Essays on Endogenous Matching in the Managerial Market PDF Download

Author: Fei Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 170

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Author: Oktay Akkus
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bank mergers
Languages : en
Pages : 134

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Author: Oluwaseyi Vincent
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 672

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Author: Michael Stops
Publisher: wbv Media GmbH & Company KG
ISBN: 3763941061
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 201

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Die Fragen, wie der Arbeitsmarkt funktioniert und welchen Einfluss die Politik ausüben kann, sind Dauerbrenner in der gesellschaftlichen und politischen Debatte. Das hierzu nötige Wissen speist sich aus der Arbeitsmarktforschung, die häufig Impulse aus dem Alltagsgeschäft der Arbeitsmarktpolitik bekommt. Umgekehrt laden Fortschritte in der Methodenentwicklung und der Datenerschließung die Arbeitsmarktpolitik dazu ein, neue Fragen aufzuwerfen, die bisher nicht beantwortet werden konnten. Michael Stops greift solche Entwicklungen auf und fokussiert drei Themenbereiche: - Berufliche Mobilität und Effizienz des Arbeitsmarktausgleichs - Die Entwicklung der Effizienz des Arbeitsmarktausgleichs vor, während und nach den Jahren der deutschen Arbeitsmarktreformen 2003-2005 auf beruflichen Teilarbeitsmärkten - Die Wirkung des flächendeckenden Mindestlohns in Großbritannien auf die Beschäftigung 1999-2012

Author: Xiao Yu Wang (Ph. D.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 145

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The primary goal of this thesis is to gain a deeper understanding of how institutional structure responds and evolves in equilibrium, particularly in the idiosyncratic and dynamic settings of developing economies. I use methods from market design to study these questions. The first chapter characterizes the equilibrium response of informal insurance relationships to changes in the formal sector, when risk-averse agents may choose what risk to bear in addition to how to share a given risk. The second chapter studies informal insurance relationships in a setting with one-sided moral hazard, and shows how the tradeoff between incentive and insurance provision shapes the composition and nature of informal relationships. The third chapter focuses on a more general setting, where the standard price mechanism fails or is not available, and provides an explanation for why the stable mechanism used in its place works well in practice, despite appearing to be easily manipulable. In the first chapter, I develop a theory of endogenous matching between heterogeneously risk-averse individuals who, once matched, choose both the riskiness of the income stream they face (ex ante risk management) as well as how to share that risk (ex post risk management). I find a clean condition on the fundamentals of the model for unique positive-assortative and negative-assortative matching in risk attitudes. From this, I derive an intuitive falsifiability condition, discuss support for the theory in existing empirical work, and propose an experimental design to test the theory. Finally, I demonstrate the policy importance of understanding informal insurance as the risk-sharing achieved within the equilibrium network of partnerships, rather than within a single, isolated partnership. A hypothetical policy which red c aggregate risk is a strict Pareto improvement if the matching is unchanged, but can be se n to h the most risk-averse individuals and to exacerbate inequality when the endogenous network response is taken into account: the least risk-averse individuals abandon their "oles as informal insurers in favor of entrepreneurial partnerships. This results in an increase in the risk borne by the most risk-averse agents, who must now match with each other on low-return investments. The aim of my second chapter is to understand the impact of optimal provision of both risk and incentives on the choice of contracting partners. I study a risky setting where heterogeneously risk-averse employers and employees must match to be productive. They face a standard one-sided moral hazard problem: mean output increases in the noncontractible input of the employee. Better insurance comes at the cost of weaker incentives, and this tradeoff differs across partnerships of different risk compositions. I show that this heterogeneous tradeoff determines the equilibrium matching pattern, and focus on environments in which assortative matching is the unique equilibrium. This endogenous matching framework enables a concrete and rigorous analysis of the interaction between formal and informal insurance. In particular, I show that the introduction of formal insurance crowds out informal insurance, and may leave those individuals acting as informal insurers in the status quo strictly worse off. My third chapter is motivated by the observation that mechanisms which implement stable matchings often work well in practice, even in environments where individuals could gain by using simple strategies to game the mechanism. Why might individuals refrain from strategic manipulation, even when the complexity cost of manipulation is low? I study a two-sided, one-to-one matching problem with no side transfers, where utility is interdependent in the following intuitive sense: an individual's utility from a match depends not only on her preference ranking of her assigned partner, but also on that partner's ranking of her. I show that, in a world of complete information and linear interdependence, a unique stable matching emerges, and is attained by a modified Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm. As a result, a stable rule supports truthtelling as an equilibrium strategy. Hence, these results offer a new intuition for why stable matching mechanisms seem to work well in practice, despite their theoretic manipulability: individuals may value being liked.

Author: Konstantinos Serfes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36

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We employ the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972) to study the endogenous matching patterns in a market that consists of heterogenous principals and agents. We show that, in general, the equilibrium matching is non-assortative. We then characterize the equilibrium relationship between risk and performance pay and risk and fixed compensation. This is the first paper that characterizes the equilibrium matching, to its fullest possible extent, building on the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) principal-agent model. This model has been used extensively in the empirical literature and therefore we hope that our results will be of great value to empirical researchers who wish to study a principal-agent market.

