?business-as usual? base case as well as alternative scenarios that include energy efficiency resources, including the corresponding utility financial budgets required in each case. If a decoupling and/or a shareholder incentive mechanism are instituted, the Benefits Calculator model readjusts the utility?s revenue requirement and retail rates accordingly. Finally, for each scenario, the Benefits Calculator produces several metrics that provides insights on how energy efficiency resources, decoupling and/or a shareholder incentive mechanism impacts utility shareholders (e.g. overall earnings, return on equity), ratepayers (e.g., average customer bills and rates) and society (e.g. net resource benefits).

Financial Analysis of Incentive Mechanisms to Promote Energy Efficiency

Financial Analysis of Incentive Mechanisms to Promote Energy Efficiency PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 109

Book Description
Many state regulatory commissions and policymakers want utilities to aggressively pursue energy efficiency as a strategy to mitigate demand and energy growth, diversify the resource mix, and provide an alternative to building new, costly generation. However, as the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (NAPEE 2007) points out, many utilities continue to shy away from aggressively expanding their energy efficiency efforts when their shareholder's fundamental financial interests are placed at risk by doing so. Thus, there is increased interest in developing effective ratemaking and policy approaches that address utility disincentives to pursue energy efficiency or lack of incentives for more aggressive energy efficiency efforts. New regulatory initiatives to promote increased utility energy efficiency efforts also affect the interests of consumers. Ratepayers and their advocates are concerned with issues of fairness, impacts on rates, and total consumer costs. From the perspective of energy efficiency advocates, the quid pro quo for utility shareholder incentives is the obligation to acquire all, or nearly all, achievable cost-effective energy efficiency. A key issue for state regulators and policymakers is how to maximize the cost-effective energy efficiency savings attained while achieving an equitable sharing of benefits, costs and risks among the various stakeholders. In this study, we modeled a prototypical vertically-integrated electric investor-owned utility in the southwestern US that is considering implementing several energy efficiency portfolios. We analyze the impact of these energy efficiency portfolios on utility shareholders and ratepayers as well as the incremental effect on each party when lost fixed cost recovery and/or utility shareholder incentive mechanisms are implemented. A primary goal of our quantitative modeling is to provide regulators and policymakers with an analytic framework and tools that assess the financial impacts of alternative incentive approaches on utility shareholders and customers if energy efficiency is implemented under various utility operating, cost, and supply conditions. We used and adapted a spreadsheet-based financial model (the Benefits Calculator) which was developed originally as a tool to support the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (NAPEE). The major steps in our analysis are displayed graphically in Figure ES- 1. Two main inputs are required: (1) characterization of the utility which includes its initial financial and physical market position, a forecast of the utility?s future sales, peak demand, and resource strategy to meet projected growth; and (2) characterization of the Demand-Side Resource (DSR) portfolio? projected electricity and demand savings, costs and economic lifetime of a portfolio of energy efficiency (and/or demand response) programs that the utility is planning or considering implementing during the analysis period. The Benefits Calculator also estimates total resource costs and benefits of the DSR portfolio using a forecast of avoided capacity and energy costs. The Benefits Calculator then uses inputs provided in the Utility Characterization to produce a?business-as usual? base case as well as alternative scenarios that include energy efficiency resources, including the corresponding utility financial budgets required in each case. If a decoupling and/or a shareholder incentive mechanism are instituted, the Benefits Calculator model readjusts the utility?s revenue requirement and retail rates accordingly. Finally, for each scenario, the Benefits Calculator produces several metrics that provides insights on how energy efficiency resources, decoupling and/or a shareholder incentive mechanism impacts utility shareholders (e.g. overall earnings, return on equity), ratepayers (e.g., average customer bills and rates) and society (e.g. net resource benefits).

