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Author: Major Jesse T. Pearson Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1786252201 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 148
Book Description
This paper investigates the failure of British strategy during the southern campaign of the American Revolutionary War from 1780 to 1781. Following France’s entry into the war in 1778, the British Secretary of State for the American Department, Lord George Germain, believed that Great Britain could expand the war into the south with minimal cost. This research traces Lord Germain’s strategy from its origin in London in 1778 to its application in the American south by British Generals Henry Clinton and Charles Cornwallis during 1780 and 1781. It also analyzes crucial British engagements with the southern patriot army at the Battle of Cowpens in January 1781, the Battle of Guilford Courthouse in March 1781, and the final withdrawal of British forces from the southern interior following the Battle of Eutaw Springs in September 1781. This research identifies four factors that contributed to the failure of British strategy in the south: (1) a false British assumption of loyalist support among the populace, (2) British application of self-defeating political and military policies, (3) the British failure to deploy sufficient forces to control the territory, and (4) patriot General Nathanael Greene’s campaign against British forces.
Author: Major Jesse T. Pearson Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1786252201 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 148
Book Description
This paper investigates the failure of British strategy during the southern campaign of the American Revolutionary War from 1780 to 1781. Following France’s entry into the war in 1778, the British Secretary of State for the American Department, Lord George Germain, believed that Great Britain could expand the war into the south with minimal cost. This research traces Lord Germain’s strategy from its origin in London in 1778 to its application in the American south by British Generals Henry Clinton and Charles Cornwallis during 1780 and 1781. It also analyzes crucial British engagements with the southern patriot army at the Battle of Cowpens in January 1781, the Battle of Guilford Courthouse in March 1781, and the final withdrawal of British forces from the southern interior following the Battle of Eutaw Springs in September 1781. This research identifies four factors that contributed to the failure of British strategy in the south: (1) a false British assumption of loyalist support among the populace, (2) British application of self-defeating political and military policies, (3) the British failure to deploy sufficient forces to control the territory, and (4) patriot General Nathanael Greene’s campaign against British forces.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 113
Book Description
This paper investigates the failure of British strategy during the southern campaign of the American Revolutionary War from 1780 to 1781. Following France's entry into the war in 1778, the British Secretary of State for the American Department, Lord George Germain, believed that Great Britain could expand the war into the south with minimal cost. This research traces Lord Germain's strategy from its origin in London in 1778 to its application in the American south by British Generals Henry Clinton and Charles Cornwallis during 1780 and 1781. It also analyzes crucial British engagements with the southern patriot army at the Battle of Cowpens in January 1781, the Battle of Guilford Courthouse in March 1781, and the final withdrawal of British forces from the southern interior following the Battle of Eutaw Springs in September 1781. This research identifies four factors that contributed to the failure of British strategy in the south: (1) a false British assumption of loyalist support among the populace, (2) British application of self-defeating political and military policies, (3) the British failure to deploy sufficient forces to control the territory, and (4) patriot General Nathanael Greene's campaign against British forces.
Author: U.s. Army Command Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781499722260 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 106
Book Description
failure was due to four factors: (1) a false British assumption of loyalist support among the local populace, (2) British application of self-defeating political and military policies, (3) the British failure to deploy sufficient forces to control the territory, and (4) patriot General Nathanael Greene's campaign against British forces. The chapters that follow examine each of these factors in detail. In March 1778, King George III was eager to find a solution to what had become a political and military quagmire with the war in America. He established the Carlisle Peace Commission and dispatched the body to New York City with a proposal to cease hostilities. The American government insisted that the king and the British government agree to recognize American independence. The commission refused to make this concession and both parties recognized that they had arrived at an impasse.
Author: Jesse T Pearson Publisher: War College Series ISBN: 9781297474361 Category : Languages : en Pages : 116
Book Description
This is a curated and comprehensive collection of the most important works covering matters related to national security, diplomacy, defense, war, strategy, and tactics. The collection spans centuries of thought and experience, and includes the latest analysis of international threats, both conventional and asymmetric. It also includes riveting first person accounts of historic battles and wars.Some of the books in this Series are reproductions of historical works preserved by some of the leading libraries in the world. As with any reproduction of a historical artifact, some of these books contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. We believe these books are essential to this collection and the study of war, and have therefore brought them back into print, despite these imperfections.We hope you enjoy the unmatched breadth and depth of this collection, from the historical to the just-published works.
Author: David K. Wilson Publisher: ISBN: 9781570037979 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
A reexamination of major Southern battles and tactics in the American War of Independence A finalist for the 2005 Distinguished Writing Award of the Army Historical Foundation and the 2005 Thomas Fleming Book Award of the American Revolution Round Table of Philadelphia, The Southern Strategy shifts the traditional vantage point of the American Revolution from the Northern colonies to the South in this study of the critical period from 1775 to the spring of 1780. David K. Wilson suggests that the paradox of the British defeat in 1781--after Crown armies had crushed all organized resistance in South Carolina and Georgia--makes sense only if one understands the fundamental flaws in what modern historians label Britain's "Southern Strategy". In his assessment he closely examines battles and skirmishes to construct a comprehensive military history of the Revolution in the South through May 1780. A cartographer and student of battlefield geography, Wilson includes detailed, original battle maps and orders of battle for each engagement. Appraising the strategy and tactics of the most significant conflicts, he tests the thesis that the British could raise the manpower they needed to win in the South by tapping a vast reservoir of Southern Loyalists and finds their policy flawed in both conception and execution.