Author: Yu Yu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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While innovation and growth can be promoted internally through focus on research and development (R&D), many firms find acquisition from external sources to be a speedy and attractive alternative. Despite the numerous theories of merger and acquisition (M&A) in the literature, no empirical study has tackled the problem of target selection in an acquisition. The existing studies on M&A outcomes also fail to control for the endogenous matching between the acquirer and the target. Essay 1 of this dissertation is the first to study the target selection criteria in an empirical setting. It quantifies the elusive concept of synergy by developing new measures of similarity and complementarily between the acquirer and the target that are more comprehensive than the existing measures in the literature. Using an innovative application of the discrete choice model, I find that firms use acquisition to promote growth and innovation in areas of strategic interest. Specifically, acquirers choose target firms whose product markets match their own R&D projects, and target firms whose R&D projects match their own product markets. Essay 2 enriches the modeling approach for merger partner selection in essay 1. I use a game-theoretic matching model and study the impact of matching on merger performance. With a Bayesian estimation method, I apply the model to 1895 mergers in five high-tech industries that occurred between 1992 and 2008. I find that the unobserved strategic fit between the two merging partners has a significant effect on the post-merger innovation abilities of the combined firm. Managers wisely choose merger partners that deepen their technical knowledge, but under-estimate the challenges in integrating foreign partners and partners with similar technology. I also find evidence of estimation bias due to matching induced endogeneity. Essay 3 of the dissertation is a comprehensive review of the M&A related research published in top marketing journals. This review will provide marketing scholars with a research background on M&A, both in terms of theories and marketing applications of those theories. This review will help readers to appreciate the contribution made by marketing researchers to M&A knowledge, and hopefully inspire more marketing scholars to incorporate M&A topic in their research.

Author: Jingnan Liu (Ph.D.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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The first chapter studies how endogenous worker mobility affects inter-firm knowledge diffusion, innovation, and economic growth. I propose a framework combining endogenous growth and on-the-job search. Firms grow knowledge by in-house innovation and by hiring workers from more productive firms. Knowledge is nonrival, leading to underinvestment in innovation. Non-compete contracts address this underinvestment by allowing innovating firms to enforce buyout payments when they lose workers. However, they discourage diffusion by deterring firm entry. Linking patent records to matched employer-employee administrative data at the U.S. Census Bureau, I document that inventors diffuse knowledge across firms and are compensated for knowledge diffusion. Constructing novel microdata, I find non-compete contracts are associated with increased innovation expenditure and decreased worker mobility. I calibrate my theoretical model to match the empirical results. Knowledge diffusion, through the channel of worker mobility, accounts for 4% of the aggregate growth rate and 9% of welfare. Optimal regulation of non-compete contracts balances the innovation-diffusion tradeoff. The second chapter (joint with Martin Ganco, Haifeng Wang and Shotaro Yamaguchi) studies the strategic use of non-compete agreements. Extant work in strategic management has focused on the role of noncompete agreements (NCAs) - a form of restrictive legal lever used by firms when managing human capital - and conceptualized them as being advantageous to firms. Challenging this notion, we highlight a novel downside of using NCAs and show how their use by some firms creates differentiation opportunities for rival firms. We analyze a unique survey dataset to examine the heterogeneity in the firms' actual use of NCAs conditional on industry and state. We find that the nonuse of NCAs is more common among firms that rely more heavily on talent and are also not the industry leaders, and such firms are more likely not to use NCAs with the goal of attracting skilled employees. The third chapter develops a structural model of pre-college educational investment in college admission tournaments. Students are heterogeneous in ability, family wealth, and preferences for colleges and can purchase tutoring services to improve their human capital and test scores. They also face borrowing constraints. The score distribution, admission thresholds, and college assignment are joint equilibrium outcomes. The model is estimated with Korean ELS: 2005 data and can be used to study Korea's tutoring market with a wide range of policy candidates, including taxing private tutoring and reducing noise in admission. A tax lowers the overall spending on tutoring. The students from middle-income families are most responsive to the price change. Reduced signal noise incentivizes the tutoring expenditure of high-ability students and improves their chances of attending prestigious colleges.

Author: Ragupathy Venkatachalam
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3031152948
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 331

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This book presents frontier research on the use of computational methods to model complex interactions in economics and finance. Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and simulations offer effective means of analyzing and learning from large as well as new types of data. These computational tools have permeated various subfields of economics, finance, and also across different schools of economic thought. Through 16 chapters written by pioneers in economics, finance, computer science, psychology, complexity and statistics/econometrics, the book introduces their original research and presents the findings they have yielded. Theoretical and empirical studies featured in this book draw on a variety of approaches such as agent-based modeling, numerical simulations, computable economics, as well as employing tools from artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms. The use of computational approaches to perform counterfactual thought experiments are also introduced, which help transcend the limits posed by traditional mathematical and statistical tools. The book also includes discussions on methodology, epistemology, history and issues concerning prediction, validation, and inference, all of which have become pertinent with the increasing use of computational approaches in economic analysis.