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Author: Konstantinos Serfes Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 36
Book Description
We employ the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972) to study the endogenous matching patterns in a market that consists of heterogenous principals and agents. We show that, in general, the equilibrium matching is non-assortative. We then characterize the equilibrium relationship between risk and performance pay and risk and fixed compensation. This is the first paper that characterizes the equilibrium matching, to its fullest possible extent, building on the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) principal-agent model. This model has been used extensively in the empirical literature and therefore we hope that our results will be of great value to empirical researchers who wish to study a principal-agent market.
Author: Konstantinos Serfes Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 36
Book Description
We employ the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972) to study the endogenous matching patterns in a market that consists of heterogenous principals and agents. We show that, in general, the equilibrium matching is non-assortative. We then characterize the equilibrium relationship between risk and performance pay and risk and fixed compensation. This is the first paper that characterizes the equilibrium matching, to its fullest possible extent, building on the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) principal-agent model. This model has been used extensively in the empirical literature and therefore we hope that our results will be of great value to empirical researchers who wish to study a principal-agent market.
Author: Xinchao Zhang Publisher: ISBN: 9781109852608 Category : Commercial agents Languages : en Pages : 50
Book Description
In our study; we study the CEO compensation using ExecuComp data. The results of our study suggest that agents have different different attitudes toward risk (measured by the coefficients of absolute risk aversion) and there is an endogenous matching process between principals and agents in the market.
Author: Sebastian J. Goerg Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing ISBN: 1785609637 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 305
Book Description
Research in Experimental Economics (REXE) Volume 19 entitled 'Experiments in Organizational Economics' highlights the importance of replicating previous economic experiments.
Author: Luis C. Corchón Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: 178536328X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 567
Book Description
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
Author: Itai Ashlagi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 78
Book Description
We study dynamic matching in an infinite-horizon stochastic market. While all agents are potentially compatible with each other, some are hard-to-match and others are easy-to-match. Agents prefer to be matched as soon as possible and matches are formed either bilaterally or indirectly through chains. We adopt an asymptotic approach and compute tight bounds on the limit of waiting time of agents under myopic policies that differ in matching technology and prioritization.We find that when hard-to-match agents arrive less frequently than easy-to-match ones (i) bilateral matching is almost as efficient as chains (waiting times scale similarly under both, though chains always outperform bilateral matching by a constant factor), and (ii) assigning priorities to hard-to-match agents improves their waiting times. When hard-to-match agents arrive more frequently, chains are much more efficient than bilateral matching and prioritization has no impact.Further, somewhat surprisingly, we find that in a heterogeneous market and under bilateral matching, increasing the arrival rate of hard-to-match agents has a non-monotone effect on waiting times. This behavior is in contrast with that of a homogeneous dynamic market, where increasing arrival rate always improves waiting time, and it highlights fundamental differences between heterogeneous and homogeneous dynamic markets.
Author: Ivan T. Kandilov Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The objective of this paper is to determine whether the choice of payment schemes (hourly vs. piece rates) is systematically related to the workers' risk aversion and ability. We derive the equilibrium relationship between agents' risk aversion and ability and the power of incentives (payment scheme) in a market where many heterogeneous principals and agents are endogenously matched. The equilibrium matching between principals and agents depends on the traits and is critical in determining the contract choice. Using confidential data from the National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS), we find evidence of matching between agricultural workers and the riskiness of their jobs (crops they harvest) based on workers' risk aversion and no matching based on ability. When controlling for matching, we find strong evidence that high risk-averse workers choose hourly rates and low risk-averse workers choose piece rates. We also found that high ability types choose piece rates and low ability types choose hourly rates but the evidence is weaker.
Author: Alexandrova-Kabadjova, Biliana Publisher: IGI Global ISBN: 1466620129 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 459
Book Description
Simulation has become a tool difficult to substitute in many scientific areas like manufacturing, medicine, telecommunications, games, etc. Finance is one of such areas where simulation is a commonly used tool; for example, we can find Monte Carlo simulation in many financial applications like market risk analysis, portfolio optimization, credit risk related applications, etc. Simulation in Computational Finance and Economics: Tools and Emerging Applications presents a thorough collection of works, covering several rich and highly productive areas of research including Risk Management, Agent-Based Simulation, and Payment Methods and Systems, topics that have found new motivations after the strong recession experienced in the last few years. Despite the fact that simulation is widely accepted as a prominent tool, dealing with a simulation-based project requires specific management abilities of the researchers. Economic researchers will find an excellent reference to introduce them to the computational simulation models. The works presented in this book can be used as an inspiration for economic researchers interested in creating their own computational models in their respective fields.
Author: Konstantinos Serfes
Author: Konstantinos Serfes
Author: Fei Li
Author: Jaerim Choi
Author: Xinchao Zhang
Author: Sebastian J. Goerg
Author: Luis C. Corchón
Author: Itai Ashlagi
Author: 
Author: Ivan T. Kandilov
Author: Alexandrova-Kabadjova, Biliana