Author: Min Jung ParkPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 306
Book Description
Essays on Incentives and Firm Behavior
Author: Min Jung ParkEssays on Incentives and Information
Author: Adam CopelandExecutive Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Antecedents and the Consequences, and the Role of Executive Personality
Author: Steffen Florian BurkertPublisher: BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN: 3947095104
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 233
Book Description
Top managers have a significant impact on organizations because they are responsible for the formulation and implementation of corporate strategies, have the visibility and influence to shape the opinions of internal and external stakeholders, and coin the culture of their organizations, affecting employees at every level of the organization. Research has focused on the drivers and consequences of top managers' actions, with a particular focus on executive compensation, but important questions remain unanswered. This dissertation contributes to the literature on top executives by examining the antecedents of executive compensation, the influence of executive compensation on executive behavior, and the interplay of executive compensation and top executive personality. The first study introduces the role of compensation benchmarking for determining executive compensation to the management literature. It finds that benchmarking leads to compensation convergence. The second study examines the impact of executive compensation complexity on firm performance. The results show that compensation complexity is negatively related to accounting-based, market-based, and ESG-based metric of firm performance. The third study explores the implications of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on the imitation behavior of firms. It finds that the introduction of RPE is positively related to the imitation of the strategic actions of peer firms. The fourth study contributes to the growing literature on the impact of corporate social performance (CSP) goals in CEO contracts. Specifically, it examines how and when CSP incentives influence the CEO's attention to corporate social responsibility topics. The final essay examines the role of CEO personality; it finds that differences in CEO personality explain differences in the level of strategic conformity. Taken together, the essays in this dissertation make a significant contribution to the scholarly discourse on the influence of top managers on their companies. The empirical evidence presented expands the current understanding of how top executives affect strategic firm behaviors, and it provides insights for policymakers, managers, and investors.
The Selten School of Behavioral Economics
Author: Axel OckenfelsPublisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642139833
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 299
Book Description
Reinhard Selten, to date the only German Nobel Prize laureate in economics, celebrates his 80th birthday in 2010. While his contributions to game theory are well-known, the behavioral side of his scientific work has received less public exposure, even though he has been committed to experimental research during his entire career, publishing more experimental than theoretical papers in top-tier journals. This Festschrift is dedicated to Reinhard Selten’s exceptional influence on behavioral and experimental economics. In this collection of academic highlight papers, a number of his students are joined by leading scholars in experimental research to document the historical role of the “Meister” in the development of the research methodology and of several sub-fields of behavioral economics. Next to the academic insight in these highly active fields of experimental research, the papers also provide a glance at Reinhard Selten’s academic and personal interaction with his students and peers.
Complex Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Impact of Compensation Design on Firm Performance, Turnover, and Organizational Justice
Author: Tobias OberpaulPublisher: BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN: 3947095112
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 202
Book Description
Compensation contracts have become ever more complex and individualized, particularly in the executive compensation domain, where increasingly diverse stakeholder demands and governance requirements have led to the inclusion of more and increasingly interrelated components into compensation contracts. Even the compensation of lower-level employees has become complex as firms individualize employee compensation and use many different rewards simultaneously. Research has examined elements of compensation in isolation but has attempted to avoid the complexities of compensation. This dissertation examines the consequences of compensation complexity and compensation design dispersion and contributes to a better understanding of compensation and its consequences for firms and employees. The first study examines how the complexity of executive compensation contracts affects firm performance. It finds that CEO compensation complexity negatively affects accounting, market, and ESG (i.e., environmental, social, and governance) metrics of firm performance and explores mechanisms that help explain the relationships. The second study examines the effect of compensation design dispersion within top management teams and its impact on executive turnover. The results show that compensation design dispersion affects executive turnover, both directly and in interaction with relative pay level. The third study addresses the role of compensation design dispersion in the development of procedural justice perceptions. Using two experiments, this study shows that compensation design dispersion causes lower procedural justice perceptions, which appears to be less problematic for participants with relatively easier to understand contracts. In summary, this dissertation provides a nuanced overview of complex compensation design and compensation design dispersion. The findings contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness of compensation as an incentive and sorting tool for organizations, and of the implications of compensation design for the functioning of teams.
