Author: Michael Kopel Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 16
Book Description
In this paper we study the nature of incentive contracts and organizational modes in a game where the firms' owners endogenously determine the order of moves at the quantity-setting stage, can choose to delegate the production decision to a manager and write appropriate incentive contracts. It is shown that in our quantity-setting model Stackelberg-type outcomes can occur. In these outcomes the Stackelberg leader is owner-managed and the follower delegates the quantity choice to a manager, who is compensated based on profits and sales. Furthermore, the follower has a second-mover advantage, i.e. achieves a higher profit than the leader.
Author: Luca Lambertini Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1317218256 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 265
Book Description
The separation between ownership and control has become common practice over the last century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century, the theory of the firm and the theory of industrial organization developed parallel and complementary views on managerial firms. This book offers a comprehensive exposition of this debate. In its survey of strategic delegation in oligopoly games, An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms is able to offer a reinterpretation of a range of standard results in the light of the fact that the control of firms is generally not in the hand of its owners. The theoretical models are supported by a wealth of real-world examples, in order to provide a study of strategic delegation that is far more in-depth than has previously been found in the literature on industrial organization. In this volume, analysis is extended in several directions to cover applications concerning the role of: managerial firms in mixed market; collusion and mergers; divisionalization and vertical relations; technical progress; product differentiation; international trade; environmental issues; and the intertemporal growth of firms. This book is of great interest to those who study industrial economics, organizational studies and industrial studies.
Author: Marco A. Marini Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The aim of this paper is to extend Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing game by including the possibility for players to cooperate. At an initial stage players are assumed to announce both their purpose to play early or late a given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate or not with their rival. The cooperation and timing formation rule is rather simple: when both players agree to cooperate and play with a given timing, they end up playing their actions coordinately and simultaneously. Otherwise, they play as singletons with the timing as prescribed by their own announcement. We check for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of such a cooperation-timing duopoly game. Two main results on the emergence of cooperation are provided. If players' actions in the symmetric duopoly game are strategic substitutes and there is no discount, cooperating early (as a grand coalition) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended timing-cooperation game. Conversely, cooperating late (at period two) represents an equilibrium when players' strategies are strategic complements. Other equilibria are also possible. Most importantly, our model shows that, in general, the success of cooperation is affected by the endogenous timing of the game. Moreover, the slope of players' best-replies appears crucial both for the success of cooperation as well as for the players' choice of sequencing their market actions.
Author: Kazuhiro Ohnishi Publisher: Bentham Science Publishers ISBN: 1681086255 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 298
Book Description
This volume of the series features 14 chapters covering theoretical and empirical research on strategic decision making of monopolistic and oligopolistic organizations. Topics covered in this volume include strategic behavior of different types of firms, identifying insiders in organizations, the relationship of employees’ green behavior with environmental sustainability, the relationship between firm size and export-intensities of manufacturing firms in India in a discriminating oligopoly model, and how industrial economics modeling can be particularly useful to analyze development issues in a context of food safety regulations. This volume is suitable for academics, students and professionals studying firm behavior in the fields of economics, business administration, policymaking and engineering.
Author: Victor J. Tremblay Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot-Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot-Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.
Author: Luis C. Corchón Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: 1788112784 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 547
Book Description
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.
Author: Yuanzhu Lu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.
Author: Roger Koppl Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing ISBN: 1784411019 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 291
Book Description
Volume 18 Entangled Political Economy of the Book Series Advances in Austrian Economics examines the concept 'entangled political economy' from several distinct but complementary points of view. The volume is proof that Wagner's notion of entanglement opens new vistas for political economy in all its dimensions.
Author: Michael Kopel
Author: Luca Lambertini
Author: Marco A. Marini
Author: Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Author: Victor J. Tremblay
Author: Toshihiro Matsumura
Author: Jonathan H. Hamilton
Author: Luis C. Corchón
Author: Yuanzhu Lu
Author: Roger Koppl