Author: William JackPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Ex Ante Adverse Selection and Ex Post Moral Hazard
Author: William JackPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard
Author: Richard ArnottPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 41
Book Description
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: an Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
Author: Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social SciencesPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 62
Book Description
Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with moral hazard
Author: Richard ArnottEquilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard
Author: Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets
Author: Richard ArnottPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Insurance
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Existence of Equilibria in Competitive Insurance Markets
Author: Peter S. FaynzilbergPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Under the conditions conjectured by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)as leading to market failure, we demonstrate the existence of a uniqueequilibrium in a risk-sharing economy with adverse selection. This equilibrium may be separating or partially pooling: in an economy withthree types, for instance, the low- and the medium-risk buyer segmentsmay be offered the same insurance policy.In equilibrium, buyers' indirect utility decreases with their propensityfor accident. When low-risk buyers are prevalent, sellers subsidizetheir operations across segments: they derive a positive profit in thelow-risk segment and incur a loss of equal magnitude in the rest ofthe economy. This leaves high-risk buyers better off than under thefirst-best policy they purchase when sellers are perfectly informed.In contrast to the putative equilibrium of the Rothschild-Stiglitzmodel, the second-best equilibrium depends on the structure of thebuyer population and converges to the first-best of the correspondinghomogeneous population as low- risk buyers become increasingly prevalentin the economy.
Competitive Insurance Markets Ii
Author: Peter S. FaynzilbergPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Under the conditions conjectured by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) as leading to extreme market failure, we show the existence of a unique incentive-efficient equilibrium. In terms of its sensitivity to the structure of the buyer population, this equilibrium may be flexible or rigid. Closed-form illustrations of equilibria and the solution methodology, which is based on the characterization of Nash equilibrium in terms of selective efficiency (Faynzilberg, 2003), are also provided.
Author: Wanda Mimra
Author: Gerald David Jaynes