Author: Péter Ernő EsőPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 129
Book Description
Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author: Péter Ernő EsőPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 129
Book Description
Three Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author: Luke HuPublisher:
ISBN: 9783844025132
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
Book Description
Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author: Kwanghyun KimThree Essays on Mechanism Design and Auctions
Author: Ilaria CingottiniEssays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author: Alessandro PavanPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 209
Book Description
Four essays in the theory of auctions and mechanism design. Chapter one introduces a Markovian revelation principle for common agency games ; chapter two derives the optimal disclosure policy ; chapter three considers a monopolist who sells a durable good, which is subsequently traded in a secondary market ; chapter four considers auctions for divisible goods, like Treasury securities.
Essays on Auctions, Mechanism Design, and Repeated Games
Author: Krittanai LaohakunakornThree Essays
Author: Rong ChenEssays on Mechanism Design
Author: Filippo BalestrieriPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 142
Book Description
(cont.) In Chapter 3 we initiate the formal analysis of the First Price-First Score Auction in a general context where the auctioneer is a seller and two bidders compete to buy one indivisible good. The auctioneer's preferences are assumed to directly depend on the identity of the buyer to whom the good is allocated. In this auction, the bidders submit monetary bids, and then the seller decides which bid to accept after comparing the bidders' scores. A particular class of auction we focus on have simple scoring functions: each bidder's score is given by the summation of his bid and a bidder-specific additional parameter. Our main goal is to obtain the specification of the problem that generates a closed-form analytical solutions for the bidding strategies. The task is complicated as there are at least two sources of asymmetries inherent to the problem that can quickly lead to intractable formulas. The main contribution of this work is to provide closed formulas for the inverse bidding functions. Our results generalize the comparison of bidding strategies in asymmetric first price auctions obtained by Maskin and Riley (2002). Even if the asymmetry between the bidders is exogenously introduced by the auctioneer, in equilibrium the disadvantaged bidder bids more aggressively. We are also able to determine the ranges of bids that can be submitted by the two bidders. They are actually different, and their extremes depend on the extra-bid parameter.
Essays on Mechanism Design and Multiple Privately Informed Principals
Author: Nicolás RiquelmePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 149
Book Description
"This dissertation is a collection of three papers studying both theoretical and applied aspects of mechanism design. In Chapter 1, we study competing auctions where each seller has private information about the quality of his object and chooses the reserve price of a second-price auction. Buyers observe the reserve prices and decide which auction to participate in. For a class of primitives, we show that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists for any finite market. In any such PBE, higher quality is signaled through higher reserve price at the expense of trade opportunities. But there might be bunching regions causing inefficiencies. In fact, in the large-market limit characterized by a directed search model, the interaction of adverse selection and search frictions entail distortion at the bottom: when either the buyer-seller ratio is sufficiently large or a regularity condition is met, there is no separating PBE in which the lowest-quality seller sets reserve price equal to his opportunity cost. This finding carries over to large finite markets and is consistent with observed behavior in auctions for used cars in UK (Choi, Nesheim and Rasul, 2016). In Chapter 2, we study games where a group of privately informed principals design mechanisms to a common agent. The agent has private information (exogenous) and, after observing principals' mechanisms, may have information (endogenous) about feasible allocations and private information from each principal. Thus, each principal may be interested in designing a mechanism to screen all this information, for which a potentially complicated message space to convey this information might be needed. In this project, we provide sufficient conditions on the agent's payoff such that any equilibrium in this setup has an output-equivalent equilibrium using only mechanisms with simple message spaces (direct mechanisms). Depending on the conditions, we propose two different notions of direct mechanisms and discuss their applicability with some examples. In Chapter 3, we study the design of horizontal merger regulation in a Cournot competition setting, where firms are privately informed about production technology. More specifically, a consumer-surplus-maximizer regulator designs a mechanism which determines whether the merger is blocked or accepted, and sets structural remedies (divestitures). This problem does not have the usual quasi-linear structure commonly assumed in the mechanism design literature. We first characterize incentive-compatible mechanisms and then find the optimal one. The complete information case is also presented as a benchmark. Asymmetric information induces important distortions in regulatory decisions. First, every rejected merge would improve consumer surplus. Second, every merge that decreases consumer surplus would be approved. Lastly, every merge rightly approved would be asked fewer divestitures than the optimal one (under-fixing effect). These results seem consistent with recent empirical evidence on the ineffectiveness of the merger regulation"--Pages vii-viii.
Essays on Mechanism Design
Author: Gregory PavlovPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 151
Book Description
In this dissertation we address several open problems in the theory of mechanism design: (i) optimal mechanism design when agents collude; (ii) multidimensional mechanism design problem of the multiproduct monopolist; (iii) robust predictions of the relative revenue loss from the bidders' collusion in the optimal auctions.