Author: Arun Naresh AdvaniPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Essays in the Economics of Networks
Author: Arun Naresh AdvaniEssays in the Economics of Networks
Author: Edoardo GalloPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Social networks
Languages : en
Pages : 196
Book Description
Essays on the Formation of Social and Economic Networks
Author: Liza CharroinPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In a world where networks become a dominant form of organization, the structure of networks and the position of individuals in these networks affect individual behavior and aggregate economic outcomes. The analysis of network formation by a central planner or by individuals themselves is at the heart of this thesis on the economics of networks.Chapter 1 theoretically studies the optimal formation and protection of networks by a central planner knowing that an external agent can destroy k links. The protection of the network can be guaranteed either by densifying the links between nodes, or by protecting the links. When the cost of protection is relatively small, a minimally connected network composed of protected links guarantees the communication flow; if this cost is high, the optimal solution is to form a symmetric network where each node has at least k+1 non-protected links.Chapter 2 explores the decentralized formation of networks in the laboratory by analyzing individual linking formation decisions when one agent has a higher value than others and that the linking formation process is sequential. The results show that sequentiality facilitatesthe coordination on efficient networks but that do not correspond to the Subgame PerfectEquilibrium. The heterogeneity across agents increases the asymmetry of networks because of the polarization of links on the agent with a higher value.Chapter 3 studies the impact of the endogenous formation of networks on the importance of peer effects, applied to dishonest behavior. In order to identify the effects of social comparisons, two controlled environments are designed in the laboratory in which individuals choose or not their peers, and then observe their behavior. The results show that peer effects on dishonest behavior are significantly higher when individuals can choose their peers.
Three Essays on Networks and Public Economics
Author: Pier-André Bouchard St AmantPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 336
Book Description
This thesis is a collection of three essays. The first two study how ideas spread through a network of individuals, and how it an advertiser can exploit it. In the model I develop, users choose their sources of information based on the perceived usefulness of their sources of information. This contrasts with previous literature where there is no choice made by network users and thus, the information flow is fixed. I provide a complete theoretical characterization of the solution and define a natural measure of influence based on choices of users. I also present an algorithm to solve the model in polynomial time on any network, regardless of the scale or the topology. I also discuss the properties of a network technology from a public economic standpoint. In essence, a network allows the reproduction of ideas for free for the advertiser. If there is any free-riding problem, I show that coalitions of users on the network can solve such problem. I also discuss the social value of networks, a value that cannot be captured for profit. The third essay is completely distinct from the network paradigm and instead studies funding rules for public universities. I show that a funding rule that depends solely on enrolment leads to "competition by franchise" and that such behavior is sometimes inefficient. I suggest instead an alternate funding rule that allows government to increase welfare without increasing spending in universities.
Essays in the Economics of Networks
Author: Mircea Ioan MarcuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Recent developments in the economics of networks have shown the potential fallacies of using one-sided logic in two-sided markets. In the third study I develop a two-sided market model to analyze the pricing and quality decisions of a profit maximizing managed care organization (MCO) in the presence of indirect network externalities between doctors and patients. The managed care organization faces trade-offs when choosing the quality of service, insurance premiums, and physician reimbursements. These trade-offs depend on patient health risk and physician cost distributions, the elasticity of supply of physicians with respect to reimbursements, the marginal cost of service quality, and the marginal utility derived by patients from access to a broader network of physicians and the quality of health services. In the case of iso-elastic distributions of patient health risk and physician cost of treatment, an increase in the cost of providing quality decreases the quality provided by the MCO, which leads to fewer policyholders, lower physician reimbursements, and fewer doctors in the preferred network. The insurance premium also decreases. An increase in the health risk of the population results in lower quality, lower reimbursements, and fewer physicians in the MCO's network. The insurance premium also decreases, but the decrease is smaller than the decrease in individuals' utility due to lower quality and fewer physicians, which leads to fewer policyholders.
Essays in the Economics of Networks and Standards
Author: Tobias KretschmerEssays in the Economics of Networks
Author: A. N. AdvaniEssays on the Economics of Networks and Standards
Author: Tobias KretschmerEssays on the Economics of Networks and Social Relations
Author: Pekka SääskilahtiPublisher:
ISBN: 9789517919678
Category : Business networks
Languages : en
Pages : 163
Book Description
The Complex Networks of Economic Interactions
Author: Akira NamatamePublisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540287272
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 345
Book Description
Understanding the mechanism of a socio-economic system requires more than an understanding of the individuals that comprise the system. It also requires understanding how individuals interact with each other, and how the agg- gated outcome can be more than the sum of individual behaviors. This book contains the papers fostering the formation of an active multi-disciplinary community on socio-economic systems with the exciting new ?elds of age- based modeling and econophysics. We especially intend to increase the awareness of researchers in many ?elds with sharing the common view many economic and social activities as collectives of a large-scale heterogeneous and interacting agents. Economists seek to understand not only how individuals behave but also how the interaction of many individuals leads to complex outcomes. Age- based modeling is a method for studying socio-economic systems exhibiting the following two properties: (1) the system is composed of interacting agents, and (2) the system exhibits emergent properties, that is, properties arising from the interactions of the agents that cannot be deduced simply by agg- gating the properties of the system’s components. When the interaction of the agents is contingent on past experience, and especially when the agents continually adapt to that experience, mathematical analysis is typically very limited in its ability to derive the outcome.