Author: Jin Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description
Three Essays in Public Mechanism Design
Egalitarian Perspectives
Author: John E. Roemer
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521574457
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
Book Description
Fifteen essays, written over the past dozen years, explore contemporary philosophical debates on egalitarianism, using the tools of modern economic theory, general equilibrium theory, game theory, and the theory of mechanism design.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521574457
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
Book Description
Fifteen essays, written over the past dozen years, explore contemporary philosophical debates on egalitarianism, using the tools of modern economic theory, general equilibrium theory, game theory, and the theory of mechanism design.
Behavioural and Experimental Economics
Author: Steven Durlauf
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230280781
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 279
Book Description
Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230280781
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 279
Book Description
Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: Now Pub
ISBN: 9781601986443
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 72
Book Description
An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design brings together and presents a number of results on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that the authors have been working on in the past decade. This work examines the implications of relaxing the strong informational assumptions that drive much of the mechanism design literature. The objective is to provide the reader with an overview of the research agenda and present the main results of this research by illustrating it in terms of a common and canonical example -- the single unit auction with interdependent values. In addition, the monograph includes an extended discussion on the role of alternative assumptions about type spaces in the authors' work. It also discusses the literature to explain the common logic of the informational robustness approach that unifies the work that is surveyed in this monograph.
Publisher: Now Pub
ISBN: 9781601986443
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 72
Book Description
An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design brings together and presents a number of results on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that the authors have been working on in the past decade. This work examines the implications of relaxing the strong informational assumptions that drive much of the mechanism design literature. The objective is to provide the reader with an overview of the research agenda and present the main results of this research by illustrating it in terms of a common and canonical example -- the single unit auction with interdependent values. In addition, the monograph includes an extended discussion on the role of alternative assumptions about type spaces in the authors' work. It also discusses the literature to explain the common logic of the informational robustness approach that unifies the work that is surveyed in this monograph.
Who Gets What--and why
Author: Alvin E. Roth
Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
ISBN: 0544291131
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 275
Book Description
A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role. If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what. Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.
Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
ISBN: 0544291131
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 275
Book Description
A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role. If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what. Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.
Mechanism Design
Author: Rakesh V. Vohra
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139499173
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 185
Book Description
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139499173
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 185
Book Description
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
Robust Mechanism Design
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 981437458X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 471
Book Description
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 981437458X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 471
Book Description
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Radical Markets
Author: Eric A. Posner
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691196974
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 190
Book Description
Revolutionary ideas on how to use markets to achieve fairness and prosperity for all Many blame today's economic inequality, stagnation, and political instability on the free market. The solution is to rein in the market, right? Radical Markets turns this thinking on its head. With a new foreword by Ethereum creator Vitalik Buterin and virtual reality pioneer Jaron Lanier as well as a new afterword by Eric Posner and Glen Weyl, this provocative book reveals bold new ways to organize markets for the good of everyone. It shows how the emancipatory force of genuinely open, free, and competitive markets can reawaken the dormant nineteenth-century spirit of liberal reform and lead to greater equality, prosperity, and cooperation. Only by radically expanding the scope of markets can we reduce inequality, restore robust economic growth, and resolve political conflicts. But to do that, we must replace our most sacred institutions with truly free and open competition—Radical Markets shows how.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691196974
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 190
Book Description
Revolutionary ideas on how to use markets to achieve fairness and prosperity for all Many blame today's economic inequality, stagnation, and political instability on the free market. The solution is to rein in the market, right? Radical Markets turns this thinking on its head. With a new foreword by Ethereum creator Vitalik Buterin and virtual reality pioneer Jaron Lanier as well as a new afterword by Eric Posner and Glen Weyl, this provocative book reveals bold new ways to organize markets for the good of everyone. It shows how the emancipatory force of genuinely open, free, and competitive markets can reawaken the dormant nineteenth-century spirit of liberal reform and lead to greater equality, prosperity, and cooperation. Only by radically expanding the scope of markets can we reduce inequality, restore robust economic growth, and resolve political conflicts. But to do that, we must replace our most sacred institutions with truly free and open competition—Radical Markets shows how.
Game Theory And Mechanism Design
Author: Y Narahari
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814525065
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 533
Book Description
This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814525065
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 533
Book Description
This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.
Mechanism Design and Its Application in Management Science
Author: Yu Wang
Publisher: VDM Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
I utilize a mechanism design framework to show that the current most popular practice in the timeshare exchange industry can be greatly improved without a tremendous change in their fundamental systems. By focusing on the ten-billion dollar timeshare industry and proposing a superior mechanism to improve its operation, the research has signi-ficant substantive implications. At the same time, from the theoretical perspective, the research extends the literature on one-sided matching to cases where supply of resources is dynamic and resources can be stored. I also study the theoretical relationship between two impor-tant matching mechanisms: Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism and Top Trading Cycles and Chains (TTCC) mechanism. I show that given a specific chain selection rule of TTCC, it can be reduced to TTC. How-ever, this applies to only one special case and do not generalize to cases where other types of chain selection rules are used. Given the obvious link between the mechanism design work and the business systems that we observe in the marketplace, one of the potential contributions of my research is to encourage mechanism design study in management science.
Publisher: VDM Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
I utilize a mechanism design framework to show that the current most popular practice in the timeshare exchange industry can be greatly improved without a tremendous change in their fundamental systems. By focusing on the ten-billion dollar timeshare industry and proposing a superior mechanism to improve its operation, the research has signi-ficant substantive implications. At the same time, from the theoretical perspective, the research extends the literature on one-sided matching to cases where supply of resources is dynamic and resources can be stored. I also study the theoretical relationship between two impor-tant matching mechanisms: Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism and Top Trading Cycles and Chains (TTCC) mechanism. I show that given a specific chain selection rule of TTCC, it can be reduced to TTC. How-ever, this applies to only one special case and do not generalize to cases where other types of chain selection rules are used. Given the obvious link between the mechanism design work and the business systems that we observe in the marketplace, one of the potential contributions of my research is to encourage mechanism design study in management science.