Quantitative Financial Analysis of Alternative Energy Efficiency Shareholder Incentive Mechanisms

Quantitative Financial Analysis of Alternative Energy Efficiency Shareholder Incentive Mechanisms PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description
Rising energy prices and climate change are central issues in the debate about our nation's energy policy. Many are demanding increased energy efficiency as a way to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions and lower the total cost of electricity and energy services for consumers and businesses. Yet, as the National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency (NAPEE) pointed out, many utilities continue to shy away from seriously expanding their energy efficiency program offerings because they claim there is insufficient profit-motivation, or even a financial disincentive, when compared to supply-side investments. With the recent introduction of Duke Energy's Save-a-Watt incentive mechanism and ongoing discussions about decoupling, regulators and policymakers are now faced with an expanded and diverse landscape of financial incentive mechanisms, Determining the 'right' way forward to promote deep and sustainable demand side resource programs is challenging. Due to the renaissance that energy efficiency is currently experiencing, many want to better understand the tradeoffs in stakeholder benefits between these alternative incentive structures before aggressively embarking on a path for which course corrections can be time-consuming and costly. Using a prototypical Southwest utility and a publicly available financial model, we show how various stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, ratepayers, etc.) are affected by these different types of shareholder incentive mechanisms under varying assumptions about program portfolios. This quantitative analysis compares the financial consequences associated with a wide range of alternative incentive structures. The results will help regulators and policymakers better understand the financial implications of DSR program incentive regulation.

Energy Efficiency Financing and Market-Based Instruments

Energy Efficiency Financing and Market-Based Instruments PDF Author: Yang Liu
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 9811635994
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 313

Book Description
This book is devoted to investigating the policy design and effectiveness of financial and market-based instruments to promote energy efficiency financing. The concept of this monograph is to present the latest results related to energy efficiency funding schemes, energy efficiency obligations, voluntary agreements, auction mechanisms, and Super Energy Services Companies (Super ESCOs) in major jurisdictions across the world. The book focuses on financial and market-based instruments as they deliver a price signal, which provides an incentive for firms to invest in innovation or implement more energy-efficient technologies and deliver energy savings while minimizing costs. Such instruments can have significant advantages for the government, supporting the fiscal sustainability of the government’s energy efficiency efforts, requiring less enforcement than regulation and according the market flexibility to select the most cost-efficient technologies. This book is highly recommended to researchers, policy experts, and business specialists who seek an in-depth and up-to-date integrated overview of energy efficiency financing.

Green Finance and Investment Clean Energy Finance and Investment Policy Review of Viet Nam

Green Finance and Investment Clean Energy Finance and Investment Policy Review of Viet Nam PDF Author: OECD
Publisher: OECD Publishing
ISBN: 9264976132
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 173

Book Description
Viet Nam has become a leading regional market for renewable energy in a short space of time led by private sector investment facilitated by favourable support mechanisms. The Clean Energy Finance and Investment Policy Review of Viet Nam provides a comprehensive overview of the current policy framework, highlighting progress and identifying untapped opportunities for strengthening policy interventions that can help scale up clean energy finance and investment.

Financing Energy Efficiency

Financing Energy Efficiency PDF Author: Robert P. Taylor
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 0821373056
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 306

Book Description
While energy efficiency projects could partly meet new energy demand more cheaply than new supplies, weak economic institutions in developing and transitional economies impede developing and financing energy efficiency retrofits. This book analyzes these difficulties, suggests a 3-part model for projectizing and financing energy efficiency retrofits, and presents thirteen case studies to illustrate the issues and principles involved.

