Author: Heisnam Thoihen SinghPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Essays on Price Competition and Firm Strategies in Oligopolies
Author: Heisnam Thoihen SinghThree Essays on Price Competition in Oligopoly
Author: Shyh-Fang UengPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 118
Book Description
This research investigates three issues related to the economic performance of oligopolistic markets where firms produce differentiated products and compete in prices. First of all, this dissertation uses a Markov Perfect Equilibrium approach with fixed periods of commitment of actions to answer the question of what prices a duopolists will charge in equilibrium if they produce horizontally differentiated products, move alternatingly, and compete in prices forever. It is found that firms charge prices which are higher than Nash equilibrium prices but lower than the fully collusive equilibrium prices. Also, contrasted with the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot constituent game, the firm having the significantly higher demand responsiveness to its own price always charges a lower price than the other firm does although it has higher marginal cost. The dissertation then proceeds to study whether a firm can overcome its cost disadvantage by upgrading its product over the rival's, and if so, whether there exists a profit-division which will induce the low cost firm and the high cost firm to collude and no one has an incentive to cheat. The results show that (1) the ability of upgrading the product over the rival's can allow a high cost firm to earn higher profit than a cost advantaged low cost firm; (2) there exists at least one profit-division which can sustain full collusion; and (3) in the collusive equilibrium firms enlarge their quality differences to alleviate the price tension between their products. Finally, this work investigates the welfare effect of mergers which occur in an oligopolistic industry where firms produce differentiated products. It is shown that for the merger to be socially beneficial, the number of the merging firms must be less than the total number of firms in the industry minus the ratio of the products' own elasticity to cross elasticity. The analysis indicates that the welfare effect of a merger of a specific size depends on the substitutability among products of the industry.
Essays on Strategic Behavior in Oligopoly Markets
Author: Kosin IsariyawongsePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 204
Book Description
This dissertation addresses issues of strategic behavior of firms in oligopoly markets. In the first study we analyze how generic advertising affects brand advertising and firm profits in differentiated oligopoly markets. We develop two models, one with vertical differentiation and another with horizontal differentiation. In the case of vertical differentiation, we amend Crespi's (2007) model to show that only the high quality firm will use brand advertising. We also show that when differentiation is horizontal, the equilibrium is likely to be more symmetric in terms of each firm's profits, spending on brand advertising, and response to generic advertising. We also demonstrate that generic advertising will increase expenditures on brand advertising when firms play a supermodular game. In the second study, we analyze the interaction between generic advertising, brand advertising, and firm profits when products are differentiated either vertically or horizontally and brand advertising is purely informative. That is, brand advertising lowers consumer search costs of identifying brand characteristics. The model demonstrates that firms can benefit from investing in brand advertising that lowers consumer search costs as well as from brand advertising that is purely persuasive. In addition, the results demonstrate that whether brand advertising is persuasive or informative, the outcome is more likely to be symmetric with horizontal differentiation than with vertical differentiation. This study shows that brand advertising is a strategic complement when persuasive and a strategic substitute when informative. In the third study, we allow the choice of strategic variable, output and price, to be endogenous to the firm. We consider the case where one firm chooses output and the other firm chooses price, which we call a Cournot-Bertrand model. We provide a real world example of this "Cournot-Bertrand" behavior and show that the outcome can be a Nash equilibrium. Allowing the timing of play (early or late) as well as the strategic variable (output or price) to be endogenous, we demonstrate an outcome where one firm competes in output and the other firm competes in price can be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Three Essays on Firm Strategy and Public Policy
Author: Byung-Cheol KimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer protection
Languages : en
Pages : 250
Book Description
Three Essays on Strategic Trading in Oligopolistic Economies
Author: Alexei BoulatovEssays on Firm Conduct Under Imperfect Competition
Author: Ryo Sakamoto (Ph.D.)Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
One of the central questions in industrial organization is whether firms compete or collude in oligopolistic markets, given the significant implications of collusion for market outcomes and competition policy. An extensive body of literature has emerged, focusing on empirically analyzing the degree of collusion and measuring its impact on welfare. However, this task is challenging because observed higher prices may be attributed to various factors such as a high degree of collusion, increased product differentiation, or higher marginal costs-all of which are unobserved. In this dissertation, I propose a new structural model of demand and supply that enables the flexible estimation of firm conduct as continuous conduct parameters in differentiated products markets. A significant advantage of the framework is its empirical tractability, even when our focus is on the conduct of a large number of firms. This innovation is achieved through my unique setup of the supply-side modeling. Unlike the previous studies, I construct the supply side of the model using an oligopolistic model developed by d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and Gérard-Varet (2007). Their model captures competition among firms in two dimensions: one is competition for market share and the other is competition for market size. This dichotomous characterization reduces the number of conduct parameters, making the estimation feasible for a larger number of firms. Importantly, the model retains flexibility on the degree of competition from monopolistic competition to collusion. I apply the model to analyze the US corn seed industry using a proprietary dataset on farm-level transactions for genetically modified seeds. Despite concerns regarding the ramifications of the growing market power of large biotech firms, there is limited understanding of whether firms compete or collude in their pricing strategies. My estimation results show that the five largest firms are all engaged in imperfect collusion, and I reject benchmark conduct such as price and quantity competition. The low degree of competition translates into high price-cost margins, which I estimate at approximately 38%-51%. The results of counterfactual simulations indicate that seed companies extract substantial rent from farmers through non-competitive pricing, and total welfare loss is measured at $3.65 billion over the period 2008-2014.
Three Essays on Successive Vertical Oligopolies
Author: Joon LimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 254
Book Description
Oligopoly Pricing
Author: Xavier VivesPublisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN: 9780262220606
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 446
Book Description
Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.
Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games
Author: Pierre von MouchePublisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319292544
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 298
Book Description
This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.
The Economics of Competition, Collusion and In-between
Author: Claude d’AspremontPublisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 303063602X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 160
Book Description
This book provides a methodology for the analysis of oligopolistic markets from an equilibrium viewpoint, considering competition within and between groups of firms. It proposes a well-founded measure of competitive toughness that can be used in empirically relevant applications. This measure reflects the weight put by each firm on competition for market share relative to competition for market size – two dimensions of competition involving conflicting and convergent interests, respectively. It further explores several applications, such as the effect of tougher competition on innovation and of output market power on the emergence of involuntary unemployment, as well as the importance of strategic interactions for investment decisions. Relative to the dominant model of monopolistic competition, The Economics of Competition, Collusion and In-between aims to explore an alternative tractable model of firm competition opening the application of oligopoly theory to many fields in economics where general equilibrium features are crucial. It will be relevant to those interested in applied industrial organization, trade, macroeconomics (in particular macrodynamics) and quantitative economics.