Evaluating the Mandatory Bid Rule for Takeover Law in China PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Evaluating the Mandatory Bid Rule for Takeover Law in China PDF full book. Access full book title Evaluating the Mandatory Bid Rule for Takeover Law in China by Joseph Lee. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Joseph Lee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 28
Book Description
This paper discusses the purpose and practice of the mandatory bid rule in takeovers in the UK. A literature review looks at the impact of the mandatory bid rule in a takeover on both bidders and target companies. The origin and evolution of the mandatory bid rule in China are described and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) used to measure its impact on bidders and target companies. The results show that shareholders of target companies receive a better return when bidders acquire more than 50% of the shareholding in target companies. This suggests that China should reform its mandatory bid rule by restricting the use of proportional partial bids to increase returns to the target shareholders. The results also show that in making a proportional partial bid to takeover a company, bidders receive a better return when they aim for corporate restructuring that adheres to the state-led industrial policy. The authors recommend that the law should strike a balance between following the state-led policy of corporate restructuring and protecting the interests of target companies.
Author: Joseph Lee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 28
Book Description
This paper discusses the purpose and practice of the mandatory bid rule in takeovers in the UK. A literature review looks at the impact of the mandatory bid rule in a takeover on both bidders and target companies. The origin and evolution of the mandatory bid rule in China are described and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) used to measure its impact on bidders and target companies. The results show that shareholders of target companies receive a better return when bidders acquire more than 50% of the shareholding in target companies. This suggests that China should reform its mandatory bid rule by restricting the use of proportional partial bids to increase returns to the target shareholders. The results also show that in making a proportional partial bid to takeover a company, bidders receive a better return when they aim for corporate restructuring that adheres to the state-led industrial policy. The authors recommend that the law should strike a balance between following the state-led policy of corporate restructuring and protecting the interests of target companies.
Author: Wei Cai Publisher: Open Dissertation Press ISBN: 9781361278031 Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This dissertation, "The Mandatory Bid Rule, Hostile Takeovers and Takeover Defences in China" by Wei, Cai, 蔡伟, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. DOI: 10.5353/th_b4696839 Subjects: Consolidation and merger of corporations - Law and legislation - China
Author: Wei Cai Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 28
Book Description
Takeover has been widely accepted as a necessary method to improve the performance of certain inefficient firms. However, strict enforcement of the Mandatory Bid Rule (MBR) would make takeovers impossible in China. As a result, its operative effect has been diluted through a series of measures. First, the China Securities Regulatory Commission has always granted exemptions from mandatory bid obligations to avoid the detrimental effects of strict enforcement. Second, in practice, certain firms that do not apply for exemptions or fail in their applications are able to circumvent their mandatory bid obligations by launching takeovers within an appropriate time period when the market is booming. Third, this circumvention is facilitated by rules allowing for the adjustment of the bid consideration. Fourth, the proportional partial takeover bid rule was introduced in 2006, further weakening the regime. These realities make the MBR exist in name only in China, yet it can still create obstacles to takeovers. Therefore, it should be abolished.
Author: Juan Chen Publisher: Springer ISBN: 3642545084 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 201
Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive review of the Measures for Administration of Takeover of Chinese Listed Companies (the Chinese takeover law), with emphasis on the differences between the Chinese takeover law and takeover legislation in the UK, the US and Hong Kong. The Chinese M&A market has been booming at an unprecedented rate in recent years; not only domestic investors, but also foreign funds and multinational companies are actively participating on the market. For both market participants and researchers, it is crucial to understand the emerging and transitional aspects of the Chinese economy and its M&A market, and the impacts of those aspects on relevant laws. While there are ongoing academic discussions on the convergence between the Chinese takeover law and its counterparts in the UK, Hong Kong and the US, this book offers a comprehensive discussion of the divergence and focuses on key differences in the transplanted Chinese takeover law.