Energy Abstracts for Policy Analysis

Energy Abstracts for Policy Analysis PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Power resources
Languages : en
Pages : 708

Book Description


Building Performance Simulation for Design and Operation

Building Performance Simulation for Design and Operation PDF Author: Jan L.M. Hensen
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0429688539
Category : Architecture
Languages : en
Pages : 958

Book Description
When used appropriately, building performance simulation has the potential to reduce the environmental impact of the built environment, to improve indoor quality and productivity, as well as to facilitate future innovation and technological progress in construction. Since publication of the first edition of Building Performance Simulation for Design and Operation, the discussion has shifted from a focus on software features to a new agenda, which centres on the effectiveness of building performance simulation in building life cycle processes. This new edition provides a unique and comprehensive overview of building performance simulation for the complete building life cycle from conception to demolition, and from a single building to district level. It contains new chapters on building information modelling, occupant behaviour modelling, urban physics modelling, urban building energy modelling and renewable energy systems modelling. This new edition keeps the same chapter structure throughout including learning objectives, chapter summaries and assignments. Moreover, the book: • Provides unique insights into the techniques of building performance modelling and simulation and their application to performance-based design and operation of buildings and the systems which service them. • Provides readers with the essential concepts of computational support of performance-based design and operation. • Provides examples of how to use building simulation techniques for practical design, management and operation, their limitations and future direction. It is primarily intended for building and systems designers and operators, and postgraduate architectural, environmental or mechanical engineering students.

Economic Incentives for Efficient Energy Use

Economic Incentives for Efficient Energy Use PDF Author: Ross M. Starr
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Energy conservation
Languages : en
Pages : 116

Book Description


Empirical Assessment of Shareholder Incentive Mechanisms Designs Under Aggressive Savings Goals

Empirical Assessment of Shareholder Incentive Mechanisms Designs Under Aggressive Savings Goals PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description
Achieving significant reductions in retail electric sales is becoming a priority for policymakers in many states and is echoed at the federal level with the introduction of legislation to establish a national energy efficiency resource standard. Yet, as the National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency (NAPEE) pointed out, many utilities continue to shy away from seriously expanding their energy efficiency program offerings because they claim there is insufficient profit motivation, or even a financial disincentive, when compared to supply-side investments. In response to an information request from the Kansas Corporation Commission staff, we conducted a financial analysis to assess the utility business case in Kansas for pursuing more aggressive energy efficiency that complies with recent state legislation. Kansas' utilities are vertically integrated and don't face retail competition. With historically low retail rates and modest experience with energy efficiency, the achievement of rapid and substantial sales reductions from energy efficiency will require a viable utility business model. Using a conglomerate of the three largest utilities in Kansas, we quantitatively illustrate the tradeoff between ratepayer and shareholder interests when a 1percent reduction in incremental sales is achieved through energy efficiency both with and without the impact of future carbon regulation. We then assess if the utility can be compensated in a manner that produces a sufficient business case but leaves an adequate amount of net resource benefits for ratepayers at a cost that is not overly burdensome. Finally, we show how several common shareholder incentive mechanisms would be designed to achieve this balance.

Shareholder Incentives for Utility-Based Energy Efficiency Programs in California

Shareholder Incentives for Utility-Based Energy Efficiency Programs in California PDF Author: Jiyong Eom
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41

Book Description
Energy efficiency is increasingly being recognized as a resource warranting aggressive public investment. The State of California has committed an unprecedented sum of $2.2 billion in ratepayer funds to utility-based energy efficiency programs from 2006 through 2008; the State finalized in 2007 the determination of the shared-savings incentive mechanism for the 2006-2008 programs and beyond. This study seeks to examine whether the adopted incentive mechanism would ensure an efficient delivery of the programs, and what reforms, if any, could be proposed to meet this end. I develop a game theory model for the implementation of the programs, in which a regulator adopts an energy savings target and a shared-savings incentive mechanism before a utility firm proposes program funding, gets the proposal authorized, and begins to manage the programs. The study reveals that each utility firm requires a certain minimum level of incentive rate, in order for the mechanism to encourage the firm to achieve the adopted energy savings target, eventually bringing non-negative bill savings to its customers. It also reveals that a higher-than-minimum incentive rate can achieve not only a greater net social benefit but also greater bill savings for customers. Model-based analysis of California energy efficiency programs suggests that a higher-than-adopted incentive rate is warranted and that social efficiency would be improved by customizing incentive mechanisms for individual utilities and updating them on a regular basis.