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Author: Adewole Musiliu Adeolu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 37
Book Description
In the essay, we show how the preference of political elites for special status and power translates to an institutional structure that not only maximizes their relative share of social wealth through predation but ensure they keep as wide as possible the gap between actual development and potential development. In exchange for de facto power, their choice of institution is one which yields them less rather than more wealth. Though developmental institutions will yield them more wealth, political elites still avoid choosing the socially optimal institution because the resulting political configuration will turn them into elites with merely de jure political power. We draw on a number of historical and contemporary examples to which our model applies. Drawing on the experiences of nations which have successfully transited from growth-inhibiting to developmental institutions, we isolated factors critical to the attainment of this transition. Factors considered included revolution or the threat of revolution, religion through it impact on human capital, international trade and entrepreneurship, external wars and political competition between countries. In examining barriers in the way of countries yet to transit, we identified ethnic diversity and natural resource endowment. Both have prevented to a large extent the emergence of common constitutional pact across elites belonging to groups with different complexities. The challenge remains overcoming these barriers. New pro-development elites are required to make the initial investments in efforts and organization required to upset the status quo. Only when they start would the larger society follow in their steps to sustain and implement the desired institutional change.
Author: Adewole Musiliu Adeolu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 37
Book Description
In the essay, we show how the preference of political elites for special status and power translates to an institutional structure that not only maximizes their relative share of social wealth through predation but ensure they keep as wide as possible the gap between actual development and potential development. In exchange for de facto power, their choice of institution is one which yields them less rather than more wealth. Though developmental institutions will yield them more wealth, political elites still avoid choosing the socially optimal institution because the resulting political configuration will turn them into elites with merely de jure political power. We draw on a number of historical and contemporary examples to which our model applies. Drawing on the experiences of nations which have successfully transited from growth-inhibiting to developmental institutions, we isolated factors critical to the attainment of this transition. Factors considered included revolution or the threat of revolution, religion through it impact on human capital, international trade and entrepreneurship, external wars and political competition between countries. In examining barriers in the way of countries yet to transit, we identified ethnic diversity and natural resource endowment. Both have prevented to a large extent the emergence of common constitutional pact across elites belonging to groups with different complexities. The challenge remains overcoming these barriers. New pro-development elites are required to make the initial investments in efforts and organization required to upset the status quo. Only when they start would the larger society follow in their steps to sustain and implement the desired institutional change.
Author: the late Alice H. Amsden Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0191634077 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Elites have a disproportionate impact on development outcomes. While a country's endowments constitute the deep determinates of growth, the trajectory they follow is shaped by the actions of elites. But what factors affect whether elites use their influence for individual gain or national welfare? To what extent do they see poverty as a problem? And are their actions today constrained by institutions and norms established in the past? This volume looks at case studies from South Africa to China to seek a better understanding of the dynamics behind how elites decide to engage with economic development. Approaches include economic modelling, social surveys, theoretical analysis, and program evaluation. These different methods explore the relationship between elites and development outcomes from five angles: the participation and reaction of elites to institutional creation and change, how economic changes affect elite formation and circulation, elite perceptions of national welfare, the extent to which state capacity is part of elite self-identity, and how elites interact with non-elites.
Author: Douglass C. North Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1139642960 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 231
Book Description
Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organisations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.)
Author: Douglass C. North Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 9780521397346 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 164
Book Description
An analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies is developed in this analysis of economic structures.
Author: Marlene Langholz Publisher: GRIN Verlag ISBN: 3640671376 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 20
Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2008 in the subject Politics - Topic: Globalization, Political Economics, University of Flensburg (European Studies), course: Seminar: "World Economic Policy", language: English, abstract: The main goal of Development Economics is to find the reasons for the rather big differences in levels of income throughout the world. Why, for instance, did European nations after the eighteenth century develop faster than Asian, African or Latin American nations and what can be done to reduce the so caused differences in income and growth?1 In recent years, many economists used institutions to explain why structural adjustment programs in poor countries have failed so far. Not the programs itself, so the tenor, but the lack of “good institutions” has been blamed for the failure of many developing countries to catch up. In this paper, the current institution centered orthodoxy in development economics will be discussed from a critical point of view. In the first part, different strands of development theory will be reviewed. Secondly, the reasons for the prominence of New Institutional Economics will be analyzed. Finally, it will be discussed, if the institutional approach is holding its promises and if it is useful to focus on the institutional variable to explain economical development.
