Author: Santhosh Abraham
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 193
Book Description
Essays in Corporate Disclosure Practises
Three Essays in Corporate Disclosure
Three Essays on Corporate Disclosure and Information Externalities
Author: Yetaotao Qiu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This dissertation includes three essays on corporate disclosure and information externalities. In the first essay, I examine the disclosure behavior of rival firms identified by an Initial Public Offering (IPO) candidate during the IPO quiet period when the IPO candidate is restricted in its communication. I find that the tone of disclosures made by identified rivals becomes more positive during the quiet period, and reverses after the quiet period ends. The strategic disclosure behavior is mainly driven by identified rivals' concerns over product market competition. I also find that this behavior hurts the IPO candidate and benefits the identified rivals. In the second essay, I investigate the relations between IPO firms' peer choice and peer information environment. I find that IPO firms tend to select peer companies with a better information environment, and this effect is more pronounced for IPO firms with greater information uncertainties. I also find support that peer information environment is positively associated with upward offering price revision, post-offering analyst coverage, and negatively associated with the number of amendment filings. Overall, this essay shows that IPO firms can make use of the externalities of peer information to facilitate their initial public offerings. In the third essay, I switch my focus from intra-industry relations to supply chain relations. More specifically, I study the effects of layoff announcements by customers on the valuation and operating performance of their supply chain partners. I find that suppliers experience a negative stock price reaction around their major customers' layoff announcements. The negative price effect is exacerbated when industry rivals of layoff-announcing customers also suffer from negative intra-industry contagion effects. Moreover, these supply chain spillover effects are asymmetric, with only "bad news" layoff announcements causing significant value implications for suppliers, but not "good news" announcements. Supplier firms also reduce their investment in and sales dependence on layoff-announcing customers in subsequent years. Keywords: Disclosure; Product market competition; IPO quiet period; Identified rivals; Information externalities; Peer information environment; Corporate layoffs, Supply chain relations; Stock market return
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This dissertation includes three essays on corporate disclosure and information externalities. In the first essay, I examine the disclosure behavior of rival firms identified by an Initial Public Offering (IPO) candidate during the IPO quiet period when the IPO candidate is restricted in its communication. I find that the tone of disclosures made by identified rivals becomes more positive during the quiet period, and reverses after the quiet period ends. The strategic disclosure behavior is mainly driven by identified rivals' concerns over product market competition. I also find that this behavior hurts the IPO candidate and benefits the identified rivals. In the second essay, I investigate the relations between IPO firms' peer choice and peer information environment. I find that IPO firms tend to select peer companies with a better information environment, and this effect is more pronounced for IPO firms with greater information uncertainties. I also find support that peer information environment is positively associated with upward offering price revision, post-offering analyst coverage, and negatively associated with the number of amendment filings. Overall, this essay shows that IPO firms can make use of the externalities of peer information to facilitate their initial public offerings. In the third essay, I switch my focus from intra-industry relations to supply chain relations. More specifically, I study the effects of layoff announcements by customers on the valuation and operating performance of their supply chain partners. I find that suppliers experience a negative stock price reaction around their major customers' layoff announcements. The negative price effect is exacerbated when industry rivals of layoff-announcing customers also suffer from negative intra-industry contagion effects. Moreover, these supply chain spillover effects are asymmetric, with only "bad news" layoff announcements causing significant value implications for suppliers, but not "good news" announcements. Supplier firms also reduce their investment in and sales dependence on layoff-announcing customers in subsequent years. Keywords: Disclosure; Product market competition; IPO quiet period; Identified rivals; Information externalities; Peer information environment; Corporate layoffs, Supply chain relations; Stock market return
Essays on Corporate Disclosure and Information Intermediaries
Three Essays on Corporate Disclosure
Author: Elisabeth Pauline Kläs
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital market
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital market
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Essays on Corporate Disclosure, Governance, and Capital Markets
Author: Zhao Wang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital market
Languages : en
Pages : 310
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital market
Languages : en
Pages : 310
Book Description
Essays on Capital Markets and Corporate Disclosure
Author: Danil A. Borilo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
