Author: Aziz A. LookmanPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Essays in Corporate Risk Management
Author: Aziz A. LookmanEssays on Corporate Risk Management
Author: Adnan Anil IsinEssays on Corporate Risk Governance
Author: Mr. Gaizka Ormazabal SanchezPublisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 185
Book Description
This dissertation comprises three papers on the governance of corporate risk: 1. The first paper investigates the role of organizational structures aimed at monitoring corporate risk. Proponents of risk-related governance structures, such as risk committees or Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) programs, assert that risk monitoring adds value by ensuring that corporate risks are managed. An alternative view is that such governance structures are nothing more than window-dressing created in response to regulatory or public pressure. Consistent with the former view, I find that, in the period between 2000 and 2006, firms with more observable risk oversight structures exhibit lower equity and credit risk than firms with fewer or no observable risk oversight structures. I also provide evidence that firms with more observable risk oversight structures experienced higher returns during the worst days of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and were less susceptible to market fluctuations than firms with fewer or no observable risk oversight structures. Finally, I find that firms without observable risk oversight structures experienced higher abnormal returns to recent legislative events relating to risk management than firms with observable risk oversight structures. 2. The most common empirical measure of managerial risk-taking incentives is equity portfolio vega (Vega), which is measured as the dollar change in a manager's equity portfolio for a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of stock returns. However, Vega exhibits at least three undesirable features. First, Vega is expressed as a dollar change. This implicitly assumes that managers with identical Vega have the same incentives regardless of differences in their total equity and other wealth. Second, the small change in the standard deviation of returns used to calculate Vega (i.e., 0.01) yields a very local approximation of managerial risk-taking incentives. If an executive's expected payoff is highly nonlinear over the range of potential stock price and volatility outcomes, a local measure of incentives is unlikely to provide a valid assessment of managerial incentives. Third, Vega is measured as the partial derivative of the manager's equity portfolio with respect to return volatility. This computation does not consider that this partial derivative also varies with changes in stock price. The second paper develops and tests a new measure of managerial risk-taking equity incentives that adjusts for differences in managerial wealth, considers more global changes in price and volatility, and explicitly considers the impact of stock price and volatility changes. We find that our new measure exhibits higher explanatory power and is more robust to model specification than Vegafor explaining a wide range of measures of risk-taking behavior. 3. The third paper examines the relation between shareholder monitoring and managerial risk-taking incentives. We develop a stylized model to show that shareholder monitoring mitigates the effect of contractual risk-taking incentives on the manager's actions. Consistent with the model, we find empirically that the positive association between the CEO's contractual risk-taking incentives and risk-taking behavior decreases with the level of shareholder monitoring. Furthermore, consistent with the board anticipating and optimally responding to shareholder monitoring, boards of firms exposed to more intense monitoring design compensation contracts that provide higher incentives to take risks. Overall, our results suggest that, when evaluating risk-taking incentives provided by a compensation contract, it is important to account for the firm's monitoring environment.
Essays on Corporate Risk Management
Author: Jiyeon YunPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 152
Book Description
In my dissertation, I examine corporate risk management behavior of U.S. insurers. In my first essay, I investigate the effects of executive compensation on corporate risk management. Because risk averse managers may underinvest and reduce risk beyond what is optimal for investors, I examine whether firms can encourage managerial risk taking through compensation that leads managers to hedge less. Our unique dataset allows us to build the comprehensive and clean measure of corporate hedging behavior. Utilizing the implementation of FAS 123R, paper finds that CEO compensation has a causal effect on their firms' overall hedging. In addition, paper provides strong evidence that CEO compensation has a causal effect on firms' insurance demand but only weak evidence on derivative usage. In my second essay, I investigate whether Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) creates value by allowing firms to take more strategic business risk and greater advantage of opportunities in their core business. Firms that engage in ERM should be able to better understand the aggregate risk inherent in different business activities. With an increased understanding in a firm's risk profile, ERM adopting firms should take a more strategic approach to risk management and expand risk-taking in areas where they do have a comparative advantage. We find that ERM adopting firms are increasing its share of core risk. We also find that life insurers have significantly higher share of core risk. ERM firms are increasing its share of core risk not through the risk substitution with non-core risk but by increasing its non-core risk. This provides evidence that ERM firms are recognizing interactions among sources of risks and the benefits of natural hedges.
Essays on Corporate Risk Management
Author: The Fantods of Risk
Author: Ann Blair KlomanPublisher: Xlibris Corporation
ISBN: 1450045707
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 133
Book Description
The Fantods of Risk is a collection of essays from the pages of Risk Management Reports, which the author edited, wrote and published from 1974 through 2007, plus several other published articles. The subject is risk management, a discipline for dealing with uncertainty in our personal and organizational lives. They continue the author’s contrary and challenging approach to managing risk, first started in Risk Management Reports and later in Mumpsimus Revisited, published in 2005.
Two Essays in Corporate Risk Management
Author: Betty J. SimkinsThe Fantods of Risk
Author: H. Felix KlomanPublisher: Xlibris Corporation
ISBN: 1436302269
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 133
Book Description
The Fantods of Risk is a collection of essays from the pages of Risk Management Reports, which the author edited, wrote and published from 1974 through 2007, plus several other published articles. The subject is risk management, a discipline for dealing with uncertainty in our personal and organizational lives. They continue the author's contrary and challenging approach to managing risk, first started in Risk Management Reports and later in Mumpsimus Revisited, published in 2005.
Essays on Corporate Risk Management
Author: 姚文韜Essays on Corporate Risk Management
Author: Jaideep Singh OberoiPublisher:
ISBN: 9780494775356
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description