Author: Terrence M. BeltonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 114
Book Description
Entry and entry deterrence under uncertainty: three essays on firm behavior under asymmetric information
Author: Terrence M. BeltonEntry and Entry Deterrence Under Uncertainty
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Barriers to entry (Industrial organization)
Languages : en
Pages : 115
Book Description
ENTRY AND ENTRY DETERRENCE UNDER UNCERTAINTY: THREE ESSAYS ON FIRM BEHAVIOR UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION.
Author: TERRENCE MATTHEW BELTONPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 124
Book Description
static results including the shape of the industry supply curve and the impact of increasing risk on long run competitive equilibrium.
Entry-deterrence and R. and D. by Entrants Under Uncertainty
Author: Gautam BhattacharyyaPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Barriers to entry (Industrial organization)
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Book Description
Capacity and Entry Deterrence Under Demand Uncertainty
Author: Sougata PoddarEntry Deterrence and Experimentation under Demand Uncertainty
Author: Neelam JainPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 43
Book Description
We examine the effect of a threat of entry on experimentation about demand by an incumbent monopolist when there is a fixed cost of entry. We also examine the impact of experimentation on the probability of entry into the market. We show that experimentation may itself be used as a tool for entry deterrence and derive conditions under which experimentation reduces the probability of entry. These conditions depend on the entry rule which in turn depends on entry costs. We show that if experimentation does not deter entry, the monopolist incumbent experiments less. We also characterize experimentation and entry in the linear-uniform example.
Uncertainty and Entry Deterrence
Author: Eric MaskinPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We study a model where capacity installation by an incumbent firm serves to deter others from entering the industry. We argue that uncertainty about demand or costs forces the incumbent to choose a higher capacity level than it would under certainty. This higher level diminishes the attractiveness of deterrence (Proposition 1) and, therefore, the range of parameter values for which deterrence occurs (Proposition 2).
Uncertainty Entry Deterrence and Excess Capacity
Author: Sougata PoddarDemand Uncertainty, Risk-aversion and Entry-deterrence
Author: Stylianos PerrakisPrecommitments and Probabilistic Entry Deterrence in Oligopoly
Author: Elie AppelbaumPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description