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Author: Jorge Omar Moreno Trevino Publisher: ISBN: 9781124049090 Category : Languages : en Pages : 116
Book Description
This dissertation develops a matching model between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries to explain the assortative organization of credit relationships and the heterogeneity in the equilibrium contracts. The diversity in credit sizes and interest rates is determined by the optimal sorting and the matching incentives from supply and demand for credit given the differences in the intermediation costs, the competition induced by the heterogeneity on productivity of both entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries, and the prices of other relevant markets. To assess the implications of the framework, this dissertation works with a unique collection of datasets that combines information from banks, firms, and credit contracts for the commercial credit banking system in Mexico, and uses as source of experiment the observed expansion in banking activity resulting from a change in the law allowing the introduction of new commercial banks to the market. The empirical analysis presents a series of findings in terms of positive assortative relationships, market outreach, contractual outcomes, and implicit differential rents consistent with the implications of the model for a stable matching equilibrium and the comparative statics given an exogenous increase in the number of intermediaries.
Author: Jorge Omar Moreno Trevino Publisher: ISBN: 9781124049090 Category : Languages : en Pages : 116
Book Description
This dissertation develops a matching model between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries to explain the assortative organization of credit relationships and the heterogeneity in the equilibrium contracts. The diversity in credit sizes and interest rates is determined by the optimal sorting and the matching incentives from supply and demand for credit given the differences in the intermediation costs, the competition induced by the heterogeneity on productivity of both entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries, and the prices of other relevant markets. To assess the implications of the framework, this dissertation works with a unique collection of datasets that combines information from banks, firms, and credit contracts for the commercial credit banking system in Mexico, and uses as source of experiment the observed expansion in banking activity resulting from a change in the law allowing the introduction of new commercial banks to the market. The empirical analysis presents a series of findings in terms of positive assortative relationships, market outreach, contractual outcomes, and implicit differential rents consistent with the implications of the model for a stable matching equilibrium and the comparative statics given an exogenous increase in the number of intermediaries.
Author: Mengbo Zhang Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 298
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three chapters on banking and monetary economics. In Chapter 1, I study whether monetary policy is less effective in a low interest-rate environment. To answer this question, I examine how the passthrough of monetary policy to banks' deposit rates has changed, during the secular decline in interest rates in the U.S. over the last decades. In the data, the passthrough increased for about one third of banks, and decreased for the rest. Moreover, the deposit-weighted bank-average passthrough increased under a lower interest rate. I explain this observation in a model where banks have market power over loans and face capital constraints. In the model, when interest rates are low, the passthrough falls as policy rates fall, only in markets where loan competition is high. Hence, the overall passthrough depends on the distribution of loan market power. I confirm the model's prediction using branch-level data of U.S. banks. This channel also impacts the transmission of monetary policy to bank lending under low interest rates. In Chapter 2 (joint with Tsz-Nga Wong), we document a new channel mediating the effects of monetary policy and regulation, the disintermediation channel. When the interest rate on excess reserves (IOER) increases, fewer banks are intermediating in the Fed funds market, and they intermediate less. Thus, the total Fed funds traded decreases. Similarly, disintermediation happens after the balance sheet cost rises, e.g. the introduction of Basel III regulations. The disintermediation channel is significant and supported by empirical evidence on U.S. banks. To explain this channel, we develop a continuous-time search-and-bargaining model of divisible funds and endogenous search intensity that includes the matching model (e.g. Afonso and Lagos, 2015b) and the transaction cost model (e.g. Hamilton, 1996) as special cases. We solve the equilibrium in closed form, derive the dynamic distributions of trades and Fed fund rates, and the stopping times of entry and exit from the Fed fund market. IOER reduces the spread of marginal value of holding reserves, and hence the gain of intermediation. In general, the equilibrium is constrained inefficient, as banks intermediate too much. In Chapter 3 (joint with Saki Bigio and Eduardo Zilberman), we compare the advantages of lump-sum transfers versus a credit policy in response to the Covid-19 crisis. The Covid-19 crisis has lead to a reduction in the demand and supply of sectors that produce goods that need social interaction to be produced or consumed. We interpret the Covid-19 shock as a shock that reduces utility stemming from "social" goods in a two-sector economy with incomplete markets. For the same path of government debt, transfers are preferable when debt limits are tight, whereas credit policy is preferable when they are slack. A credit policy has the advantage of targeting fiscal resources toward agents that matter most for stabilizing demand. We illustrate this result with a calibrated model. We discuss various shortcomings and possible extensions to the model.
Author: Mark William Jenkins Publisher: Stanford University ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 135
Book Description
This dissertation studies the organization of consumer credit markets using a rich and novel dataset from a large subprime auto lender. Its primary goal is to develop empirical methods for analyzing markets with asymmetric information and to use these methods to better understand the behavior of subprime borrowers and lenders. The first chapter quantifies the importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in the subprime auto loan market and shows how different loan contract terms serve to mitigate these distinct information problems. The second chapter examines the impact of centralized credit scoring on lending outcomes, including the distribution of performance across dealerships within the firm. The third chapter studies borrower repayment behavior and quantifies the impact of ex post moral hazard on interest rates and the costs of default. Collectively, the three chapters provide a better understanding of the functioning of markets for subprime credit in the U.S. They also provide unique empirical evidence on the importance of asymmetric information and the value of screening, monitoring, and contract design in consumer credit markets in general.
