Experimental Studies on Competition and Incentives PDF Download

Author: Gabriele K. Ruchala
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783866242364
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 162

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Author: Jonas Heite
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3658292318
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 219

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Book Description
Individuals and firms can improve their performance through collaboration and competition. However, it is still an open question how collaboration and competition schemes can be optimally designed and incentivized in order to exploit their full potential. Jonas Heite investigates this question by assessing efforts to stimulate R&D collaboration and by examining properties as well as underlying mechanisms (e.g., effort, risk, confidence and stress) of ability configurations in contests. Based on three large-scale economic studies covering laboratory, field and natural experiments, the author applies novel and sophisticated econometric methods to provide causal empirical evidence that yields important implications for policymakers, managers and researchers.

Author: Xuezheng CHEN
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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This study presents a theoretical and experimental investigation into the effects of competition and team incentives on dishonest behavior. We develop a singleagent decision model that incorporates loss aversion and a lying cost to examine the impact of these incentives. Our theoretical analysis reveals the diminishing marginal impacts of competition and team incentives on promoting dishonesty in the sense that the effect of the coexistence of team and competition is smaller than the combined effect of pure competition and pure team incentives. To test these theoretical predictions, we develop a new experimental framework based on a double-die rolling game, which provides a handy tool for studying dishonest behavior across various environments and investigating underlying factors that influence dishonesty. Unlike traditional single-die or coin-tossing games, our game generates a long-tailed distribution of honest reports, which enables us to more accurately and effectively identify liars and measure the size of lies. Our experimental findings are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model.

Author: Christine Harbring
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 190

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Author: Jeroen Hinloopen
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521493420
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 329

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Economists have begun to make much greater use of experimental methods in their research. This collection surveys these methods and shows how they can help us to understand firm behaviour in relation to various forms of competition policy.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students' effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives. -- education ; field experiments ; incentives ; competition ; cooperation

Author: Joseph Zubin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 80

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Author: Joan L. Luft
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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This article reviews experimental studies that investigate the influence of management control systems on competitive and cooperative interactions among employees. It begins by describing the role of experiments in improving theory specification, by improving construct definitions, documenting the causal processes that link management controls and performance, and identifying contextual factors that influence these processes. The article then analyzes experimental research on the role of management control systems in the social comparisons and tournament incentives that generate competition in organizations, and in the teamwork and reciprocity processes that support cooperation. A number of open questions and directions for future research, both experimental and non-experimental, are identified.

Author: Cary A. Deck
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Knowledge-sharing arrangements are an important part of the innovation process as they help firms acquire technological capabilities, shorten development time, and spread risk and cost. A question central to the study of knowledge-sharing arrangements is the impact of competition on cooperation. While cooperation has the benefit of avoiding duplication, it may have an adverse effect on the competitive advantage of a leading firm. Hence, firms face a difficult challenge during the innovation process while deciding which components of it, if any, to carry out in collaboration with other firms. This paper reports the results of controlled laboratory experiments which identify how the decision to form research joint ventures changes with both relative progress during the R&D process and the intensity of product market competition. The design is based on a modified version of Erkal and Minehart “Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of Research and Development.” Research Paper 1038, University of Melbourne, Department of Economics, 2008. The results indicate that if expected profits are such that the lagging firms always stay in the race, cooperation unravels as firms move forward in the discovery process and as monopoly profits become more attractive. These results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions.

Author: Roman M. Sheremeta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Group contests are ubiquitous. Some examples include warfare between countries, competition between political parties, team-incentives within firms, and rent-seeking. In order to succeed, members of the same group have incentives to cooperate with each other by expending effort. However, since effort is costly, each member also has an incentive to abstain from expending any effort and instead free ride on the efforts of other members. Contest theory predicts that the intensity of competition between groups and the amount of free riding within groups depend on the group size, sharing rule, group impact function, contest success function, and heterogeneity of players. We review experimental studies testing these theoretical predictions. Most studies find significant over-expenditure of effort relative to the theory and significant heterogeneity of behavior within and between groups. Also, most studies find support for the comparative statics predictions of the theory (with the exception of the “group size paradox”). Finally, studies show that there are effective mechanisms that can promote within-group cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms that can de-escalate and potentially eliminate between-group conflict.