Author: Tai-Yeong Chung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Essays on Contract Remedies, Incomplete Contracts, and Renegotiation
Author: Tai-Yeong Chung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
Author: Birger Wernerfelt
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
The parties to a contract typically make a lot of decisions during the time it is in force, and the paper is based on the premise that it takes time to be involved in any one of these decisions. Attempts to economize on decision-making time then imply that the parties may write a contract in which each cedes some decision rights to the other. The cost of the arrangement is that the information and preferences of the uninvolved party are neglected. We find that decisions are more likely to be left out of contracts if only one player attaches significant weight to them and simultaneously is well informed. While the direct effect of this may be small, it is dramatically amplified if the decision-maker can be disciplined by the threat of renegotiation. We identify a set of conditions under which the possibility of renegotiation allows the parties to leave all non-price decisions out of the contract. By thus arguing that the threat of renegotiation allows contractual incompleteness, the paper reverses the direction of causality stressed by the literature.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
The parties to a contract typically make a lot of decisions during the time it is in force, and the paper is based on the premise that it takes time to be involved in any one of these decisions. Attempts to economize on decision-making time then imply that the parties may write a contract in which each cedes some decision rights to the other. The cost of the arrangement is that the information and preferences of the uninvolved party are neglected. We find that decisions are more likely to be left out of contracts if only one player attaches significant weight to them and simultaneously is well informed. While the direct effect of this may be small, it is dramatically amplified if the decision-maker can be disciplined by the threat of renegotiation. We identify a set of conditions under which the possibility of renegotiation allows the parties to leave all non-price decisions out of the contract. By thus arguing that the threat of renegotiation allows contractual incompleteness, the paper reverses the direction of causality stressed by the literature.
The Evolution of Contract Remedies (and Why Do Contracts Professors Teach Remedies First?).
Author: George G. Triantis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This essay traces the evolution of the scholarly understanding of contract remedies, beginning with the era in which the compensation principle and expectation damages dominated. Fuller and Perdue's classic articles in 1936-7 and, later, the theory of efficient breach both offered important justifications for the principle. However, as economic analysis extended to incorporate a wider range of incentive and risk-bearing goals, the support for the compensation principle became increasingly frayed. Subsequently, the emergence of the incomplete contracts theory further weakened its normative significance. In practice, the cutting-edge uses of contract damages pursue several other objectives, unrelated to compensation. In particular, damages promote contracting goals by (a) providing the price for embedded options or (b) setting the stakes and thereby incentives for future litigation. Finally, the paper discusses the design of “tiered” damages within a single contract that are triggered by different contingencies. In this sense, damages and conditions act as complements as well as substitutes. In light of the complex role played by contract remedies, the essay suggests that this topic should be taught near the end rather than beginning of the first-year contracts course.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This essay traces the evolution of the scholarly understanding of contract remedies, beginning with the era in which the compensation principle and expectation damages dominated. Fuller and Perdue's classic articles in 1936-7 and, later, the theory of efficient breach both offered important justifications for the principle. However, as economic analysis extended to incorporate a wider range of incentive and risk-bearing goals, the support for the compensation principle became increasingly frayed. Subsequently, the emergence of the incomplete contracts theory further weakened its normative significance. In practice, the cutting-edge uses of contract damages pursue several other objectives, unrelated to compensation. In particular, damages promote contracting goals by (a) providing the price for embedded options or (b) setting the stakes and thereby incentives for future litigation. Finally, the paper discusses the design of “tiered” damages within a single contract that are triggered by different contingencies. In this sense, damages and conditions act as complements as well as substitutes. In light of the complex role played by contract remedies, the essay suggests that this topic should be taught near the end rather than beginning of the first-year contracts course.
Three Essays on Dispute Resolution and Incomplete Contracts
Author: Kathryn Elizabeth Spier
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
Unverifiable Information, Incomplete Contracts, and Renegotiation
Author: Georg Nöldeke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description
Essays on Optimal Contracts and Renegotiation
Three Essays on Contract Renegotiation
Author: Hojin Jung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 218
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 218
Book Description
Contract Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Formation
Contract renegotiation under asymmetric information
Author: Sönje Reiche
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Academic theses
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Academic theses
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description