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Author: Bomi Lee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 176
Book Description
This dissertation contains two essays on the aggressive behavior of corporations in product market competition. In the first essay, I investigate how market structure can impact a firm's risk of facing predation by rivals, and hence, its financial policy decisions. Using a simple model, I demonstrate that a firm faces a greater predation threat when it meets the same competitor in many markets, as this competitor is able to internalize more of the benefit, degrading the firm's ability to compete in the future through aggressive actions today. I then test the predictions of the model using 2003-2011 panel data on store location across retail store chains in the US. I find that firms tend to expand more aggressively in markets shared with a competitor experiencing a substantial increase in leverage, or a decline in a credit rating, when they face that competitor in more of the other markets. The expansion relationship was found to be stronger in data from the 2008-2009 financial crisis, a period when difficulty in rolling over or obtaining new debt made it especially hard for weak firms to absorb losses. I also show that a firm facing the same competitors in many markets choose lower levels of leverage and that it decreases that leverage when a merger in the industry increases the amount of competitive overlap it has with other firms. These results suggest that firms are aware of the predation risk due to a competitive overlap and select financial policies to minimize this risk. In the second essay, I study the impact of internally generated funds on product market competition. More specifically, I investigate the idea that firms compete aggressively when their competitors face cash flow shortfalls. Testing this idea is challenging because competitor's cash flow changes are potentially endogenous with respect to firm's behavior. I address this problem in three ways. First, I investigate firm's reaction in a given market when its competitors face cash flow shortfalls outside of that market; this analysis is conducted using store location data on retail store chains. Second, I focus on the 2008-2009 financial crisis period in which retail store chains were hit by a negative demand shock which was hardly expected ex ante. Finally, I use a shock to local economic conditions which varies across markets and the different distributions of store locations across firms as instruments for the changes in competitors' cash flows. I find that a firm expands more in a given market in which it competes with rivals which face a more negative cash flow shortfall in the other markets. This relation is stronger when the competitors were highly leveraged before the crisis. Finally, I illustrate evidence that a firm responds more aggressively to competitor's cash flow shortfalls if it competes with that competitor in many of the same markets; this result is consistent with the prediction of the model in Chapter 1. These essays contribute to the literature by adding new evidence on the predatory behavior of corporations in product market competition.
Author: Bomi Lee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 176
Book Description
This dissertation contains two essays on the aggressive behavior of corporations in product market competition. In the first essay, I investigate how market structure can impact a firm's risk of facing predation by rivals, and hence, its financial policy decisions. Using a simple model, I demonstrate that a firm faces a greater predation threat when it meets the same competitor in many markets, as this competitor is able to internalize more of the benefit, degrading the firm's ability to compete in the future through aggressive actions today. I then test the predictions of the model using 2003-2011 panel data on store location across retail store chains in the US. I find that firms tend to expand more aggressively in markets shared with a competitor experiencing a substantial increase in leverage, or a decline in a credit rating, when they face that competitor in more of the other markets. The expansion relationship was found to be stronger in data from the 2008-2009 financial crisis, a period when difficulty in rolling over or obtaining new debt made it especially hard for weak firms to absorb losses. I also show that a firm facing the same competitors in many markets choose lower levels of leverage and that it decreases that leverage when a merger in the industry increases the amount of competitive overlap it has with other firms. These results suggest that firms are aware of the predation risk due to a competitive overlap and select financial policies to minimize this risk. In the second essay, I study the impact of internally generated funds on product market competition. More specifically, I investigate the idea that firms compete aggressively when their competitors face cash flow shortfalls. Testing this idea is challenging because competitor's cash flow changes are potentially endogenous with respect to firm's behavior. I address this problem in three ways. First, I investigate firm's reaction in a given market when its competitors face cash flow shortfalls outside of that market; this analysis is conducted using store location data on retail store chains. Second, I focus on the 2008-2009 financial crisis period in which retail store chains were hit by a negative demand shock which was hardly expected ex ante. Finally, I use a shock to local economic conditions which varies across markets and the different distributions of store locations across firms as instruments for the changes in competitors' cash flows. I find that a firm expands more in a given market in which it competes with rivals which face a more negative cash flow shortfall in the other markets. This relation is stronger when the competitors were highly leveraged before the crisis. Finally, I illustrate evidence that a firm responds more aggressively to competitor's cash flow shortfalls if it competes with that competitor in many of the same markets; this result is consistent with the prediction of the model in Chapter 1. These essays contribute to the literature by adding new evidence on the predatory behavior of corporations in product market competition.