Author: Stanley D. M. Carpenter Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press ISBN: 0806163348 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 329
Book Description
In a world rife with conflict and tension, how does a great power prosecute an irregular war at a great distance within the context of a regional struggle, all within a global competitive environment? The question, so pertinent today, was confronted by the British nearly 250 years ago during the American War for Independence. And the answer, as this book makes plain, is: not the way the British, under Lieutenant General Charles, Earl Cornwallis, went about it in the American South in the years 1778–81. Southern Gambit presents a closely observed, comprehensive account of this failed strategy. Approaching the campaign from the British perspective, this book restores a critical but little-studied chapter to the narrative of the Revolutionary War—and in doing so, it adds detail and depth to our picture of Cornwallis, an outsize figure in the history of the British Empire. Distinguished scholar of military strategy Stanley D. M. Carpenter outlines the British strategic and operational objectives, devoting particular attention to the strategy of employing Southern Loyalists to help defeat Patriot forces, reestablish royal authority, and tamp down resurgent Patriot activity. Focusing on Cornwallis’s operations in the Carolinas and Virginia leading to the surrender at Yorktown in October 1781, Carpenter reveals the flaws in this approach, most notably a fatal misunderstanding of the nature of the war in the South and of the Loyalists’ support. Compounding this was the strategic incoherence of seeking a conventional war against a brilliant, unconventional opponent, and doing so amidst a breakdown in the unity of command. Ultimately, strategic incoherence, ineffective command and control, and a misreading of the situation contributed to the series of cascading failures of the British effort. Carpenter’s analysis of how and why this happened expands our understanding of British decision-making and operations in the Southern Campaign and their fateful consequences in the War for Independence.
Author: Stanley D. M. Carpenter Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press ISBN: 080616333X Category : History Languages : en Pages : 531
Book Description
In a world rife with conflict and tension, how does a great power prosecute an irregular war at a great distance within the context of a regional struggle, all within a global competitive environment? The question, so pertinent today, was confronted by the British nearly 250 years ago during the American War for Independence. And the answer, as this book makes plain, is: not the way the British, under Lieutenant General Charles, Earl Cornwallis, went about it in the American South in the years 1778–81. Southern Gambit presents a closely observed, comprehensive account of this failed strategy. Approaching the campaign from the British perspective, this book restores a critical but little-studied chapter to the narrative of the Revolutionary War—and in doing so, it adds detail and depth to our picture of Cornwallis, an outsize figure in the history of the British Empire. Distinguished scholar of military strategy Stanley D. M. Carpenter outlines the British strategic and operational objectives, devoting particular attention to the strategy of employing Southern Loyalists to help defeat Patriot forces, reestablish royal authority, and tamp down resurgent Patriot activity. Focusing on Cornwallis’s operations in the Carolinas and Virginia leading to the surrender at Yorktown in October 1781, Carpenter reveals the flaws in this approach, most notably a fatal misunderstanding of the nature of the war in the South and of the Loyalists’ support. Compounding this was the strategic incoherence of seeking a conventional war against a brilliant, unconventional opponent, and doing so amidst a breakdown in the unity of command. Ultimately, strategic incoherence, ineffective command and control, and a misreading of the situation contributed to the series of cascading failures of the British effort. Carpenter’s analysis of how and why this happened expands our understanding of British decision-making and operations in the Southern Campaign and their fateful consequences in the War for Independence.
Author: Major Joel Woodward Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1782896554 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 137
Book Description
This thesis is an analysis and evaluation of the British and American campaign strategies in the Southern Campaign of the War for American Independence. After over four and one-half years of inconclusive fighting in America, the British government developed a plan to restore Royal control of the American South where large numbers of Loyalist Americans were expected to rally in support of the Crown. Control of the southern provinces would allow the British army to isolate the North where the rebellion was strongest. In May 1780, the American army of the South surrendered to a British army at Charlestowne, South Carolina. The Americans raised a new army in the South, but it too was decisively defeated at Camden, South Carolina, in August 1780. American prospects in the Southern Department appeared bleak until the arrival of Nathanael Greene in December 1780. Despite a scarcity of resources, Greene rebuilt the American southern army and fought an inspired campaign of compound warfare to counter the expanding British control of the Carolinas. Lord Cornwallis led the British army on a protracted pursuit of Greene’s forces across North Carolina following the American victory at Cowpens in January 1781. The British army, operating well beyond its supply lines, was exhausted by the pursuit of Greene. Despite winning a narrow tactical victory at Guilford Courthouse in March of 1781, the British force was rendered operationally ineffective. Cornwallis withdrew to Virginia where he would ultimately be trapped at Yorktown. This thesis demonstrates the application of operational design using the British and American strategies in the Southern Campaign as a historical case study. The methodology for this study is based on the linkages between ends, ways, and means through the elements of operational design. Nathanael Greene ultimately succeeded because he implemented a strategy that was designed to match his means to his ends.
Author: Major Jesse T. Pearson
Author: Major Jesse T. Pearson
Author: 
Author: U.s. Army Command
Author: Jesse T Pearson
Author: David K. Wilson
Author: Julian Philip Clover
Author: Stanley D. M. Carpenter
Author: Stanley D. M. Carpenter
Author: Major Joel Woodward
Author: Richard Sears Dukes