Essays on Public Intervention in Insurance Markets PDF Download

Author: Wen-Jyh Henry Chiu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Author: Johannes Spinnewijn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 166

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(cont.) Heterogeneity in beliefs strengthens the case for government intervention in insurance markets and can explain the negative correlation between risk occurrence and insurance coverage found in empirical studies.

Author: Tobin Knowles McKearin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 386

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This public economics dissertation examines the effects resulting from government intervention in the electricity and health insurance markets. The first chapter analyzes the impact on residential electricity prices by studying a once regulated market in which government regulators withdrew from in hopes of allowing a free and competitive market to flourish. The second chapter analyzes the resulting effects on employment and other forms of health insurance that occur when the government tightens the income limits to qualify for Medicaid. The third and final chapter studies employment, health insurance, health, and emergency room usage effects when the government gives subsidies to employers providing health insurance to their employees.

Author: Richard Domurat
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 200

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This dissertation includes three chapters on the health insurance markets established by the Affordable Care Act (ACA), known as exchanges. Chapter 1 estimates the demand for each plan in the California exchange using a discrete choice model. The model incorporates heterogeneity in consumer preferences and in product characteristics, including hospital and primary care physician (PCP) networks. Endogeneity of prices is addressed using networking hospital costs as instruments, and prices for any given plan can vary across consumers within a market. Consumers are highly sensitive to prices, with market shares declining by 3%-5% for just a $1 increase in the premium. Demand also responds to hospital and PCP networks, but to a relatively small degree. Along the take-up margin, a $1 increase in premium subsidy increases take-up by 1.4%. Chapter 2 uses a structural model of demand and supply to examine how two insurance market regulations--community rating and risk adjustment--affect prices and enrollment in the ACA exchange in California. Without risk adjustment, community rating in the ACA would lead to a significant reduction in enrollment in desirable plans and in take-up overall. Risk adjustment under the ACA roughly restores relative shares across plans to what they would be without community rating; however, the reduction in take-up is not restored. An alternative risk adjustment method can increase enrollment by 3.0% and would have little impact on government spending. Chapter 3, written jointly with Isaac Menashe and Wesley Yin, examines the impact of information on insurance take-up in the ACA. We exploit experimental variation in the information mailed to 87,000 households in California's exchange to study the role of frictions in insurance take-up. We find that a basic reminder of the enrollment deadline raised enrollment by 1.4 pp (or 16 percent). Compared to the reminder alone, also reporting personalized subsidy benefits increases take-up among low-income individuals, but decreases take-up among higher-income individuals. This is despite reminder-only recipients eventually observing their subsidies before purchase. Finally, the letter interventions induced healthier individuals into the market, lowering aggregate spending risk by 5.9 percent, suggesting these interventions can improve both enrollment and average market risk.

Author: Sandra G. Gustavson
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401113785
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 188

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Five years ago the world lost one of its most prolific insurance scholars, Dr. Robert I. Mehr. His death in 1988 signalled the passing of not only a gifted writer and researcher, but also a pioneering teacher, mentor, and friend. The essays compiled within this volume are intended as an appropriate tribute to this occasionally outrageous individual who touched the lives of so many within the insurance community. Bob Mehr was a teacher who expected and demanded nothing less than perfect scholarship and flawless, efficient writing. Among alumni of the University of lllinois insurance doctoral program, stories still abound of late night and early morning sessions in which students and professor painstakingly debated precise words and phrases for dissertations, journal articles, and textbooks. Bob's respect for language was both immense and contagious, if at times more than a little compulsive. He joked that he could not read letters or novels without pencil in hand for editing. Bob's respect for his doctoral students was equally evident. The confidence he displayed in his students' abilities was sometimes startling, but "competence assumed" often begot "competence in fact." The accomplishments and records amassed by the many who studied with Bob Mehr are impressive and ongoing. On the dedication page in his final textbook, Fundamentals of Insurance, Bob spoke of his affection for those he called his "academic progeny" and wished them happiness as they build their own academic families.

Author: Casey Rothschild
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 126

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(Cont.) In particular, it shows that a government which can provide pooled-price social insurance can relax restrictions on characteristic-based pricing while implementing a "compensatory" social insurance policy in a way that ensures no individual is harmed while some individuals gain. Chapter 3 is collaborative work with James Poterba and Amy Finkelstein. It starts from the observation that the "compensatory" social insurance policies identified in Chapter 2 are not typically employed in practice. When they are not, permitting characteristic-based pricing has both efficiency and distributional consequences vis a vis banning such pricing. We develop a methodology for empirically measuring the magnitudes of both consequences. We apply this methodology to evaluate the hypothetical imposition of a ban on gender-based pricing in the U.K. annuity market. We estimate that this imposition will re-distribute significant resources from short-lived men to long-lived women. The amount of re-distribution may be up to 50% less than would be predicted without accounting for the endogenous market response, however.

