Essays on Workplace Incentives Under Incomplete Contracts PDF Download

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Essays on Workplace Incentives Under Incomplete Contracts

Essays on Workplace Incentives Under Incomplete Contracts PDF Author: Nara Decharin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 266

Book Description


Essays on Workplace Incentives Under Incomplete Contracts

Essays on Workplace Incentives Under Incomplete Contracts PDF Author: Nara Decharin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 266

Book Description


Essays on workplace incentives under incomplete contracts

Essays on workplace incentives under incomplete contracts PDF Author: Nara Decharin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 266

Book Description


Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision

Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision PDF Author: Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3658241330
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 211

Book Description
Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.

Essays on Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard and Non-verifiable Performance

Essays on Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard and Non-verifiable Performance PDF Author: Anja Schöttner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 190

Book Description


The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics

The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics PDF Author: Philippe Aghion
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190259019
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 224

Book Description
The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.

Three Essays on Team Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Synergy

Three Essays on Team Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Synergy PDF Author: Hong Chao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Industrial management
Languages : en
Pages : 358

Book Description


Essays on Intertemporal Incentives and Signalling

Essays on Intertemporal Incentives and Signalling PDF Author: Praveen Kumar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 432

Book Description


Three Essays on Non-Monetary Incentives and Employee Compensation

Three Essays on Non-Monetary Incentives and Employee Compensation PDF Author: Cristian Ramirez
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 187

Book Description
Scholars in strategy, organizational behavior, and economics have shown increasing interest in the link between non-monetary, extrinsic incentives and employee productivity. However, nearly all of this research examines rewards that have some kind of social recognition mechanism. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I examine the awarding of private, non-monetary badges for hitting performance targets. On Amazon Mechanical Turk, workers receiving this type of badge upon hitting a performance threshold are approximately 9.4 percent more productive than workers in the control group. Interestingly, this increase in productivity was almost the exact same as giving workers hitting the threshold a 20 percent bonus in pay. The second chapter of my dissertation presents the analysis of an actual incentive scheme that has a unique characteristic: it combines both symbolic and pecuniary incentives under the same platform. By examining the results of this real-life application, I can estimate the extent to which workers respond to an actual application of gamification and how its impact varies over time. Understanding the determinants of value captured by different stakeholders is a key issue for both practitioners and scholars in strategic management. The final chapter of my dissertation presents a study on variations in worker compensation in the copper mining industry. Our results show that there is a positive effect of copper price on workers' compensation, but this effect is moderated by the characteristics of labor regulation in each country.

Essays on Contract Enforcement in Transition Economies

Essays on Contract Enforcement in Transition Economies PDF Author: Hamish Rafe Gow
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 290

Book Description


IMF Staff papers, Volume 46 No. 2

IMF Staff papers, Volume 46 No. 2 PDF Author: International Monetary Fund. Research Dept.
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451974205
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 148

Book Description
This paper analyzes the predictability of currency crises. The paper evaluates three models for predicting currency crises that were proposed before 1997. Two of the models failed to provide useful forecasts. One model provides forecasts that are somewhat informative though still not reliable. Plausible modifications to this model improve its performance, providing some hope that future models may do better. The study suggests, though, that although forecasting models may help indicate vulnerability to crises, the predictive power of even the best of them may be limited.