Author: Burcu Esmer Publisher: ISBN: Category : Chief executive officers Languages : en Pages : 118
Book Description
In contrast, their rivals grow market share and exhibit significantly positive abnormal returns after their peer firm violates a covenant. Overall, these findings suggest that creditor influence over firms have dramatic effects on product market outcomes and rival firm behavior. Chapter three questions whether managers time the market when they make merger decisions. Merger and acquisition waves seem to correspond with market tides, cresting with bull markets. A contentious debate exists over whether this trend indicates managerial market timing ability. Pseudo market timing, introduced by Schultz (2003, Journal of Finance 58, 483-517), provides an alternative hypothesis to explain abnormal performance following events even when managers cannot time the market. I find that acquiring firms which use stocks as the method of payment exhibit negative long-run abnormal returns in event-time, but not in calendar time. Simulations reveal that even when ex ante expected abnormal returns are zero (i.e. managers have no market timing ability), median ex post performance for acquirers is significantly negative when event-time is used. These findings support pseudo market timing as an explanation for acquiring firm underperformance in the context of stock mergers.
Author: Mr. Andrey Malenko Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This thesis consists of three essays that examine various problems in corporate finance. The central theme of all essays is information asymmetry between agents. The first essay features information asymmetry between the headquarters and the division manager about investment projects of the division and studies the best way to provide the manager with incentives to invest efficiently. The second essay studies implications of asymmetric information between the decision-maker and the outsiders on exercise decisions of real options in several settings. The third essay features asymmetric information between sellers of assets and potential buyers and studies what selling procedures arise in equilibrium in a market with multiple sellers and potential buyers. More specifically, in Chapter 1 of the dissertation, I study optimal design of a capital allocation system in a firm in which the division manager with empire-building preferences privately observes the arrival and properties of investment projects, and the headquarters is able to audit each project at a cost. I show that under certain conditions the optimal system takes the form of a budgeting mechanism with threshold division of authority. Specifically, the headquarters: (i) allocates a spending account to the manager at the initial date and accumulates it over time; (ii) sets a threshold on the size of individual projects, such that all projects below the threshold are delegated to the manager and financed out of her spending account, while all projects above the threshold are audited and financed fully by the headquarters. I extend the model in several directions, including multiple audit technologies, multiple project categories, and the possibility of renegotiation. In Chapter 2, which is the product of joint work with Steven R. Grenadier, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, we study games in which the decision to exercise an option is a signal of private information to outsiders, whose beliefs affect the utility of the decision-maker. In a general setting that accommodates a variety of applications we show that signaling incentives distort the timing of exercise, and the direction of distortion depends on whether the decision-maker's utility increases or decreases in the outsiders' belief about the payoff from exercise. In the former case, signaling incentives erode the value of the option to wait and speed up option exercise, while in the latter case option exercise is delayed. We demonstrate the implications of the general model through four corporate finance applications: investment under managerial myopia, venture capital grandstanding, investment under cash flow diversion, and product market competition. In Chapter 3, which is the product of joint work with\ Alexander S.\ Gorbenko, forthcoming in the American\ Economic Review, we study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The key difference from the prior literature on competition among auctioneers is that we allow bidders to make bids in the form of contingent claims on future payoffs of the assets. The sellers compete for bidders by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options.
