Author: Toshihiro MatsumuraPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description
Endogenous Timing in Multi-stage Duopoly Games
Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - 'Capacity-then-Quantity' Game
Author: Yuanzhu LuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.
Lead, Follow Or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games
Author: Marco A. MariniPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The aim of this paper is to extend Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing game by including the possibility for players to cooperate. At an initial stage players are assumed to announce both their purpose to play early or late a given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate or not with their rival. The cooperation and timing formation rule is rather simple: when both players agree to cooperate and play with a given timing, they end up playing their actions coordinately and simultaneously. Otherwise, they play as singletons with the timing as prescribed by their own announcement. We check for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of such a cooperation-timing duopoly game. Two main results on the emergence of cooperation are provided. If players' actions in the symmetric duopoly game are strategic substitutes and there is no discount, cooperating early (as a grand coalition) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended timing-cooperation game. Conversely, cooperating late (at period two) represents an equilibrium when players' strategies are strategic complements. Other equilibria are also possible. Most importantly, our model shows that, in general, the success of cooperation is affected by the endogenous timing of the game. Moreover, the slope of players' best-replies appears crucial both for the success of cooperation as well as for the players' choice of sequencing their market actions.
Endogenous Timing and Strategic Managerial Incentives in a Duopoly Game
Author: Michael KopelPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description
In this paper we study the nature of incentive contracts and organizational modes in a game where the firms' owners endogenously determine the order of moves at the quantity-setting stage, can choose to delegate the production decision to a manager and write appropriate incentive contracts. It is shown that in our quantity-setting model Stackelberg-type outcomes can occur. In these outcomes the Stackelberg leader is owner-managed and the follower delegates the quantity choice to a manager, who is compensated based on profits and sales. Furthermore, the follower has a second-mover advantage, i.e. achieves a higher profit than the leader.
Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information
Author: Hans-Theo NormannPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Decision making
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games
Author: Jonathan H. HamiltonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Endogenous Timing and the Choice of Quality in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically differentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a fixed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process.
Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets
Author: Luís Santos-PintoPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support for it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous. This paper generalizes Saloner's (1987) and Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing games by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. We explore the theoretical implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical evidence. We find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky's endogenous timing games.
Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence
Author: Miguel A. FonsecaHandbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I
Author: Luis C. CorchónPublisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178536328X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 567
Book Description
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.