Author: James L. FieldPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defense contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 408
Book Description
Economic Profit in U.S. Government Defense Contracting
Author: James L. FieldPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defense contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 408
Book Description
Defense Contractors' Profit Review
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Legislation and National Security SubcommitteePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defense contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 122
Book Description
Economics of Military Procurement
Author: United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Economy in GovernmentPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 626
Book Description
Reviews methods used by DOD to calculate contractor profit margins and use of competitive bidding procurement techniques. Includes discussion of C5-A cost over-runs.
The Economics of Military Procurement
Author: United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Economy in GovernmentPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defense contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation
Author: William Paul RogersonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 86
Book Description
The defense sector is subject to a form of cost-based economic regulation, just as public utilities are. A set of regulations determines the price that defense contractors will receive for their products. This report describes and empirically investigates an extremely simple theory that captures an important aspect of the regulatory problem in defense contracting. The theory describes a critical difference between the regulatory problems in defense and public utilities and suggests why therefore different rules and institutions might be appropriate in each case. It also identifies several implications regarding the structuring of an optimal regulatory policy and sheds light on current policy debates over Department of Defense policy. The author empirically verifies that the incentives posited by the theory exist and are large. The theory is that profit regulation of defense contractors is structured (and necessarily must be structured) so that firms generating valuable new innovations will receive large rewards or prizes. The author attempts to establish the theoretical link between prizes and innovation and then to show that price levels induced by the current rules are large enough to make a theoretical analysis of the role of these prizes important.
Review of the Defense Department's Profit Policy for Noncompetitive Contracts
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Legislation and National Security SubcommitteePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defense contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 224
Book Description
Government Contracting
Author: Progress Made by the Department of Defense in Reducing the Impact of Military Procurement on the Economy
Author: United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Defense ProcurementPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defense contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 166
Book Description
Reviews DOD contracting and procurement policies and methods. Focuses on use of non-competitive (negotiated) contract.
Economics of Military Procurement
Author: United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Economy in GovernmentPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Defense contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 662
Book Description
The Economics of National Security
Author: Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 194
Book Description