Effective Competition and Corporate Disclosure PDF Download

Author: Razahussein Mohamedhussein Merali Devji
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 282

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Author: Gill North
Publisher: Kluwer Law International B.V.
ISBN: 9041168184
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 386

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Book Description
Effective corporate reporting and disclosure are critical in financial markets to promote vigorous competition, optimal performance, and transparency. This book examines whether existing disclosure frameworks in eight countries with the world's most significant securities exchanges achieve these objectives, and then, drawing on extensive empirical findings, identifies the policies and practices that contribute most to improving the overall quality of listed company reporting and communication. Contending that public disclosure of listed company information is an essential precondition to the long-term efficient operation of financial markets, the book provides analysis of such issues and topics as the following: - arguments for and against mandatory disclosure regimes; - key principles of periodic and continuous disclosure regulation; - tensions between direct and indirect investment in financial markets; - assumptions concerning the need to maintain a privileged role for financial intermediaries; - intermediary, analyst, and research incentives; - protection of individual investors; - selective disclosure; - disclosure of bad news; - the role of accounting standards; - public access to company briefings; - long term performance reporting and analysis; and - company reporting developments. A significant portion of the book provides an overview of disclosure regulation and practice in the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, Hong Kong, Australia, and Singapore. A highly informative survey looks at company reports, disclosures, and websites of large listed companies, including Microsoft, Citigroup, Teck Resources, Deutsche Bank, BP, Sony, PetroChina Company, BHP Billiton, and Singapore Telecommunications. The book discusses common disclosure issues that arise across jurisdictions, provides valuable insights on the efficacy of existing disclosure regulation and practice, and highlights the important principles, processes, and practices that underpin best practice company disclosure frameworks. It will be welcomed by company boards and executives and their counsel, as well as by policymakers and scholars in the areas of corporate, securities, banking and financial law, accounting, economics and finance.

Author: Flora Muiño
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 53

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Book Description
In this paper, we argue that the influence product market competition exerts on disclosure is defined by the combined effect of the incentives and disincentives to disclose raised by the multiple competition dimensions. We distinguish between firm and industry level competition measures, and we hypothesize that the former raises agency and proprietary costs, whereas the latter creates incentives to disclose either to fulfill the owners' need of information to monitor managers or to deter the entrance of new competitors in the industry. Our research design allows for non-monotonic relationships between competition and disclosure as well as for interactions between competition dimensions. Using a sample of U.S. manufacturing companies, we gather evidence that is consistent with our hypotheses. First, we find an inverted U-shape relationship between corporate disclosure and a firm's abnormal profitability, which is suggestive of firms being reluctant to disclose when they are underperforming (outperforming) their rivals because of the fear of unveiling agency conflicts (raising proprietary costs). Second, we observe a U-shape relationship between corporate disclosure and industry profitability, although this U design evolves to approximate a rising function as the protection provided by entry barriers increases.

Author: Yong-Chul Shin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This paper investigates empirically the effect of different types of product market competition on levels of voluntary disclosure of proprietary information in financial markets. Firms, considering a disclosure, trade off attaining financial market valuation-related benefits vs. protecting long-term product market advantage. Based on economic theory, I propose that there are two types of strategic interaction settings relevant to disclosure: Capacity competition drives firms to disclose more; price competition drives them to disclose less. When firms are competing on capacities, firms disclose more information to lower the cost of capital needed for capital investments. In contrast, when firms are competing on prices, they disclose less information because proprietary costs are high and the benefit from any decreased cost of capital is low due to less acute need for additional capital. By estimating the signs of the slope of reaction curves to identify the type of competition facing firms in oligopoly markets, I find that the type of product market competition affects the level of voluntary disclosure over and above what pervious literature has documented as the firm's external financing needs. That is, firms engaged in capacity competition disclose relatively more information than firms engaged in price competition. Further analysis after including as benchmarks firms with no strategic interaction, shows that capacity competition firms disclose more information than no-strategic-interaction firms but that price competition firms do not disclose less information than no-strategic-interaction firms.

