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Author: Nguyen M. Hung Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642515088 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 201
Book Description
Jay Forrester's Economic Dynamics was published in 1971 and The Limits to Growth by Dennis Meadows and his associates appeared a year later. The publication of those two books gave rise to twenty years of intense research into the economics of exhaustible resources, research which everywhere has had a substantial impact both on public debate and on academic curricula. And now, just as that line of research is losing steam, economists are focussing on problems associated with the degradation of the natural environment, problems which call for models which, in their formal structure, are quite similar to those already developed in resource economics. This is therefore an appropriate moment for the appearance of a thorough exposition of the economics of exhaustible resources. For that is what Nguyen Manh Hung and Nguyen Van Quyen have provided. Their splendid new book covers equally well the older Hotelling-inspired theory of cake-eating and the economics of search and R&D designed to uncover new and cheaper sources of supply. It provides an entree to the whole subject of resource economics, as well as many new discoveries which will be of interest to experienced researchers.
Author: Nguyen M. Hung Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642515088 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 201
Book Description
Jay Forrester's Economic Dynamics was published in 1971 and The Limits to Growth by Dennis Meadows and his associates appeared a year later. The publication of those two books gave rise to twenty years of intense research into the economics of exhaustible resources, research which everywhere has had a substantial impact both on public debate and on academic curricula. And now, just as that line of research is losing steam, economists are focussing on problems associated with the degradation of the natural environment, problems which call for models which, in their formal structure, are quite similar to those already developed in resource economics. This is therefore an appropriate moment for the appearance of a thorough exposition of the economics of exhaustible resources. For that is what Nguyen Manh Hung and Nguyen Van Quyen have provided. Their splendid new book covers equally well the older Hotelling-inspired theory of cake-eating and the economics of search and R&D designed to uncover new and cheaper sources of supply. It provides an entree to the whole subject of resource economics, as well as many new discoveries which will be of interest to experienced researchers.
Author: Franco Nardini Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642566596 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 187
Book Description
In this book we intend to discuss economic fluctuations and growth and possible stabilizing fiscal policies. Since these topics are major preoccupa tions of economic theorists and have been extensively discussed since the classics, one may wonder why another book on these subjects. A possible defense is that we are going to do so in the framework of a two-sector model where the main featureS of each sector depend on the characteristics of the goods produced by the sector itself. The conventional wisdom suggests that the problem of (dis )aggregation in growth and business cycle theory is basically a quantitative one: the model should consider as many sectors, goods, and agents as necessary to provide a sufficiently rich picture, the upper bound obviously resulting from the tractability of the problem. In this attitude the same equilibrium (or diseqUilibrium) assumptions generally hold true throughout all sectors. Here we want to prove the relevance of an alternative approach: we look at the qualitative differences across sectors and at the peculiarities of each market as at the determinants of the economic dynamics. This tradition goes back over one hundred years to Tugan-Baranowkj and has been de veloped by Aftalion, Fanno, Spiethof, and Lowe, but has never been sys tematically formalized.
Author: Michael Reutter Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 9783540412441 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 150
Book Description
The book offers an explanation of unemployment based on a model of wage bargaining between a trade union and an employers' association. The theoretical model emphasizes the importance of distributional fairness in wage negotiations, especially with regard to factor taxation. This is achieved by the application of the proportional solution to the bargaining problem. It is shown, that this solution concept delivers a reasonable model of long run wage determination in which the natural rate of unemployment is independent of productivity growth. Taxes on labour and capital are identified as important determinants of equilibrium employment, the labour tax having a negative, the capital income tax having a positive effect. The latter result distinguishes the model from the standard literature. An empirical test using cointegration methods with West German data confirms the theoretical predictions.
Author: Dietmar Franzen Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642569323 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 183
Book Description
I first came across the issue of derivatives documentation when writing my diploma thesis on measuring the credit risk ofOTC derivatives while I was an economics student at the University of Bonn. Despite the fact that security design has been an area of research in economics for many years and despite the widespread use of derivatives documentation in financial practice, the task of designing contracts for derivatives transactions has not been dealt with in financial theory. The one thing that aroused my curiosity was that two parties with usually opposing interests, namely banking supervisors and the banking industry's lobby, unanimously endorse the use ofcertain provisions in standardized contracts called master agreements. Do these provisions increase the ex ante efficiency of contracts for all parties involved? I actually began my research expecting to find support for the widely held beliefs about the efficiency or inefficiency of certain provisions and was sur prised to obtain results that contradicted the conventional wisdom. I would strongly advise against using these results in any political debate on deriva tives documentation. They were obtained within a highly stylized model with some restrictive assumptions. This work should rather be seen as an attempt to formalize the discussion on derivatives documentation and to challenge the notion that certain provisions are generally ex ante efficient. It is also an invitation to all those advocating the use of certain provisions in master agreements to formalize their arguments and to explain the economic ratio nale behind these provisions.
