Author: Mónica López-Puertas Lamy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 225

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Author: Mónica López-Puertas Lamy
Publisher: Ed. Universidad de Cantabria
ISBN: 8486116813
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32

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Book Description
El principal objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar los efectos que la estructura de propiedad bancaria tiene sobre la toma de riesgos, a nivel microeconómico y sobre el riesgo sistémico, a nivel macroeconómico. Para ello se desarrolla un modelo de competencia oligopolística y se analizan las propiedades del equilibrio de mercado en términos de beneficios, cuota de mercado y micro y macro estabilidad financiera cuando un banco comercial, maximizador de beneficios, compite contra un banco no orientado hacia los beneficios (stakeholder bank). Los resultados teóricos son validados empíricamente usando datos bancarios de 72 países durante el periodo 1997-2007. Concretamente se muestra que a) los stakeholder banks son menos arriesgados que los bancos comerciales, b) cualquier banco es más arriesgado cuando compite contra un stakeholder bank en lugar de contra un banco comercial, c) a nivel sistémico la presencia de stakeholder banks aumenta la estabilidad financiera, d) el efecto de la regulación bancaria y de la competencia en la toma de riesgos depende de la estructura de propiedad del banco, e) la concentración accionarial incrementa el riesgo bancario, f) el diseño de los incentivos gerenciales tiene un efecto muy significativo sobre la toma de riesgos bancarios.

Author: Ikuo Takei
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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In Chapter 1, I estimate a heterogeneous firm model on dynamic adverse selection with screening and signaling in public debt markets for privately informed persistent productivity, and quantify the effect of asymmetric information on misallocation of capital and financial liabilities. The firm's manager chooses between public debt (e.g., corporate bonds), priced on the accumulation of borrower's history, and monitored private debt (e.g., bank loans), allowing costly monitoring to be an imperfect substitute for reputation building. Cross-subsidization caused by asymmetric information in public debt markets leads to overinvestment of low productivity firms and capital misallocation. A good reputation lowers borrowing costs from public lenders. The firm's manager uses leverage and equity to send a good signal. However, neither reputation building nor monitored private debt substantially remove capital misallocation. I find precise information associated with productivity increases total factor productivity, decreases the variance of the marginal product of capital, and increases consumption by 1.4%. Less demand for monitoring lowers aggregate bank debt ratio by 6 percentage points. In the counterfactual policy analysis, the taxation of debt forgiveness under Chapter 11 reorganization generates a rise in consumer welfare by reducing low productivity firms' incentive to overborrow. Chapter 2 studies bank risk-taking. To understand bank risk-taking incentives, I construct a novel dataset of small and medium-sized U.S. bank Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation contracts and bank financials. First, I find empirical evidence of bonus and stock option compensations that explain the bank's poor performance and failure during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Second, I quantitatively evaluate regulatory policies for bank CEO compensation to promote long-run financial stability. I develop a dynamic model of banking with agency conflicts to characterize the effect of shares owned, bonuses, and stock options on risk-taking. The bank CEO faces trade-offs between short-termism for immediate payment of cash and long-termism for stability subject to costs of external equity issuance under capital regulation and deposit insurance. The model is calibrated to U.S. data using the novel dataset. Counterfactual analysis shows that the Euro bonus cap and U.K. remuneration code - limitations to the ability of the bonus payment - improve financial stability and welfare. Finally, I argue that the Dodd-Frank proposal of 2016, which included a combination of deferred dividends and bonuses, has a further improvement according to the model prediction. Heterogeneity in compensation among bank CEOs has aggregate consequences of designing a proper compensation system.