Author: John L. Campbell Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 9780691089218 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 268
Book Description
This book is about some of the most important problems confronting social scientists who study institutions and institutional change. It is also about globalization, particularly the frequent claim that globalization is transforming national political and economic institutions as never before.
Author: Daron Acemoglu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Economics Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. The model consists of landowning elites and workers, and the key economic decision concerns the form of economic institutions regulating the transaction of labor (e.g., competitive markets versus labor repression). The main idea is that equilibrium economic institutions are a result of the exercise of de jure and de facto political power. A change in political institutions, for example a move from nondemocracy to democracy, alters the distribution of de jure political power, but the elite can intensify their investments in de facto political power, such as lobbying or the use of paramilitary forces, to partially or fully offset their loss of de jure power. In the baseline model, equilibrium changes in political institutions have no effect on the (stochastic) equilibrium distribution of economic institutions, leading to a particular form of persistence in equilibrium institutions, which we refer to as invariance. When the model is enriched to allow for limits on the exercise of de facto power by the elite in democracy or for costs of changing economic institutions, the equilibrium takes the form of a Markov regime-switching process with state dependence. Finally, when we allow for the possibility that changing political institutions is more difficult than altering economic institutions, the model leads to a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive, but choose economic institutions favoring the elite. The main ideas featuring in the model are illustrated using historical examples from the U.S. South, Latin America and Liberia. Keywords: democracy, de facto power, de jure power, dictatorship, elites, institutions, labor repression, persistence, political economy. JEL Classifications: H2, N10, N40, P16.
Author: M. M. Shirley Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: 1848443994 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 241
Book Description
Both economic research and the history of foreign aid suggest that the largest barriers to development arise from a society's institutions - its norms and rules. This book explains how institutions drive economic development. It provides numerous examples to illustrate the complex, interlocking, and persistent nature of real world rules and norms.
Author: Douglass C. North Publisher: ISBN: Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 168
Book Description
An analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies is developed in this analysis of economic structures.
Author: Timur Kuran Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 1400836018 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 422
Book Description
How religious barriers stalled capitalism in the Middle East In the year 1000, the economy of the Middle East was at least as advanced as that of Europe. But by 1800, the region had fallen dramatically behind—in living standards, technology, and economic institutions. In short, the Middle East had failed to modernize economically as the West surged ahead. What caused this long divergence? And why does the Middle East remain drastically underdeveloped compared to the West? In The Long Divergence, one of the world's leading experts on Islamic economic institutions and the economy of the Middle East provides a new answer to these long-debated questions. Timur Kuran argues that what slowed the economic development of the Middle East was not colonialism or geography, still less Muslim attitudes or some incompatibility between Islam and capitalism. Rather, starting around the tenth century, Islamic legal institutions, which had benefitted the Middle Eastern economy in the early centuries of Islam, began to act as a drag on development by slowing or blocking the emergence of central features of modern economic life—including private capital accumulation, corporations, large-scale production, and impersonal exchange. By the nineteenth century, modern economic institutions began to be transplanted to the Middle East, but its economy has not caught up. And there is no quick fix today. Low trust, rampant corruption, and weak civil societies—all characteristic of the region's economies today and all legacies of its economic history—will take generations to overcome. The Long Divergence opens up a frank and honest debate on a crucial issue that even some of the most ardent secularists in the Muslim world have hesitated to discuss.
Author: Adewole Musiliu Adeolu
Author: Adewole Musiliu Adeolu
Author: the late Alice H. Amsden
Author: Douglass C. North
Author: Douglass C. North
Author: Marlene Langholz
Author: John L. Campbell
Author: Daron Acemoglu
Author: M. M. Shirley
Author: Douglass C. North
Author: Timur Kuran