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Author: Bo Sun Publisher: DIANE Publishing ISBN: 1437930980 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 33
Book Description
Analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. Examines how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establishes necessary and sufficient conditions under which earnings management occurs. The author¿s model provides a set of implications on the role earnings management plays in driving the time-series and cross-sectional variation of executive compensation. In addition, the model's predictions regarding the changes of earnings management and executive pay in response to corporate governance legislation are consistent with empirical observations. Charts and tables.
Author: Bo Sun Publisher: DIANE Publishing ISBN: 1437930980 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 33
Book Description
Analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. Examines how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establishes necessary and sufficient conditions under which earnings management occurs. The author¿s model provides a set of implications on the role earnings management plays in driving the time-series and cross-sectional variation of executive compensation. In addition, the model's predictions regarding the changes of earnings management and executive pay in response to corporate governance legislation are consistent with empirical observations. Charts and tables.
Author: Bo Sun Publisher: ISBN: Category : Corporate governance Languages : en Pages : 42
Book Description
This paper analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. We examine how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which earnings management occurs. Our model provides a set of implications on the role earnings management plays in driving the time-series and cross-sectional variation of executive compensation. In addition, the model's predictions regarding the changes of earnings management and executive pay in response to corporate governance legislation are consistent with empirical observations.
Author: Ada Demb Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0195361393 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 225
Book Description
Written for practitioners, this book addresses corporate governance and the role of the board of directors in multinational corporations. Throughout the world, corporations are experiencing the second major transition in corporate governance of this century. The nature of the relationship between the corporation and the rest of society is changing fundamentally. The corporate board has unique responsibilities during this transition, but as it tries to respond directors are faced with destabilizing paradoxes: resolving who is in control--management or the board, achieving critical judgment while maintaining detachment, and avoiding becoming either a cozy club or a collection of all-stars. This book, based on interviews with 71 directors serving on more than 500 boards in eight countries, shows the nature of the challenges and suggests ways to analyze and confront them. This major international study compares the experiences of board members in Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Venezuela.
Author: Muhammad Fayyaz Sheikh Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 31
Book Description
We examine how compensation of chief executive officer (CEO) and corporate governance practices affect earnings management behavior in an emerging economy, Pakistan. Using 1836 firm-year observations from 260 firms listed in KSE for period 2005 to 2012, we do not find that CEO compensation has significant influence on earnings management behavior however weak evidence is found that CEOs in small firms do manage earnings to increase their compensation. Further, we find that CEO duality is related to improved earnings quality. However, larger boards appear to be related to higher earnings. Thus, larger boards reduce the quality of reported financial information. Furthermore, we find that concentrated ownership is related to higher earnings management. Sub-sample analysis shows that both concentrated and family ownerships are related to income decreasing earnings management. Overall, as policy implications, our findings suggest that earnings management behavior is likely to be conditioned to the contextual settings of the economy under examination.
Author: Cheng Few Lee Publisher: World Scientific ISBN: 9811202400 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 5053
Book Description
This four-volume handbook covers important concepts and tools used in the fields of financial econometrics, mathematics, statistics, and machine learning. Econometric methods have been applied in asset pricing, corporate finance, international finance, options and futures, risk management, and in stress testing for financial institutions. This handbook discusses a variety of econometric methods, including single equation multiple regression, simultaneous equation regression, and panel data analysis, among others. It also covers statistical distributions, such as the binomial and log normal distributions, in light of their applications to portfolio theory and asset management in addition to their use in research regarding options and futures contracts.In both theory and methodology, we need to rely upon mathematics, which includes linear algebra, geometry, differential equations, Stochastic differential equation (Ito calculus), optimization, constrained optimization, and others. These forms of mathematics have been used to derive capital market line, security market line (capital asset pricing model), option pricing model, portfolio analysis, and others.In recent times, an increased importance has been given to computer technology in financial research. Different computer languages and programming techniques are important tools for empirical research in finance. Hence, simulation, machine learning, big data, and financial payments are explored in this handbook.Led by Distinguished Professor Cheng Few Lee from Rutgers University, this multi-volume work integrates theoretical, methodological, and practical issues based on his years of academic and industry experience.
Author: Hoje Jo Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Using firms' cash compensation data, we examine the empirical relationship between earnings management and the weight placed on accounting performance measure in compensation. Our results indicate that the weight on accounting income in compensation decreases as the tendency of using discretionary accruals increases. A plausible interpretation of the findings is that compensation committees view the managers' use of discretionary accruals as providing crude measure of managers' and firm performance and they actively intervene to reduce the ability of executives to manipulate compensation by lowering the weight on accounting performance.
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk Publisher: Harvard University Press ISBN: 9780674020634 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 308
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Author: Andrea L. Gouldman Publisher: ISBN: Category : Executives Languages : en Pages : 61
Book Description
This study examines the effects of research and development (R&D) reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation on R&D project continuation decisions. The current study employs an experiment with a 2x3 between-participants design, manipulating both R&D reporting method (expense vs. capitalize) and knowledge of supervisor compensation (control group with no knowledge vs. knowledge of non-restricted stock compensation vs. knowledge of restricted stock compensation). Using salient short-term incentives to motivate real earnings management, this study demonstrates that capitalization may result in managers foregoing economically efficient R&D investment opportunities. The results indicate that managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation structure has little influence on managers' R&D project continuation choices. However, when managers capitalizing R&D expenditures had knowledge that their supervisors received non-restricted (short-term) stock compensation their perceived personal responsibility for the decision significantly decreased. Participants who capitalized R&D expenditures and had knowledge that their supervisor received restricted (long-term) stock compensation rated the importance of making a decision to please their supervisor significantly higher than all other participants. Additionally, participants with knowledge that their supervisors restricted stock compensation were significantly more concerned about the likelihood of negative personal repercussions regardless of R&D reporting method. These findings contribute to the management accounting literature by providing new insights on the influence of knowledge of supervisor compensation on managerial decision making as well as additional insights into the factors that contribute to and limit real earnings management. This study also extends the literature on R&D by providing evidence of the potential for real earnings management when R&D expenditures are capitalized in the absence of personal responsibility.
Author: Bo Sun
Author: Bo Sun
Author: Bo Sun
Author: Ada Demb
Author: Muhammad Fayyaz Sheikh
Author: 邱品璇
Author: Cheng Few Lee
Author: Christopher L. Jones
Author: Hoje Jo
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Author: Andrea L. Gouldman