Author: Joseph Lee Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 3030723453 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 281
Book Description
This book investigates stakeholders’ interests, market players, and governance models for the takeover market in the changing global economic orders. Authors from the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, and China discuss takeovers in the context of China as a rising power in the global M&A market and re-examine takeover as an efficient method for corporate competition, consolidation, and restructuring. China has come to embrace takeovers as a market practice and is seeking directions for further reforms of its law, regulatory model, and banking system in order to compete with other economic powers. Yet, China is at a very different economic development stage and has different legal and political structures. State-owned enterprises dominate the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets – a very different landscape from UK and European exchanges. Researchers and policy makers are currently developing options in response to needs for reform. Recently, China has also announced the opening of its financial markets to foreign ownership. This book reflects on the UK and European models and focuses on the policy choices for China to transform its capital market. The book is of interest to postgraduate students and researchers (LLM, PhD, postdocs), law and management/finance academics, and policy makers.
Author: Charlie Weng Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 29
Book Description
This research examines the traditional wisdom of takeovers and regulations. Generally, takeovers have a value adding effect, but need to be regulated in order to curb excesses. Auction promotion rules are efficient in maximizing social wealth and reducing non-value maximizing takeover deals when shareholders fail to coordinate in the face of a coercive offer. China has adopted such a rule. The application of the rule nevertheless is far from satisfactory. The rule is not only ineffective in terms of the application ratio, but also reinforces controlling shareholders' power, which makes minority shareholders even more vulnerable to controlling shareholders' expropriation. This research first conducts an empirical study on Chinese shareholder distribution in listed firms. Based on these up-to-date results, this article then analyzes, from an agency problem perspective, the utilities of different types of controlling shareholders in the market. This paper concludes that the current auction promotion rule, the “5% rule,” is not efficient in light of the Chinese ownership structure. An ex ante announcement institution is suggested in order to compensate for the missing functions due to the deactivation of the rule. Finally, the paper introduces an opt-in legislation mode for the sake of the minority companies with dispersed shareholder distributions.
Author: Hui Huang Publisher: ISBN: Category : Antitakeover strategies Languages : en Pages : 130
Book Description
This book is largely prompted by the two recently promulgated regulations governing takeovers in China. The goal of this book is to critically examine the legal takeover regime in China and to put forward proposals for reform. To outline the discussion, Part II describes the stock market, the takeover law, and the takeover activities in China. Two legislative goals, namely contestability of takeovers and shareholder protection, are set out in Part III. Under these principles, Part IV and Part V explore the issues of tender offer and anti takeover defenses, respectively. Specifically, Part IV focuses on information disclosure and other major rules relating to takeovers. It appears that these rules are in line with the international norm and acceptably workable in the context of China. Furthermore, Part V explores the serious problems that are associated with anti-takeover defenses. China's law seems to be both over inclusive and under inclusive in this respect. After an in depth comparative analysis of the legal regimes in the U.S., UK, and Australia, it is apparent that those regimes are not suitable for China's local conditions. Lastly, this book proposes a regime in which shareholders could veto the use of takeover defenses ex post, while requiring that certain defensive measures be decided ex ante. This proposal could well suit China's needs because it not only gives shareholders sufficient protection, but also preserves necessary flexibility for management to efficiently respond to truly undesirable tender offers.
Author: Charlie Weng Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 34
Book Description
The Mandatory Bid Rule (MBR) requires a bidder who acquires control over a firm to make a general offer to all remaining shareholders to purchase their residual shares. It is the most powerful institution that requires controlling shareholders to share the control premium with other shareholders in a control transaction. The MBR is considered to be a key method of protection for minority shareholders but faces strong criticism over high implementation costs and on-going debate over its effectiveness in practice.From a utilitarianism perspective, the paper shows the relevance between the MBR and the effectiveness of minority shareholder protection mechanisms in a jurisdiction of legal transplantation. Using Mainland China as the test sample where the MBR was adopted, removed then re-introduced, the paper employs the empirical research methodology to highlight market reactions when the rule is removed. The paper analyzes the efficiency of the MBR and outlines the types of environments and jurisdictional specifications where the MBR can operate at an optimal level, and alternatively, where the MBR will not be value-maximizing. It offers ideal legislation suggestions for similar jurisdictions considering transplanting MBR.
Author: Joseph Lee
Author: Joseph Lee
Author: Wei Cai
Author: Wei Cai
Author: Juan Chen
Author: Wei Cai (S. J. D.)
Author: Joseph Lee
Author: Charlie Weng
Author: Hui Huang
Author: 薛人伟
Author: Charlie Weng