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Author: Thomas Rutford Covert Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This dissertation consists of two essays on the behavior of traders in opaque financial markets and one on the behavior of firms while they are learning to use a new technology.
Author: Thomas Rutford Covert Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This dissertation consists of two essays on the behavior of traders in opaque financial markets and one on the behavior of firms while they are learning to use a new technology.
Author: Menghan Xu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 117
Book Description
The dissertation consists of three essays on industrial organization with a particular focus on the structures of financial markets. The first chapter theoretically studies how search friction affects competition and resource allocation in crowdfunding loan markets, which are described using a many-to-one matching framework. Namely, competitive fundraisers must accumulate multiple investors to complete a transaction. I develop a dynamic matching model with a fixed sample search, a la Burdett and Judd (1983), in which fundraisers compete in interest rates while investors look for good investment targets. I highlight two important economic forces in the model. First, investors can only observe a limited number of quotes. Second, a surplus cannot be created until a fundraiser attracts contributions from enough investors. I show that in the presence of search friction, fundraisers implement mixed strategies to set interest rates in a unique stationary equilibrium, which results in rate dispersion even if the goods are homogeneous. Regarding resource allocation, I show that in the many-to-one market, rate dispersion creates an endogenous coordination mechanism among anonymous and independent investors, thereby making it easy for them to concentrate their investments. In other words, search friction improves allocation efficiency in a crowdfunding market compared with its perfect competition counterpart. Based on the theoretical framework constructed in the first chapter, the second chapter empirically studies the market structure of the crowdfunding market. I construct a novel data set based on a large panel of fundraisers' behaviors. Using reduced form analysis, I find evidence of persistent rate dispersion and funding mismatches, which are consistent with the theoretical predictions of the search model. I also show that the model is identifiable and can be estimated using a non-parametric approach, which allows me to measure the allocation efficiency. Regarding methodology, I demonstrate that it is sufficient to use projects' ranks to recover search friction primitives, which reduces the computational burden and increases the precision. The third chapter studies how the combination of adverse selection and moral hazard affects the design of financial contracts. Specifically, the chapter studies an optimal mechanism design problem,a la Mussa and Rosen (1978), in the presence of limited enforcement. In the study, the bank (principal) designs loan contracts to screen firms (agents) with unobserved productivities. Meanwhile, the bank cannot prevent the firm from consuming acquired funds without producing anything. The impediment of forming contracts creates an endogenous outside option for all borrowers. I show that in the optimal mechanism, loan sizes for higher types are decreased by ironing, i.e., by pooling on the top. In addition, the lower types produce at the second-best level. Moreover, I show that firms' participation is independent of the enforcement level.
Author: Mohammad Hossein Rahmati Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 248
Book Description
What motivates mergers in banking? The data show that merger activity is concentrated among very large banks. A large literature on the banking structure has studied this question by estimating cost functions and has provided mixed evidence. A crucial assumption is the exogeneity of input prices. If this assumption fails, result may be biased. This paper adopts the production function method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to separate the impact of productivity from scale economies in banking. To avoid this bias, I use recovery rates of non-performing loans, charge off rates, and cash holdings as proxies for productivity. The proxy method illustrates that the industry operates with significant diseconomies of scale, while the OLS method generates opposite results. Therefore, this finding supports the view that improvements in productivity cause mergers, which is also consistent with data. Finally, I introduce the Quantile Proxy Method to capture the impacts of both input endogeneity and size heterogeneity. This method reveals that medium size banks have largest diseconomies of scale, while top 5% experience somewhat extensive economies of scale. This result sheds light on the fact why many mergers occur among large banks: large parties involved in a consolidation benefit from both productivity improvements and scale economies.
Author: Thomas Rutford Covert
Author: Thomas Rutford Covert
Author: Soegeng Wibowo
Author: Toker Doganoglu
Author: Menghan Xu
Author: Massimo Tognoni (t.d.-)
Author: Gerard Joseph Wedig
Author: Pantelis Karapanagiotis
Author: Rodney Benjamin Wallace
Author: Emanuele Tarantino
Author: Mohammad Hossein Rahmati