Author: John KennesPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Dynamic Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism
Author: John KennesEconomics Working Papers
Author: John KennesReview of Direct Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Author: Serge L. WindPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 19
Book Description
Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley were awarded the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economic Science "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design;" (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2012).This paper, motivated by a desire to understand their accomplishments, reviews successful matching processes adopted in particular market institutions. In some situations, the standard market mechanism - which adjusts prices and allocates resources by allowing supply to equal demand - cannot be utilized to directly match two sets of agents in markets with prices often unavailable. The deferred acceptance matching algorithm - originally designed by Gale and Shapley (1962) for the college admissions problem - was imbued with several optimum properties, including Pareto optimality for the students, and was subsequently adapted for specific market institutions by Roth; (Roth, 1985).Designing optimal matching algorithms has been heavily influenced by the practice of adopting and implementing market-specific designs which recognize characteristics of specific markets and sets of agents, rather than directly applying the theory of simple markets; (Roth, 2010). The deferred acceptance matching algorithm and its adaptations and extensions serve as the most highly-preferred stable mechanism to assign matchings in several two-sided markets, such as the medical residency and school choice problems. The deferred acceptance procedure has been successfully linked to other direct-matching market designs.
Matching mechanisms in theory and practice
Author: Andreas ZweifelPublisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3640579380
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 88
Book Description
Bachelor Thesis from the year 2009 in the subject Economics - Other, grade: 5.0, University of Zurich (Sozialökonomisches Institut (SOI)), language: English, abstract: Matching is the part of economics that deals with the question of who gets what, e.g. who gets which jobs, who goes to which university, who receives which organ or who marries whom. During the second part of the last century, many markets have been discovered to have failed in providing the necessary conditions for efficient matches. These market failures have partly evolved on ethical or institutional grounds, but are more generally attributed to congestion or coordination problems caused by the inability of the market to make it safe for participants to act on their private information. For this reason, a variety of allocation mechanisms have been developed and subsequently tested in field and laboratory experiments for possible implementation in real-world applications. This work attempts at giving a condensed review of different matching mechanisms and the performance of algorithms that have been implemented for solving the problems in their respective environments. The theoretical properties of these mechanisms as described in the increasingly vast literature on matching design will be used as a benchmark to compare their relative performance in terms of overall efficiency. The results yield some basic insights in the varying success of the competing algorithms in practice, indicating that both the quality of theoretical predictions and the actual performance of the algorithms decrease with the complexity of market environments. In particular, they show that imperfections of markets such as information asymmetry and incentive problems can have far-reaching consequences with respect to the effective working of matching procedures.
Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets
Author: Mohammad AkbarpourPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 63
Book Description
We introduce a simple model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically, and the composition of the trade network depends endogenously on the matching algorithm. Varying the timing properties of matching algorithms can substantially affect their performance, and this depends crucially on the information structure. More precisely, if the planner can identify agents who are about to depart, then waiting to thicken the market substantially reduces the fraction of unmatched agents. If the planner cannot identify such agents, then matching agents greedily is close-to-optimal. We specify conditions under which local algorithms that choose the right time to match agents, but do not exploit the global network structure, are close-to-optimal. Finally, we consider a setting where agents have private information about their departure times, and design a continuous-time dynamic mechanism to elicit this information.
Dynamic Marriage Markets
Author: Asefeh SalarinezhadPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The main focus of this paper is dynamic matching. I will consider a model to match agents on two sides of the market to each other while both sides have their preferences, and the market is dynamic. That means the market is open for more than one period, at the beginning of each period new agents enter the market and the matched ones leave it. Each agent accepts a subset of the agents on the other side, and she has an individual preference ranking over the agents who are in her acceptance set.I introduce a new algorithm, DYM (Dynamic Marriage), based on the Deferred Acceptance algorithm. DYM considers a Marriage Market in a dynamic environment. Considering requirements and characteristics of this environment, DYM's structure allows both sides to make offers simultaneously and selects a matching which is optimal for both sides in a defined dynamic structure if such a matching exists. Otherwise, the algorithm finds a matching which lies somewhere in between the two sides' optimals without favoring any side. This property makes the matching fair since it gives both sides a fair chance (fairness is an important concept to be considered in marriage markets, static or dynamic.) That is why my algorithm deals with the two sides offering along with the dynamic aspect of the model. The novelty of my paper is that my algorithm allows both sides to make offers simultaneously in a dynamic setting. I also study the dynamic strategy-proofness, stability and Pareto-optimality of the algorithm.
