Export Subsidies, Price Competition and Vertical Integration PDF Download

Author: Leonardo Medrano
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 56

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Book Description

Author: Barbara J. Spencer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 52

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Book Description
A domestic firm is partially dependent on a foreign vertically integrated supplier for a key intermediate product when both firms are Cournot competitors in the market for the final product. The foreign supplier generally charges its domestic rival a price for the input that exceeds the independent monopoly level and vertical foreclosure may occur. Domestic policies applied to the vertically related products can increase domestic welfare by reducing the price and increasing the availability of imported supplies of the input. Vertical integration in the foreign supplier has significant implications for all three domestic policies considered: a tariff or subsidy on imports of both products and a domestic production subsidy. The foreign vertically integrated firm tends to reduce its price for the input in response to an import tariff on the final product, whereas a simple monopoly supplier would respond by increasing its export price. Also domestic cost conditions for the production of the input can critically affect the desirability of a tax as apposed to a subsidy on intermediate imports.

Author: Barbara J. Spencer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competing, International
Languages : en
Pages : 52

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Book Description
We examine conditions under which a low cost vertically integrated manufacturer has an incentive to export an intermediate product to its higher cost (vertically integrated) rival rather than to vertically foreclose, fully cutting off supplies. The nature of supply conditions in the importing country, the size of an import tariff on the final good and optimal policy by the exporting country are all shown to be important for this decision. The exporting country may gain by taxing exports of the final (Cournot) product even though, under Cournot competition, an export subsidy is optimal in the absence of a market for intermediates. In this case, optimal policy also requires an export tax on intermediates, but the higher tax on final goods serves to divert sales to the more profitable market for intermediates increasing the extent of vertical supply. It is optimal to tax the export of both goods or to subsidize the export of both goods. It is never optimal to tax one and subsidize the other.

Author: Instituto de Planejamento Econômico e Social
Publisher: Brasilia : United Nations ; Nueva York, NY, USA : United Nations Publications, Sales Section
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 122

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Book Description

Author: Khalid Sekkat
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781958254
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 200

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Book Description
This book analyses the vertical relationships of firms in an international context. These relationships, Khalid Sekkat argues, have gained further relevance due to the notable increase in vertical specialization of production across borders in the past few years.

Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. Subcommittee on Trade
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition, Unfair
Languages : en
Pages : 676

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Book Description

Author: Gene M. Grossman
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262570930
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 414

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Book Description
This book collects 19 of the most influential articles on trade with imperfect competition, providing ready access to current research by top-level economists.

Author: Joy Langston
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Political candidates
Languages : en
Pages : 80

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Author: Jacob Viner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 366

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Book Description

Author: Giovanni Galizzi
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642487653
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 637

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Book Description
New analysis and empirical evidence on several topics such as the determinants of shape and nature of the vertical relationships in the food system, the determinants of vertical co-ordination and competition, types and mechanisms of co-ordination as well as the consequences for competitiveness, consumer welfare and policy implications are provided. The focus is on vertical issues at different stages of the food chain with a particular emphasis on the increasing role played by retailers in shaping the vertical relationships in the food system through the development of food supply-chain management.