Author: Hongchao Zeng Publisher: ISBN: Category : Electronic dissertations Languages : en Pages : 118
Book Description
This dissertation contains three essays in corporate finance. In the first essay, using the presence of business combination (BC) laws to proxy for the monitoring strength of the takeover market, we examine how an active takeover market affects the level and valuation of corporate cash holdings. After accounting for potential endogeneity of state incorporation, we find that firms incorporated in states without BC laws hold significantly more cash than those incorporated in states with BC laws. We also find that the value of cash holdings used by firms to defend themselves against unwanted takeovers in the presence of an active takeover market is not discounted by investors. Our findings suggest a substitution effect between legal antitakeover protection and firms' use of cash protection. However, there is no evidence that these cash holdings lead to value destruction. Firms may use corporate payouts to signal internal governance quality and avoid a market discount placed on cash holdings. In the second essay, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the industry price-cost margin, the number of firms within an industry, and the level of import penetration to gauge the intensity of product market competition, we find that the speed of capital structure adjustment for firms in competitive industries is significantly faster than for firms in non-competitive industries. Further analysis reveals that this effect is driven solely by the capital structure movements of over-levered firms. While over-levered firms in competitive industries face higher levels of investment needs relative to those in non-competitive industries, they are significantly less likely to use debt financing and to deliberately deviate from target. In the third essay, we find that cash has a negative impact on the future market share growth of the old firms, evidence that can better explain the unwillingness of such firms to hold precautionary cash as they face increasingly more volatile cash flows in an imperfect capital market. Furthermore, we show that the relational strength between cash and product market performance evolves in a way that reflects a changing composition of manufacturing firms which progressively tilts toward young firms.
Author: Haofei Zhang Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This thesis consists of three essays on financial markets, product markets, information markets, and their interaction. Chapter 1 offers an introduction of the essays and summarizes the main findings. Chapter 2 studies how product markets shape managerial short-termism (myopia). It shows that under market competition, managerial short-termism may arise endogenously as a means for firms to commit to competing aggressively. Such managerial short-termism is facilitated by financial markets as firms tie their managers' pay to the short-term stock prices. The following two chapters focus on the interaction between financial markets and information markets; both chapters demonstrate that information markets are crucial in determining asset prices and market quality in financial markets. Chapter 3 develops an information-sales model in which investors acquire uncertain skills to interpret purchased data, thereby changing the behavior of data sellers. It leads to several novel results (e.g., price informativeness increases with skill-acquisition costs), which help clarify certain empirical regularities. Chapter 4 examines sales of financial market information in an economy with two information sellers. In equilibrium, the two sellers form either orthogonal or overlapping clientele, depending on the similarity of the information to be sold. When the two sellers' information is very distinct and the sellers have relatively large bargaining power in sharing trading profits, investors' information purchase behavior exhibits complementarity, leading to the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Author: Yan Wang Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
"This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay provides a systematic way to distinguish informed institutional trades from uninformed ones based on the relation between institutional trades and sequential public information. By studying actively managed U.S. institutions from 1994 to 2010, I show that institutional trades initiated by managers responding proactively to upcoming informational signals strongly predict future stock returns. A hedging portfolio based on these trades generates an average risk-adjusted abnormal return of approximately 3% per quarter. The predictability is more pronounced for stocks with higher information asymmetry, such as those of firms with high volatility and young age. I also find that the most informed institutional traders are likely to have short-term investment horizon, large block holdings, high industry portfolio concentrations, as well as reside in financial centers. My results indicate that the informedness of certain institutional investor groups is substantially reduced after Regulation FD. The second essay examines the product market impact of minority stake acquisitions. We show that partial equity ownership between rival firms has a significant impact on industry competition. Industry-level tests indicate that acquisitions of a minority stake in competing firms' equity are followed by higher output prices and higher price-cost margins, particularly in industries with high barriers to entry. Stock-price reactions of non-participating competitors of the acquirer and target are positive while announcement returns of customer firms are negative. Moreover, the positive (negative) stock-price reaction of competitors (customers) is more pronounced when the acquirer and target are larger firms with greater market share. These results indicate that equity ownership of rival firms dampens competition in an industry.The third essay examines whether foreign firms by listing on or delisting from regular U.S. stock exchanges affect their U.S. counterparts. We find that they do - negatively for listings and positively for delistings, - and the impact is especially profound for the listing events. The U.S. counterparts of foreign firms belonging to the same industry experience severe underperformance in the short- and long-run across a variety of financial and accounting performance metrics, such as firm returns as well as growth in sales, profits, total assets, and capital expenditures. For example, the average 60-day cumulative abnormal return of U.S. firms around the foreign listing date is negative 2%, while the 36-month post-listing return is negative 4.3%. This result is present among listings with and without U.S. equity issuance. In addition, incumbent U.S. firms experience changes in their financing policies and a reduction in analyst coverage following listings of competing foreign firms in the U.S. Our findings therefore highlight an important role of international markets in influencing U.S. firms and markets. " --
Author: Bomi Lee
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