Essays on dynamic matching markets
Author: Morimitsu KurinoWeb and Internet Economics
Author: Jugal GargPublisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3031489748
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 728
Book Description
This volume LNCS 14413 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 19th International Conference, WINE 2023, in December 2023 held in Shanghai, China. The 37 full papers presented together with 29 one-page abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 221 submissions. The WINE conference series aims to exchange research ideas in a diverse area of application at the intercept of theoretical computer science , artificial intelligence, operations research, and economics.
ECAI 2010
Author: European Coordinating Committee for Artificial IntelligencePublisher: IOS Press
ISBN: 160750605X
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 1184
Book Description
LC copy bound in 2 v.: v. 1, p. 1-509; v. 2, p. [509]-1153.
Essays on Matching Theory and Behavioral Market Design
Author: Siqi PanPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 112
Book Description
This dissertation focuses on the design and implementation of matching markets where transfers are not available, such as college admissions, school choice, and certain labor markets. The results contribute to the literature from both a theoretical and a behavioral perspective, and may have policy implications for the design of some real-life matching markets. Chapter 1, “Exploding Offers and Unraveling in Two-Sided Matching Markets,” studies the unraveling problem prevalent in many two-sided matching markets that occurs when transactions become inefficiently early. In a two-period decentralized model, I examine whether the use of exploding offers can affect agents' early moving incentives. The results show that when the culture of the market allows firms to make exploding offers, unraveling is more likely to occur, leading to a less socially desirable matching outcome. A market with an excess supply of labor is less vulnerable to the presence of exploding offers; yet the conclusion is ambiguous for a market with a greater degree of uncertainty in early stages, which depends on the specific information structure. While a policy banning exploding offers tends to be supported by high quality firms and workers, it can be opposed by those of lower quality. This explains the prevalence of exploding offers in practice. Chapter 2, “Constrained School Choice and Information Acquisition,” investigates a common practice of many school choice programs in the field, where the length of students' submitted preference lists are constrained. In an environment where students have incomplete information about others’ preferences, I theoretically study the effect of such a constraint under both a Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA) and a Boston mechanism (BOS). The result shows that ex-ante stability can only be ensured under an unconstrained DA, but not under a constrained DA, an unconstrained BOS, or a constrained BOS. In a lab experiment, I find that the constraint also affects students’ information acquisition behavior. Specifically, when faced with a constraint, students tend to acquire less wasteful information and distribute more efforts to acquire relevant information under DA; such an effect is not significant under BOS. Overall, the constraint has a negative effect on efficiency and stability under both mechanisms. Chapter 3, “Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms,” is jointly written with Huanxing Yang. We investigate targeted advertising in two-sided markets. Each of the two competing platforms has single-homing consumers on one side and multi-homing advertising firms on the other. We focus on how asymmetry in platforms’ targeting abilities translates into asymmetric equilibrium outcomes, and how changes in targeting ability affect the price and volume of ads, consumer welfare, and advertising firms' profits. We also compare social incentives and equilibrium incentives in investing in targeting ability. Chapter 4, “The Instability of Matching with Overconfident Agents: Laboratory and Field Investigations,” focuses on centralized college admissions markets where students are evaluated and allocated based on their performance on a standardized exam. A single exam’s measurement error causes the exam-based priorities to deviate from colleges' aptitude-based preferences: a student who underperforms in one exam may lose her placement at a preferred college to someone with a lower aptitude. The previous literature proposes a solution of combining a Boston algorithm with pre-exam preference submission. Under the assumption that students have perfect knowledge of their relative aptitudes before taking the exam, the suggested mechanism intends to trigger a self-sorting process, with students of higher (lower) aptitudes targeting more (less) preferred colleges. However, in a laboratory experiment, I find that such a self-sorting process is skewed by overconfidence, which leads to a welfare loss larger than the purported benefits. Moreover, the mechanism introduces unfairness by rewarding overconfidence and punishing underconfidence, thus serving as a gender penalty for women. I also analyze field data from Chinese high schools; the results suggest similar conclusions as in the lab.