Author: Wolfgang Ryll Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642614671 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 177
Book Description
We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously.
Author: Günther Lang Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642481523 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 109
Book Description
This book was born out of a five-years research at Sonderforschungsbe reich 303 by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) at Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitiit Bonn and was approved as my doctoral thesis by the Rechts-und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultiit in December 1994. It was my former colleague Wolfgang Peters who had drawn my atten tion to overlapping-generations models and to problems of intergenerational efficiency and distribution. The subtle connection between the latter two has been fascinating me from the very beginning: redistribution of the results of free trade can become necessary from the point of view of efficiency, although no externalities hamper the development of an economy. In spite of being a matured part of economics, neoclassical growth theory had left many questions unsolved, some of them even unrecognized by a large part of our profession. I took up the challenge to contribute to the investigation of some of these thorny problems. One of these issues is the often quoted idea of the inter generational con tract. Although intergenerational transfers can improve intertemporal effi ciency, the design of pension schemes to achieve an improvement of well-being of some generations without hurting that of any other, is not an easy task in an economy with flexible prices. Quite frequently, only interest rate and growth rate are taken into account when deciding on whether a generation wins or looses.
Author: Antonio Villar Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3662004577 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 172
Book Description
This is a book on general equilibrium in which firms are allowed to exhibit increasing returns to scale (more precisely, in which the convexity of production sets is not assumed). As such, it provides a full fledged general equilibrium model and analyzes the chief questions concerning existence and optimality. Increasing returns is a topic which many economists find it to be simultaneously very imponant, very difficult and very discouraging. It is very important because it refers to a well established technological phenomenon which is essentially incompatible with the functioning of competitive markets. It is very difficult because the standard concepts and tools for the analysis fail (in particular, the supply mappings are not well defined). It is very discouraging because the available models do not seem to solve the basic questions: Normative models where nonconvex firms follow marginal pricing do not achieve efficient outcomes, and positive models cannot incorporate monopolistic competition as a way of defming the behavior of those firms with increasing returns to scale. I would like to think that this monograph will contribute to show that "the increasing returns question" is neither too difficult nor too discouraging. Concerning the difficulty, it will be shown that the analysis can be carried out with essentially the same tools as those applicable to the standard competitive model. As for the relevance of the results available, let me point out the following.
Author: Thomas Steger Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642457843 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 161
Book Description
Four stylised facts of aggregate economic growth are set up initially. The growth process is interpreted to represent transitional dynamics rather than balanced-growth equilibria. Against this background, the fundamental importance of subsistence consumption is comprehensively analysed. Subsequently, the meaning of the productive-consumption hypothesis for the intertemporal consumption trade-off and the growth process is investigated. Finally, the process of growth is analysed empirically by means of cross-sectional conditional convergence regressions with endogenous control variables.
Author: Marlies Klemisch-Ahlert Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642468276 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 163
Book Description
Two features are combined in this book: the analysis of bargaining experiments and the development of axiomatic bargaining theories. Further, a new type of the latter is derived from observations in the former. The author describes bargaining experiments with different economic and ethical frames as well as developing axiomatic approaches to characterize the corresponding bargaining solutions.
Author: Angelo Artale Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642591582 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 176
Book Description
In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale • But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants. "The term ring apparently derives from the fact that in a settlement sale following the auction, members of the collusive arrangement form a circle or ring to facilitate observation of their trading behavior by the ring leader" (Cassady jr. (1967)). If the coalition members knew other players' values, the problem faced by the ring might be easily solved: the player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eventually, esta blish side payments paid to each of the losers2.
Author: Nguyen M. Hung
Author: Nguyen M. Hung
Author: Franco Nardini
Author: Michael Reutter
Author: Dietmar Franzen
Author: Wolfgang Ryll
Author: Günther Lang
Author: Antonio Villar
Author: Thomas Steger
Author: Marlies Klemisch-Ahlert
Author: Angelo Artale