Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
Dynamic Pricing with Capacity Constraints, Strategic Buyers and Uncertain Demand
Author: Dynamic Price Cometition with Capacity Constraints and Strategic Buyers
Author: Gary BiglaiserDynamic Price Competition with Capacity Constraints and Strategic Buyers
Author: Gary BiglaiserPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition, Imperfect
Languages : en
Pages : 43
Book Description
Dynamic Price Competition with Capacity Constraints and a Strategic Buyer
Author: James J. AntonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We analyze a simple dynamic durable good model. Two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game. We solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the (necessarily mixed) pricing strategies. In equilibrium, the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition, making it possible that a high and low price seller both have sales. Sellers command a rent above the value of unmet demand by the other seller. A buyer benefits from either a commitment not to make future purchases or by hiring an agent to always buy from the lowest priced seller.
Dynamic Pricing Under Demand Uncertainty in the Presence of Strategic Consumers
Author: Yinhan MengPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 96
Book Description
We study the effect of strategic consumer behavior on pricing, inventory decisions, and inventory release policies of a monopoly retailer selling a single product over two periods facing uncertain demand. We consider the following three-stage two-period dynamic pricing game. In the first stage the retailer sets his inventory level and inventory release policy; in the second stage the retailer faces uncertain demand that consists of both myopic and strategic consumers. The former type of consumers purchase the good if their valuations exceed the posted price, while the latter type of consumers consider future realizations of prices, and hence their future surplus, before deciding when to purchase the good; in the third stage, the retailer releases its remaining inventory according to the release policy chosen in the first stage. Game theory is employed to model strategic decisions in this setting. Each of the strategies available to the players in this setting (the consumers and the retailer) are solved backward to yield the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which allows us to derive the equilibrium pricing policies. This work provides three primary contributions to the fields of dynamic pricing and revenue management. First, if, in the third stage, inventory is released to clear the market, then the presence of strategic consumers may be beneficial for the retailer. Second, we find the optimal inventory release strategy when retailers have capacity limitation. Lastly, we numerically demonstrate the retailer's optimal decisions of both inventory level and the inventory release strategy. We find that market clearance mechanism and intermediate supply strategy may emerge as the retailers optimal choice.
Dynamic Pricing Strategies in the Presence of Demand Shifts
Author: Omar BesbesPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33
Book Description
Many factors introduce the prospect of changes in the demand environment that a firm faces, with the specifics of such changes not necessarily known in advance. If and when realized, such changes affect the delicate balance between demand and supply and thus current prices should account for these future possibilities. We study the dynamic pricing problem of a retailer facing the prospect of a change in the demand function during a finite selling season with no inventory replenishment opportunity. In particular, the time of the change and the postchange demand function are unknown upfront, and we focus on the fundamental trade-off between collecting revenues from current demand and doing so for postchange demand, with the capacity constraint introducing the main tension. We develop a formulation that allows for isolating the role of dynamic pricing in balancing inventory consumption throughout the horizon. We establish that, in many settings, optimal pricing policies follow a monotone path up to the change in demand. We show how one may compare upfront the attractiveness of pre- and postchange demand conditions and how such a comparison depends on the problem primitives. We further analyze the impact of the model inputs on the optimal policy and its structure, ranging from the impact of model parameter changes to the impact of different representations of uncertainty about future demand.
Collusive Pricing with Capacity Constraints in the Presence of Demand Uncertainty
Author: Robert W. StaigerPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Pricing
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
Dynamic Pricing with Fairness Concerns and a Capacity Constraint
Author: Matthew SelovePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Although some firms use dynamic pricing to respond to demand fluctuations, other firms claim that fairness concerns prevent them from raising prices during periods when demand exceeds capacity. This paper explores conditions in which fairness concerns can or cannot cause shortages. In our model, a firm announces a price policy that states its prices during high and low demand, and customers must travel to a venue to learn the current price. We show that the interaction of fairness concerns with travel costs can cause the firm to set stable prices, which leads to shortages during high demand. However, if the firm is able to inform customers about the current price before they incur any travel costs, then dynamic pricing with no shortages is optimal even with strong fairness concerns.
Dynamic Pricing of Experience Goods in Markets with Demand Uncertainty
Author: Yu-Hung ChenPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
This paper studies a firm's optimal dynamic pricing strategies for its new experience goods inmarkets where the distribution of consumers' valuations is ex ante unknown. We examine whetherand how the firm facing information asymmetry and demand uncertainty can signal its high qualityand learn market demand through its pricing strategy. First, we find that a high-quality firm cancredibly reveal its true quality in the early period with either a skimming-pricing strategy or apenetration-pricing strategy under different conditions. Second, though a high-quality firm canbenefit more from learning market demand than a low-quality firm, the high-quality firm may inequilibrium adopt a penetration-pricing strategy to forgo the benefit of learning demand in orderto separate from the low-quality firm, who would adopt a skimming strategy to learn marketdemand. Third, although consumers have higher willing-to-pay for a high-quality product, thehigh-quality firm may in equilibrium charge a lower initial price than the low-quality firm. Fourth,interestingly, the high-quality firm may earn higher profits when its initial price is made underdemand uncertainty than under no uncertainty. Lastly, with perfect social learning (i.e., in the laterperiod, all consumers can learn the firm's quality from earlier customers), the high-quality firmcan in equilibrium signal its quality and learn market demand by adopting a skimming strategy.
Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Control
Author: Elodie AdidaPublisher: VDM Publishing
ISBN: 9783836421430
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Book Description
(cont.) We introduce and study a solution method that enables to compute the optimal solution on a finite time horizon in a monopoly setting. Our results illustrate the role of capacity and the effects of the dynamic nature of demand. We then introduce an additive model of demand uncertainty. We use a robust optimization approach to protect the solution against data uncertainty in a tractable manner, and without imposing stringent assumptions on available information. We show that the robust formulation is of the same order of complexity as the deterministic problem and demonstrate how to adapt solution method. Finally, we consider a duopoly setting and use a more general model of additive and multiplicative demand uncertainty. We formulate the robust problem as a coupled constraint differential game. Using a quasi-variational inequality reformulation, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in continuous time and study issues of uniqueness. Finally, we introduce a relaxation-type algorithm and prove its convergence to a particular Nash equilibrium (normalized Nash equilibrium) in discrete time.