Author: Myeong-Hyeon ChoPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 292
Book Description
Essays on Corporate Restructuring
Author: Myeong-Hyeon ChoEssays in Corporate Restructuring, Reputation and Law
Author: Andrea PoloPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bankruptcy
Languages : en
Pages : 344
Book Description
Essays on Corporate Restructuring
Author: Oneil M. HarrisPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 486
Book Description
Corporate restructuring may be defined as the reorganization of a company with the aim of improving efficiency. This dissertation examines two corporate restructuring activities, namely (i) spinoffs and (ii) mergers and acquisitions. The first essay examines whether poison pill adoptions by impending spinoff subsidiaries is consistent with goal of shareholder wealth maximization. The main implication of my findings is that poison pills do not deter takeovers; not even in environments where takeovers are more likely. Hence, poison pill adoptions may not be motivated by entrenchment. However, since managers' motives are never clear, investors react adversely to poison pill adoptions because of concerns about potential abuse of power by management. Interestingly, the evidence suggests that poison pills have a positive effect on firm value over the longterm. One possible explanation for this finding is that the potential for abuse associated with poison pills promote shareholder activism. Since activist shareholders closely monitor managers, poison pills indirectly enhance firm value. The second essay examines whether spinoff withdrawals are in response to (i) the market reaction to the initial spinoff announcement, (ii) changes in the estimated value of the unit over the spinoff interval, and (iii) changes in expected spinoff gains owing to changes in market conditions within the subsidiary's industry. It takes 7 months to complete an announced spinoff, on average, over which time industry conditions are likely to change. The main implications of my findings are that managers learn from the market and track changes in industry conditions when making spinoff decisions. It appears that managers time spinoffs for periods when the subsidiary's industry valuations are high to fetch a better price in the market for the unit. These practices are consistent with the goal of maximizing shareholders' wealth. The third essay examines whether having outside blockholders with a higher propensity to monitor managers cause variations in (i) abnormal announcement returns, (ii) proportional wealth gains, (iii) takeover premiums, and (iv) payment methods. The evidence supports the view that the types of outside blockholders that targets and bidders have, in relation to their propensity to monitor managers, affect bargaining position. Firms that have outside blockholders with higher propensities to monitor managers experience higher takeover gains because monitoring limits takeover related agency costs. Therefore, acquisitions create agency problems for minority shareholders of the target and bidder firms, when managers are not monitored.
Essays on Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency
Author: C. E. F. RickettPublisher: Brooker's Legal Information
ISBN: 9780864722034
Category : Bankruptcy
Languages : en
Pages : 265
Book Description
Essays on the Causes and Effects of Corporate Restructuring
Author: Audra L. BooneEssays on Financial Distress and Corporate Restructuring
Author: Kevin M. J. KaiserTwo Essays on Corporate Restructuring
Author: Dung Anh PhamPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
In the first essay titled "Divestitures and Acquisition Probability", I examine the relationship between a firm's divestiture activities and the likelihood that the firm will become an acquisition target. Using a logit model comparing a sample of target firms matched with a sample of non-target firms from 1986 to 2010, we find that a firm is 27 percent more likely to be acquired within three years of a divestiture activity than if there was no previous divestiture, and the effect is stronger for firms with fewer numbers of segments. Our finding is robust to modifications of control variables, to managerial entrenchment, as well as to alternative diagnoses. Consistent with the literature, we find the market reacts positively to a divestiture announcement. However, cross-sectionally we find the market reaction is positively related to whether or not the divesting firm adopts a golden parachute feature and negatively on the firm's number of segments which is related to the probability of future acquisition. In the second essay titled "The Choice of Divestiture and Long-run Performance: Asset Sell-off versus Equity Carve-out," I examine the post-divestiture long-run performance of two different choices of corporate divestiture, asset sell-offs versus equity carve-outs, and find that the choice of divestiture method has important implications for post-divestiture long-run performance. My findings show that the sell-off parents' long-run abnormal returns are significantly higher than those of the carve-out parents. I also find evidence that the long-term abnormal performance improves with a reduction in the diversification discount. The effect of the diversification discount is weaker for divesting parents with higher levels of R&D. My results further show that a firm's pre-divestiture number of segments and level of asymmetric information are positively related to the probability of an asset sell-off.
Three Essays on Corporate Restructuring : how to Effectively Reverse Declining Firm Performance
Author: Florian Alexander BlechschmidtPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate turnarounds
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Essays on Current Topics in Corporate Restructuring
Author: Carl Leonard SchwellnusPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Essays on Distressed Corporate Restructurings in the United States
Author: Yungang LuhPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bankruptcy
Languages : en
Pages : 406
Book Description