Author: Russell B. Stevenson
Publisher: Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 250

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Book Description

Author: George Benston
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 0815708912
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 140

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Book Description
A Brookings Institution Press and American Enterprise Institute publication A few years ago, Americans held out their systems of corporate governance and financial disclosure as models to be emulated by the rest of the world. But in late 2001 U.S. policymakers and corporate leaders found themselves facing the largest corporate accounting scandals in American history. The spectacular collapses of Enron and Worldcom—as well as the discovery of accounting irregularities at other large U.S. companies—seemed to call into question the efficacy of the entire system of corporate governance in the United States. In response, Congress quickly enacted a comprehensive package of reform measures in what has come to be known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ followed by making fundamental changes to their listing requirements. The private sector acted as well. Accounting firms—watching in horror as one of their largest, Arthur Andersen, collapsed after a criminal conviction for document shredding—tightened their auditing procedures. Stock analysts and ratings agencies, hit hard by a series of disclosures about their failings, changed their practices as well. Will these reforms be enough? Are some counterproductive? Are other shortcomings in the disclosure system still in need of correction? These are among the questions that George Benston, Michael Bromwich, Robert E. Litan, and Alfred Wagenhofer address in Following the Money. While the authors agree that the U.S. system of corporate disclosure and governance is in need of change, they are concerned that policymakers may be overreacting in some areas and taking actions in others that may prove to be ineffective or even counterproductive. Using the Enron case as a point of departure, the authors argue that the major problem lies not in the accounting and auditing standards themselves, but in the system of enforcing those standards.

Author: Daniel Hoang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44

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Book Description
This paper studies the effects of hedge disclosure requirements on corporate risk management and product market competition. The analysis is based on a model of market entry and shows that to prevent entry incumbent firms engage in risk management when these activities remain unobserved by outsiders. In the resulting equilibrium, financial markets are well informed and entry is efficient. However, potential attempts for more transparency by additional disclosure requirements introduce a commitment device that provides incumbents with incentives to distort risk management activities thereby influencing entrant beliefs. In equilibrium, firms engage in significant risk-taking. This behavior limits entry and adversely affects the nature of competition in industries.

Author: Jidong Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The relation between the motivation of voluntary disclosure and the characters of companies is important research topic in accounting research and strategy research. The paper investigates the samples from Chinese capital market during 2004-2006 and concludes some empirical results to verify and support the strategy theory that pre-literatures had document through the analysis of game theory. The findings are that there is no significant relationship between industry competitive information voluntary disclosure and corporate governance and there is no significant relationship between industry competitive information voluntary disclosure and earning quality. As the analysis of strategy theory, there is significant relationship between industry competitive information voluntary disclosure and corporate competitive strategy which integrates with the status of market competitive where the corporate locates. If the corporate locates in growth period of Product Life Cycle (PLC), it is more possible to disclose industry competitive information and this motivation is obvious. The findings provide the empirical evidence of strategy competitive theory. These also implicate that voluntary disclosure is related to the disclosure content, not to corporate characters such as governance and earning quality.

Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 2248

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Author: Christopher R. Yukins
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
In the U.S. defense procurement market, regulators require contractors to make “mandatory disclosures” if principals at those firms determine, after due review, that there is credible evidence that the firms engaged in certain crimes (fraud, bribery or gratuities), civil fraud, or significant overpayment by the government. Failure to make such a mandatory disclosure, required by clause and by regulation, can lead to (among other things) the debarment of the contractor -- a potentially devastating result. Mandatory disclosure is a natural extension of a separate requirement, that contractors maintain effective corporate compliance and ethics systems, and the Defense Department's largest prime contractors, with sophisticated compliance systems in place, have been able to accommodate the mandatory disclosure requirement. This paper asks whether this disclosure requirement in effect favors those largest contractors, and decreases competition in a already highly concentrated defense market, either by creating substantial legal risks for firms too small or inexperienced to institute effective compliance and disclosure systems, or by discouraging competition from other companies in the commercial sector. The paper concludes that the mandatory disclosure rule can impair competition in defense procurement, and recommends that regulators carefully shape any disclosure requirements, and perhaps reconsider relying on voluntary disclosure, mindful of the need to reduce costs and enhance competition in defense procurement markets.