This thesis studies how a firm's disclosure decisions are affected by the interaction between prevailing financial reporting regulation and managerial incentives. Chapter 1 summarizes studies related to this thesis. I focus on rules that require a firm to issue regular financial statements. As a result, the release of some information about a firm's performance and financial condition is inevitable. However, since financial statements do not fully reflect all value-relevant information, a firm's manager can still affect the interpretation of this information via voluntary disclosure. In Chapter 2, I study how reputational concerns of a firm's manager affect her voluntary disclosure decisions. I show that interpretation of both the firm's report and voluntarily disclosed information depend on the timing of the disclosure relative to disclosures made by other firms in the same industry. In Chapter 3, I consider the case when private information of the firm's manager cannot be credibly communicated to outside investors and a mandatory financial report is the only available information channel about firm value. As a result, the noisiness of a financial report will lead investors to overvalue some firms and undervalue others. I show that allowing for misreporting can increase social welfare if a firm must rely on external capital in order to finance its investment opportunities. Overall, my results emphasize the importance of taking into account strategic disclosure decisions of managers for regulators, investors, and analysts.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
This thesis studies how a firm's disclosure decisions are affected by the interaction between prevailing financial reporting regulation and managerial incentives. Chapter 1 summarizes studies related to this thesis. I focus on rules that require a firm to issue regular financial statements. As a result, the release of some information about a firm's performance and financial condition is inevitable. However, since financial statements do not fully reflect all value-relevant information, a firm's manager can still affect the interpretation of this information via voluntary disclosure. In Chapter 2, I study how reputational concerns of a firm's manager affect her voluntary disclosure decisions. I show that interpretation of both the firm's report and voluntarily disclosed information depend on the timing of the disclosure relative to disclosures made by other firms in the same industry. In Chapter 3, I consider the case when private information of the firm's manager cannot be credibly communicated to outside investors and a mandatory financial report is the only available information channel about firm value. As a result, the noisiness of a financial report will lead investors to overvalue some firms and undervalue others. I show that allowing for misreporting can increase social welfare if a firm must rely on external capital in order to finance its investment opportunities. Overall, my results emphasize the importance of taking into account strategic disclosure decisions of managers for regulators, investors, and analysts.
Essays on Disclosure and Corporate Governance
Author: Ramanan Natarajan
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781109941463
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 98
Book Description
This dissertation expands on the existing disclosure theory by considering the monitoring role of a firm's disclosure as well as recognizing how a firm's disclosure is influenced by the firm's monitoring mechanisms. The first chapter of the dissertation examines the effect of corporate governance on a firm's earnings reporting process. I develop a model that high-lights the trade-offs and interdependencies between the audit function and the governance quality of the firm. This allows me to explain many seemingly surprising empirical findings in the area of corporate governance and provide several new testable predictions. The second Chapter addresses an important issue of how a firm's disclosure policy is influenced by information transfers across multiple markets that it accesses. The model captures the monitoring role of disclosures and addresses the issue of how a firm's disclosure policy may influence its governance choices and further, analyzes the interaction between different monitoring instruments, namely, disclosures, institutional investors and other internal corporate governance mechanisms.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781109941463
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 98
Book Description
This dissertation expands on the existing disclosure theory by considering the monitoring role of a firm's disclosure as well as recognizing how a firm's disclosure is influenced by the firm's monitoring mechanisms. The first chapter of the dissertation examines the effect of corporate governance on a firm's earnings reporting process. I develop a model that high-lights the trade-offs and interdependencies between the audit function and the governance quality of the firm. This allows me to explain many seemingly surprising empirical findings in the area of corporate governance and provide several new testable predictions. The second Chapter addresses an important issue of how a firm's disclosure policy is influenced by information transfers across multiple markets that it accesses. The model captures the monitoring role of disclosures and addresses the issue of how a firm's disclosure policy may influence its governance choices and further, analyzes the interaction between different monitoring instruments, namely, disclosures, institutional investors and other internal corporate governance mechanisms.