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Author: Jeremy Waldron Publisher: Harvard University Press ISBN: 0674970365 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 369
Book Description
Political theorists focus on the nature of justice, liberty, and equality while ignoring the institutions through which these ideals are achieved. Political scientists keep institutions in view but deploy a meager set of value-conceptions in analyzing them. A more political political theory is needed to address this gap, Jeremy Waldron argues.
Author: Jeremy Waldron Publisher: Harvard University Press ISBN: 0674970365 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 369
Book Description
Political theorists focus on the nature of justice, liberty, and equality while ignoring the institutions through which these ideals are achieved. Political scientists keep institutions in view but deploy a meager set of value-conceptions in analyzing them. A more political political theory is needed to address this gap, Jeremy Waldron argues.
Author: R. A. W. Rhodes Publisher: OUP Oxford ISBN: 019103696X Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 836
Book Description
The study of political institutions is among the founding pillars of political science. With the rise of the 'new institutionalism', the study of institutions has returned to its place in the sun. This volume provides a comprehensive survey of where we are in the study of political institutions, covering both the traditional concerns of political science with constitutions, federalism and bureaucracy and more recent interest in theory and the constructed nature of institutions. The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions draws together a galaxy of distinguished contributors drawn from leading universities across the world. Authoritative reviews of the literature and assessments of future research directions will help to set the research agenda for the next decade.
Author: Stephen Haber Publisher: Hoover Institution Press ISBN: 0817996664 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 306
Book Description
Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America offers a new contribution to the literature on institutions and growth through the analysis of historical cases of institutional change and economic growth in Latin America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Author: Alexander Victor Hirsch Publisher: Stanford University ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 122
Book Description
This collection of essays studies the preferences of political actors over the policies that their respective political institutions enact; what those preferences consist of, how they change and are changed by their institutional environment, and how to measure them given that institutional environment. Traditionally, scholars of positive political science have assumed that 1) preferences are exogenous and fixed, and 2) policies may be ordered on a single left-right ideological continuum over which preferences are single-peaked. The first essay in this collection takes these assumptions as given. It asks whether the preferences of legislators may be properly estimated from observable votes in Congress if one of a broad class of lawmaking theories known as pivot theories describes the data generating process. In pivot theories the consent of multiple key actors known as pivots are necessary for successful policy change. Clinton (2007) argues that the behavior predicted by pivot theories is such that legislators' underlying preferences should not be recoverable from votes. The contribution of the first essay is to argue and present Monte Carlo evidence that this claim is false for a sensible modification of the theories. The broader implication of this finding is that measures of legislators' policy preferences generated from votes are valid for testing a broad class of Congressional lawmaking theories. The second and third essays in this collection both present theoretical models that push beyond the traditional assumptions on policy preferences. The second essay (co-authored with Kenneth W. Shotts) extends the basic spatial model to capture the notion of good public policy by assuming that policies, in additional to their ideological quality, may have a valence dimension that is endogenously determined by political actors. Using this model we revisit the canonical Congressional committee specialization game proposed by Gilligan and Krehbiel, and demonstrate how modeling committee specialization as the production of policy-specific valence generates results that starkly contrast with widely accepted propositions about legislative organization in the Congressional literature. The third essay departs starkly from the spatial model by assuming that political actors share identical preferences over policy outcomes, and that their differences in realized policy preferences are the consequence of openly differing beliefs about which policies will most effectively achieve shared goals. The essay develops this assumption in the context of a simple delegation game of policy choice and implementation, and shows that when additional learning about policy efficacy is possible policy disagreements driven by openly differing beliefs predict markedly distinct behavior from previously analyzed forms of conflict. In particular, when political actors share power over policy choice and implementation, they have short-term incentives to take actions that they believe will persuade each other that their beliefs are mistaken. One manifestation of this incentive can be the choice by one political actor of a policy he is certain will lead to a negative outcome, in order persuade another actor that an alternative policy is superior.
Author: Étienne Balibar Publisher: Duke University Press ISBN: 0822377225 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 376
Book Description
First published in French in 2010, Equaliberty brings together essays by Étienne Balibar, one of the preeminent political theorists of our time. The book is organized around equaliberty, a term coined by Balibar to connote the tension between the two ideals of modern democracy: equality (social rights and political representation) and liberty (the freedom citizens have to contest the social contract). He finds the tension between these different kinds of rights to be ingrained in the constitution of the modern nation-state and the contemporary welfare state. At the same time, he seeks to keep rights discourse open, eschewing natural entitlements in favor of a deterritorialized citizenship that could be expanded and invented anew in the age of globalization. Deeply engaged with other thinkers, including Arendt, Rancière, and Laclau, he posits a theory of the polity based on social relations. In Equaliberty Balibar brings both the continental and analytic philosophical traditions to bear on the conflicted relations between humanity and citizenship.
Author: Áron Kiss Publisher: Peter Lang ISBN: 9783631596760 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 132
Book Description
Coalitions and political accountability -- Divisive politics and accountability -- Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition -- Summary in German.
Author: Pranab Bardhan Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262261814 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 324
Book Description
This wide-ranging review of some of the major issues in development economics focuses on the role of economic and political institutions. Drawing on the latest findings in institutional economics and political economy, Pranab Bardhan, a leader in the field of development economics, offers a relatively nontechnical discussion of current thinking on these issues from the viewpoint of poor countries, synthesizing recent research and reflecting on where we stand today. The institutional framework of an economy defines and constrains the opportunities of individuals, determines the business climate, and shapes the incentives and organizations for collective action on the part of communities; Pranab Bardhan finds the institutional framework to be relatively weak in many poor countries. Institutional failures, weak accountability mechanisms, and missed opportunities for cooperative problem-solving become the themes of the book, with the role of distributive conflicts in the persistence of dysfunctional institutions as a common thread. Special issues taken up include the institutions for securing property rights and resolving coordination failures; the structural basis of power; commitment devices and political accountability; the complex relationship between democracy and poverty (with examples from India, where both have been durable); decentralization and devolution of power; persistence of corruption; ethnic conflicts; and impediments to collective action. Formal models are largely avoided, except in two chapters where Bardhan briefly introduces new models to elucidate currently under-researched areas. Other chapters review existing models, emphasizing the essential ideas rather than the formal details. Thus the book will be valuable not only for economists but also for social scientists and policymakers.
Author: Jeremy Waldron
Author: Jeremy Waldron
Author: R. A. W. Rhodes
Author: Stephen Haber
Author: Alexander Victor Hirsch
Author: Imtiaz Ahmed
Author: Étienne Balibar
Author: Joseph Marie comte de Maistre
Author: Áron Kiss
Author: Pranab Bardhan
Author: Frédéric Bastiat