Endogenous Coalition Formation in Rivalry PDF Download

Author: Guofu Tan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Alliances
Languages : en
Pages : 46

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Author: Santiago Sánchez-Pagés
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This paper analyzes a model where groups can attain exclusive ownership of a resource by means of a contest. We show that more concave production technologies and more egalitarianism within groups induce higher levels of social conflict. We then study endogenous coalition formation. Under cooperative exploitation of the resource, the grand coalition is the efficient partition but there exists a strong tendency toward bipartisan conflicts. Under non-cooperative exploitation, conflict can ex ante Pareto dominate peaceful access and it becomes more difficult to support the grand coalition as a stable structure.

Author: Lingling Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Coalitions
Languages : en
Pages : 133

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"The aim of this dissertation is to study a class of endogenous coalition formation problems with externalities where each agent's payoff depends not only on the coalition he or she belongs to but also how others partition themselves. This dissertation contains both theoretical and application elements. At the theoretical front (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2), two dynamic coalition formation games with endogenous choice of proposers are introduced. We prove that each game admits a dynamically efficient Markov perfect equilibrium. Moreover, we prove that the equilibrium payoff allocation of the game presented in Chapter 2 is unique." --

Author: María Pilar Montero García
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789056680701
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 238

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Author: Sang-Seung Yi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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This paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions. In many interesting economic games, coalition formation creates either negativee externalities or positive externalities for nonmembers. Examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions. Examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions. I characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation: the Open Membership game of Yi and Shin 1995 , the Coalition Unanimity game of Bloch 1996 , and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements of Ray and Vohra 1994.

Author: David M. McEvoy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.

Author: Partha Gangopadhyay
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814289833
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 380

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Book Description
Presents a study of the dynamics of rivalry, evolution of costly and violent conflicts, and potential cooperation among powerful players. This work is suitable for those interested in some of the pressing problems of the global system, such as intra-national and interethnic conflicts, climate change challenges, poverty and terrorism.

Author: Michelle R. Garfinkel
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199908346
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 888

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Book Description
Social scientists and policy makers have long been interested in the causes and consequences of peace and conflict. This Handbook brings together contributions from leading scholars who take an economic perspective to study the topic. It includes thirty-three chapters and is divided into five parts: Correlates of Peace and Conflict; Consequences and Costs of Conflict; On the Mechanics of Conflict; Conflict and Peace in Economic Context; and Pathways to Peace. Taken together, they demonstrate not only how the tools of economics can be fruitfully used to advance our understanding of conflict, but how explicitly incorporating conflict into economic analysis can add substantively to our understanding of observed economic phenomena. Some chapters are largely empirical, identifying correlates of war and peace and quantifying many of the costs of conflict. Others are more theoretical, exploring a variety of mechanisms that lead to war or are more conducive to peace.

Author: Luis C. Corchón
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1788112784
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 547

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Book Description
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.

Author: H.A.M. Wilke
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0080866786
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 305

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Book Description
A comprehensive view of coalition formation is presented here. Each of the chapters gives a summary of theories and research findings in a specific field of interest, at various levels of human and primate organisation.