Author: Hyman Minsky
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317232496
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 329

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Book Description
In the winter of 1933, the American financial and economic system collapsed. Since then economists, policy makers and financial analysts throughout the world have been haunted by the question of whether "It" can happen again. In 2008 "It" very nearly happened again as banks and mortgage lenders in the USA and beyond collapsed. The disaster sent economists, bankers and policy makers back to the ideas of Hyman Minsky – whose celebrated 'Financial Instability Hypothesis' is widely regarded as predicting the crash of 2008 – and led Wall Street and beyond as to dub it as the 'Minsky Moment'. In this book Minsky presents some of his most important economic theories. He defines "It", determines whether or not "It" can happen again, and attempts to understand why, at the time of writing in the early 1980s, "It" had not happened again. He deals with microeconomic theory, the evolution of monetary institutions, and Federal Reserve policy. Minsky argues that any economic theory which separates what economists call the 'real' economy from the financial system is bound to fail. Whilst the processes that cause financial instability are an inescapable part of the capitalist economy, Minsky also argues that financial instability need not lead to a great depression. This Routledge Classics edition includes a new foreword by Jan Toporowski.

Author: Pascal Alphonse
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 303129050X
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 344

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Author: Shage Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Chief executive officers
Languages : en
Pages : 200

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Book Description

Author: Barry Eichengreen
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521448475
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 356

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Book Description
A new interpretation of the operation and macroeconomic repercussions of the international monetary system during the interwar years.

Author: Jan Toporowski
Publisher: Anthem Press
ISBN: 0857286560
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 158

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Book Description
The essays in this volume explain the key structural features of financial inflation that give rise to financial crisis. These features include excessive reliance on finance to maintain economic activity through rising asset prices. Reliance on asset inflation induces a preoccupation with property values and a new social divide between the asset-rich and the asset-poor that undermines the culture of the welfare state. When debt can no longer be supported by cash flow from asset markets, excess debt plunges economies into economic depression.

Author: Douglas D Evanoff
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 981322956X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 313

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Book Description
The central goal of this volume was to assemble outstanding scholars and policymakers in the field of financial markets and institutions and have them articulate significant market developments in their particular areas of expertise during the past few decades.Not just a celebratory volume, Public Policy and Financial Economics selected internationally recognized financial economists who have worked with Professor Kaufman during his years of scholarly research, and have a combined mastery of specialized financial markets themes and, very importantly, knowledge of public policies in the areas. All 15 chapters offer unique, innovative, and exciting expositions of several critical topics in financial economics.

Author: Haiwei Jing
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 210

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Book Description
Chapter 1 hypothesizes that some banks specialize in providing monitoring capital, which includes monitoring services in addition to financial capital, and that such specialization leads them to focus their lending on financially weak firms. I test this hypothesis by constructing a variety of novel measures of banks' monitoring skills and find that financially weak firms are more likely to match with banks that have high monitoring skills and that shocks to firms' financial strength cause them to switch to banks that are a better fit to their new monitoring needs. Chapter 2 investigates how the switching cost, as a result of informational frictions, affects firms' migration behavior. I propose a novel mechanism whereby banks can coordinate with other institutions with which they conduct business; when a relationship bank determines that its firm matching is inefficient, under some conditions, it can transfer the firm to the bank's partner. Using the loan spread residual as a proxy for unobservable credit shocks, I find consistent evidence that a firm with a larger magnitude residual has a higher likelihood of going to a bank that is not a relationship bank but rather a syndicate partner of its relationship bank; and when the spread residual is positively large, the bank partner to which the firm switches tends to put a high stake in the syndicate, which is consistent with its monitoring role for a distressed firm. Chapter 3 proposes that alliances are a channel for merger propagation when partnering firms have complementary resources. I confirm the mechanism's main prediction using US data on corporate alliances and merger activity: The likelihood that a firm will be involved in mergers and acquisition (M\&A) increases significantly if its partners have also engaged in M\&A during the previous two years. My empirical result is not explained by industry-wide M\&A activity or company characteristics. I present three additional empirical results: (i) The propagation effect is stronger when I include proxies for the strength of post-partner-merger resource reallocation, which is consistent with the mechanism, (ii) merger propagation effects are not merely localized but rather diffuse through the alliance network, and (iii) partner mergers also lead to a higher likelihood of entering new alliances.