Author: Marika Ilona Cabral
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 290

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This dissertation consists of four distinct essays. In an essay entitled "Claim Timing and Ex Post Adverse Selection: Evidence from Dental 'Insurance, ' " I explore the impact of strategic timing on insurance market allocations. If people can delay a claim just long enough to buy more insurance coverage in anticipation of it, severe adverse selection may result, and in extreme cases, this can lead to the complete unraveling of an insurance market. I study these forces by analyzing dental treatments and insurance, with the goal of understanding insurance in the market for dental care and also revealing lessons that apply to insurance markets more broadly. Using rich claim-level data from a large firm, my analysis reveals that the strategic delay of treatment and the associated adverse selection may be an important factor in explaining why so few people have dental coverage in the US and why typical dental "insurance" contracts provide so little insurance. More generally, my results suggest that insurance products without contract features designed to limit coverage for strategically delayed costs (e.g., open-enrollment periods, pricing pre-existing conditions) may generate unraveling. An essay entitled "The Hated Property Tax: Salience, Tax Rates, and Tax Revolts" (with Caroline Hoxby), explores the relationship between the salience of the property tax and observed property tax rates. We hypothesize that high salience explains the unpopularity of the property tax, the level of the property tax, and prevalence of property tax revolts. To identify variation in the salience of the property tax over local jurisdictions and over time, we exploit conditionally random variation in tax escrow, a method of paying the property tax that makes it much less salient. We find that areas in which the property tax is less salient are areas in which property taxes are higher and property tax revolts are less likely to occur. In an essay entitled "Private Coverage and Public Costs: Identifying the Effect of Private Supplemental Insurance on Medicare Spending" (with Neale Mahoney), we explore the impact of private supplemental insurance on Medicare spending. Private supplemental insurance to "fill the gaps" of Medicare, known as Medigap, is very popular. We estimate the impact of this supplemental insurance on total medical spending using an instrumental variables strategy that leverages discontinuities in Medigap premiums at state boundaries. Our estimates suggest that Medigap increases medical spending by 57 percent---or about 40 percent more than previous estimates suggest. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that a 20 percent tax on premiums would generate combined revenue and savings of 6.2 percent of Medicare baseline costs. An essay entitled "The Effect of Insurance Coverage on Preventive Care" (with Mark Cullen), explores the effect of insurance coverage on preventive care utilization. Using health insurance claims data from a large company, this paper examines the implementation of an insurance benefit design which differentially increased the marginal price of curative care (non-preventive care) while decreasing the marginal price of prevention. We examine the effect of the differential price change on the use of preventive procedures. We reveal evidence consistent with an important negative cross-price effect; that is, increases in the price of curative care can depress preventive care utilization.

Author: Nathaniel Hendren
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 138

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This thesis studies the impact of private information on the existence of insurance markets. In the first chapter, I study the case of insurance rejections. Across a wide set of non-group insurance markets, applicants are rejected based on observable, often high-risk, characteristics. I explore private information as a potential cause by developing and testing a model in which agents have private information about their risk. I derive a new no-trade result that can theoretically explain how private information could cause rejections. I use the no-trade condition to generate measures of the barrier to trade private information imposes. I develop a new empirical methodology to estimate these measures that uses subjective probability elicitations as noisy measures of agents' beliefs. I apply the approach to three non-group markets: long-term care (LTC), disability, and life insurance. Consistent with the predictions of the theory, in all three settings I find significant evidence of private information for those who would be rejected; I find that they have more private information than those who can purchase insurance; and I find that it is enough to cause a complete absence of trade. This presents the first empirical evidence that private information leads to a complete absence of trade. In the second chapter, I show that private information explains the absence of a private unemployment insurance market. I provide the empirical evidence that a private UI market would be afflicted by private information and suggest the amount of private information is sufficient to explain a complete absence of trade. I present evidence a private market would still not arise even if the government stopped providing unemployment benefits. Finally, in the third chapter I use the empirical and theoretical tools developed in the first chapter to explore the impact of an adjusted community rating policy that would force insurance companies to only price based on age. My results suggest such a policy would completely unravel the LTC insurance market. Not only would welfare not be improved for those who are currently rejected, but the regulation would prevent the healthy from being able to purchase long-term care insurance.

Author: George William Blazenko
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 204

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Author: Pierre-André Chiappori
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN: 9780262033527
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 328

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Leading international economists offer new insights on recent developments in theeconomic analysis of the limits of insurability, with particular attention of adverse selection andmoral hazard.