Author: Mehmet Furkan Karaca Publisher: ISBN: Category : Electronic dissertations Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This dissertation consists of two chapters of my work on macro-finance and innovation. In particular, it studies the impact of the dynamic process of credit reallocation on aggregate innovative activities. The first chapter introduces the main focus of my dissertation. In addition, it reviews the literature and discusses the contribution of this dissertation.The next chapter builds a model to draw out theoretical predictions. In the model economy, borrowing firms choose whether to innovate or retain a mature technology, while lenders decide their allocation of credit. The credit market is characterized with financial and matching frictions and investigates the consequences of lenders' credit reallocation decisions on borrowers' innovation choices. We posit that the innovation process is time consuming (e.g. due to the length of R&D projects). The different amount of time needed for production with the new and old technology exposes lenders to a liquidity risk. The analysis shows that lenders tend to reallocate credit when they face liquidity risks. We show that an intensification of the credit reallocation process improves the matching between lenders and innovative firms but, overall, it disrupts innovation activities.The final chapter empirically investigates the impact of credit reallocation on innovation and tests the predictions from the model. We use a novel data set on bank balance sheets and the number of patents in Italian (a bank-centered country) local markets (provinces) during a period of great economic growth and tighter banking regulation. We construct measures of credit reallocation following the established literature on job reallocation and examine their effect on innovation. To address the concerns about the endogeneity of credit reallocation in the provinces, we exploit indicators of the geographical diversity of the 1936 Italian Banking regulation. We then estimate a two-stage model that in the first stage projects the rate of credit reallocation in a province onto an indicator of tightness of the banking regulation in the province and in the second stage projects the measure of innovation (the number of patents) onto the value of credit reallocation in the province defined by the tightness of local banking regulation. Consistent with the predictions of the model, we find that an increase in credit reallocation depresses innovative activity while aggregate credit growth helps to expand it. Furthermore, we show that our results are robust across empirical specifications, and carry through when controlling for a broad battery of province characteristics or altering the estimation period.
Author: International Monetary Fund. External Relations Dept. Publisher: International Monetary Fund ISBN: 1451922140 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 60
Book Description
Young people, hardest hit by the global economic downturn, are speaking out and demanding change. F&D looks at the need to urgently address the challenges facing youth and create opportunities for them. Harvard professor David Bloom lays out the scope of the problem and emphasizes the importance of listening to young people in "Youth in the Balance." "Making the Grade" looks at how to teach today's young people what they need to get jobs. IMF Deputy Managing Director, Nemat Shafik shares her take on the social and economic consequences of youth unemployment in our "Straight Talk" column. "Scarred Generation" looks at the effects the global economic crisis had on young workers in advanced economies, and we hear directly from young people across the globe in "Voices of Youth." Renminbi's rise, financial system regulation, and boosting GDP by empowering women. Also in the magazine, we examine the rise of the Chinese currency, look at the role of the credit rating agencies, discuss how to boost the empowerment of women, and present our primer on macroprudential regulation, seen as increasingly important to financial stability. People in economics - C. Fred Bergsten, American Globalist. Back to basics - The multi-dimensional role of banks in our financial systems.
Author: Klaus Hammes Publisher: Department of Economics School of Economics and Commercial Law Go ISBN: Category : Capital investments Languages : en Pages : 188
Author: Thomas Piketty Publisher: HMH ISBN: 0544663292 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 229
Book Description
Reflections on politics, the economy, and the modern world by the #1 New York Times–bestselling author of Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Thomas Piketty’s work has proved that unfettered markets lead to increasing inequality, and that without meaningful regulation, capitalist economies will concentrate wealth in an ever smaller number of hands, threatening democracy. For years, his newspaper columns have pierced the surface of current events to reveal the economic forces underneath. Why Save the Bankers? collects these columns from the period between the September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers and the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. In crystalline prose, Piketty examines a wide range of topics, and along the way he decodes the European Union’s economic troubles, weighs in on oligarchy in the United States, wonders whether debts actually need to be paid back, and discovers surprising lessons about inequality by examining the career of Steve Jobs. Coursing with insight and flashes of wit, these brief essays offer a view of recent history through the eyes of one of the most influential economic thinkers of our time. “Easy to follow for readers without much knowledge of economics, especially when [Piketty] picks apart topics that defy classical economic logic; in this he resembles Paul Krugman, who similarly writes clearly on complex topics . . . Helps make sense of recent financial history.” —Kirkus Reviews “Anyone with an interest in politics, monetary policy, or international diplomacy will get a kick out of Piketty’s clear discussion.” —Shelf Awareness “If you have been influenced by Piketty’s landmark work on inequality, make sure to read this next.” —Naomi Klein, author of The Shock Doctrine and This Changes Everything
Author: Martin Shubik Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262693110 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 472
Book Description
This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.
Author: Jorge Omar Moreno Trevino
Author: Jorge Omar Moreno Trevino
Author: Mengbo Zhang
Author: Conglin Xu
Author: Mark William Jenkins
Author: Mehmet Furkan Karaca
Author: International Monetary Fund. External Relations Dept.
Author: Jaemin Baik
Author: Klaus Hammes
Author: Thomas Piketty
Author: Martin Shubik