Essays on International Taxation
Author: Dhruv SanghaviPublisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 9390077745
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Fiscally transparent entities and tax treaty eligibility Shefali Goradia Triangular cases – the neglected problem in tax treaty law Michael Lang Can tax treaty entitlement provisions for hybrid entities be refined? Dhruv Sanghavi Non-discrimination provisions in tax treaties Ajay Vohra Two to tango: a dance of substance and form Bijal Ajinkya Deconstructing Principal Purpose Test under Article 7 of MLI Mukesh Butani Preventing treaty abuse in the context of multilateral instrument Dinesh Kanabar and Saurabh Shah Taxation of digital economy – the journey, India and across the world Daksha Baxi Digitalisation of the economy: Our perspective on the OECD's Unified Approach Vikram Chand Reflections on the 2019 OECD proposal on Pillar One Guglielmo Maisto Implementation of BEPS and Amendments to Section 9 Radhakishan Rawal Public international law, object and purpose, MLI, BEPS and the OECD Model Tax Convention Clive M. Baxter Tax laws through a constitutional prism Arvind P. Datar Tax policy as a tool to enable impact investment and improve CSR targeting Meyyappan Nagappan and Nehal Binani Tax system design - an analysis of some design choices made by the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 Shreya Rao Through the looking glass: resolving tax disputes by arbitration under a bilateral investment treaty H. David Rosenbloom
Dissertation Abstracts International
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 594
Book Description
Essays on Corporate Risk Governance
Author: Mr. Gaizka Ormazabal SanchezPublisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 185
Book Description
This dissertation comprises three papers on the governance of corporate risk: 1. The first paper investigates the role of organizational structures aimed at monitoring corporate risk. Proponents of risk-related governance structures, such as risk committees or Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) programs, assert that risk monitoring adds value by ensuring that corporate risks are managed. An alternative view is that such governance structures are nothing more than window-dressing created in response to regulatory or public pressure. Consistent with the former view, I find that, in the period between 2000 and 2006, firms with more observable risk oversight structures exhibit lower equity and credit risk than firms with fewer or no observable risk oversight structures. I also provide evidence that firms with more observable risk oversight structures experienced higher returns during the worst days of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and were less susceptible to market fluctuations than firms with fewer or no observable risk oversight structures. Finally, I find that firms without observable risk oversight structures experienced higher abnormal returns to recent legislative events relating to risk management than firms with observable risk oversight structures. 2. The most common empirical measure of managerial risk-taking incentives is equity portfolio vega (Vega), which is measured as the dollar change in a manager's equity portfolio for a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of stock returns. However, Vega exhibits at least three undesirable features. First, Vega is expressed as a dollar change. This implicitly assumes that managers with identical Vega have the same incentives regardless of differences in their total equity and other wealth. Second, the small change in the standard deviation of returns used to calculate Vega (i.e., 0.01) yields a very local approximation of managerial risk-taking incentives. If an executive's expected payoff is highly nonlinear over the range of potential stock price and volatility outcomes, a local measure of incentives is unlikely to provide a valid assessment of managerial incentives. Third, Vega is measured as the partial derivative of the manager's equity portfolio with respect to return volatility. This computation does not consider that this partial derivative also varies with changes in stock price. The second paper develops and tests a new measure of managerial risk-taking equity incentives that adjusts for differences in managerial wealth, considers more global changes in price and volatility, and explicitly considers the impact of stock price and volatility changes. We find that our new measure exhibits higher explanatory power and is more robust to model specification than Vegafor explaining a wide range of measures of risk-taking behavior. 3. The third paper examines the relation between shareholder monitoring and managerial risk-taking incentives. We develop a stylized model to show that shareholder monitoring mitigates the effect of contractual risk-taking incentives on the manager's actions. Consistent with the model, we find empirically that the positive association between the CEO's contractual risk-taking incentives and risk-taking behavior decreases with the level of shareholder monitoring. Furthermore, consistent with the board anticipating and optimally responding to shareholder monitoring, boards of firms exposed to more intense monitoring design compensation contracts that provide higher incentives to take risks. Overall, our results suggest that, when evaluating risk-taking incentives provided by a compensation contract, it is important to account for the firm's monitoring environment.
Essays in Technology Management and Policy
Author: David J. TeecePublisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9789810244477
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 528
Book Description
This book examines the manner in which successful firms develop, transfer, protect, and capture value from technological innovation. In essence, it is about ?knowledge management?, which lies at the foundation of firm level competitive advantage in today's global economy. The essays contain some of the fundamental contributions to the field of knowledge management by one of its best-known thinkers; they also constitute an immensely practical guide for those managers who wish to look below the surface of what is going on in Silicon Valley and elsewhere.
Author: Yeon-Koo Che