Author: Ricardo Serrano-PadialPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Essays on Strategic Incentives for Information Revelation
Author: Ricardo Serrano-PadialPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms
Author: Theodore GrovesPublisher: U of Minnesota Press
ISBN: 1452908044
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 410
Book Description
Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session
Essays on the Theory of Incentives and Information
Author: Luis RayoEssays in Strategic Learning
Author: Fabiano SchivardiStrategic Information Revelation
Author: Masahiro Okuno-FujiwaraPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
Dissertation Abstracts International
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 732
Book Description
Essays in Learning and the Revelation of Private Information
Author: Robert Bruce NoahRational Interaction
Author: Reinhard SeltenPublisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3662096641
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 427
Book Description
The unifying theme of the 23 contributions to this book is the social interaction of rational individuals. The work of John C. Harsanyi on game theory, social choice, and the philosophy of science finds an echo in these essays. Contributions by well known game theorists and economists present a great variety of stimulating theoretical investigations. Part I contains six papers on non-cooperative game theory written by Maschler, Owen, Myerson, Peleg, Rosenmüller, Hart and Mas-Collel. Part II with three contributions by Kalei, Samet, van Damme, d'Aspremont, and Gérard-Varet is devoted to the use of non-cooperative game theory in the analysis of problems of mechanism design. Basic questions of non-cooperative game theory are discussed in three essays by Güth, Hardin, and Sugden in Part III. Applied game models are discussed in three papers by Friedman, Selten, and Shubik in Part IV. Problems of social choice are investigated in Part V which deals with utilitarianism and related topics in five contributions by Hammond, Binmore, Arrow, Roemer, and Broome. Finally, Part VI contains three papers: an interdisciplinary comparison of physics and economics by Samuelson, a methodological essay by Brock, and an appraisal of the work of John C. Harsanyi.
Differential Information Economies
Author: Dionysius GlycopantisPublisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540269797
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 656
Book Description
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.
Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow: The economics of information
Author: Kenneth Joseph ArrowPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Distributive justice
Languages : en
Pages : 312
Book Description