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Author: Asefeh Salarinezhad Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The main focus of this paper is dynamic matching. I will consider a model to match agents on two sides of the market to each other while both sides have their preferences, and the market is dynamic. That means the market is open for more than one period, at the beginning of each period new agents enter the market and the matched ones leave it. Each agent accepts a subset of the agents on the other side, and she has an individual preference ranking over the agents who are in her acceptance set.I introduce a new algorithm, DYM (Dynamic Marriage), based on the Deferred Acceptance algorithm. DYM considers a Marriage Market in a dynamic environment. Considering requirements and characteristics of this environment, DYM's structure allows both sides to make offers simultaneously and selects a matching which is optimal for both sides in a defined dynamic structure if such a matching exists. Otherwise, the algorithm finds a matching which lies somewhere in between the two sides' optimals without favoring any side. This property makes the matching fair since it gives both sides a fair chance (fairness is an important concept to be considered in marriage markets, static or dynamic.) That is why my algorithm deals with the two sides offering along with the dynamic aspect of the model. The novelty of my paper is that my algorithm allows both sides to make offers simultaneously in a dynamic setting. I also study the dynamic strategy-proofness, stability and Pareto-optimality of the algorithm.
Author: Asefeh Salarinezhad Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The main focus of this paper is dynamic matching. I will consider a model to match agents on two sides of the market to each other while both sides have their preferences, and the market is dynamic. That means the market is open for more than one period, at the beginning of each period new agents enter the market and the matched ones leave it. Each agent accepts a subset of the agents on the other side, and she has an individual preference ranking over the agents who are in her acceptance set.I introduce a new algorithm, DYM (Dynamic Marriage), based on the Deferred Acceptance algorithm. DYM considers a Marriage Market in a dynamic environment. Considering requirements and characteristics of this environment, DYM's structure allows both sides to make offers simultaneously and selects a matching which is optimal for both sides in a defined dynamic structure if such a matching exists. Otherwise, the algorithm finds a matching which lies somewhere in between the two sides' optimals without favoring any side. This property makes the matching fair since it gives both sides a fair chance (fairness is an important concept to be considered in marriage markets, static or dynamic.) That is why my algorithm deals with the two sides offering along with the dynamic aspect of the model. The novelty of my paper is that my algorithm allows both sides to make offers simultaneously in a dynamic setting. I also study the dynamic strategy-proofness, stability and Pareto-optimality of the algorithm.
Author: Hans-Peter Blossfeld Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 9400710658 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 364
Book Description
Marriage and social inequality are closely interrelated. Marriage is dependent on the structure of marriage markets, and marriage patterns have consequences for social inequality. This book demonstrates that in most modern societies the educa tional system has become an increasingly important marriage market, particularly for those who are highly qualified. Educational expansion in general and the rising educational participation of women in particular unintentionally have increased the rate of "assortative meeting" and assortative mating across birth cohorts. Rising educational homogamy means that social inequality is further enhanced through marriage because better (and worse) educated single men and women pool their economic and sociocultural advantages (and disadvantages) within couples. In this book we study the changing role of the educational system as a marriage market in modern societies from a cross-national comparative perspective. Using life-history data from a broad range of industrialized countries and longitudinal statistical models, we analyze the process of spouse selection in the life courses of single men and women, step by step. The countries included in this book vary widely in important characteristics such as demographic behavior and institutional characteristics. The life course approach explicitly recognizes the dynamic nature of partner decisions, the importance of educational roles and institutional circum stances as young men and women move through their life paths, and the cumulation of advantages and disadvantages experienced by individuals.
Author: Jing Liu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Husbands Languages : en Pages : 194
Book Description
In this thesis we study the interdependency of individual decisions on work and family, particularly the dynamic interaction of the marriage market and the labor market. My basic idea is that marital status affects individual labor supply decisions, and in turn, labor market condition influences marriage formation and dissolution. While these interactions are evident, the overwhelming majority of research on labor or family economics usually simplifies the individual decision-making by assuming that one of two markets outcomes is given while studying the other one. In the empirical study, endogeneity issues are troublesome, especially under the dynamic setting. My work takes a different approach. I directly model the individual decision-making, which describes how marriage market and labor market interact with each other; and matching with survey data we empirically recover the underlying economic environments that characterize the structure of the marriage market and the labor market. I further examine to what extent my model explains the observed facts. Very few studies have been conducted to explore work and family issues in this direction partly due to its complexity. The structural models, besides the conventional regression, improve our perceptions on how individuals form decisions on work and family, which have far-reaching implications on policy designs and welfare evaluations. In my thesis, I explore all these issues in three steps. In chapter 1, I explain a stylized fact that there exists a positive correlation between rising wage inequality and declining marriage rates. A two-sided matching model is developed to exploit a theoretical channel through which wage inequality affects marriage rates. My model features a steady state equilibrium in which the whole marriage market is divided into groups and only people in the same group will marry each other. Using the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) data from 1970 to 2000, my estimates indicate that a structural change occurs in the U.S. marriage market. The higher matching efficiency and declining elasticity of men suggest that the nowadays marriage market provides more chance to meet and better gender equity, though higher arrival rates also raise the outside options of getting married. Additionally, I find that wage inequality accounts for over 38% of the decline in marriage rate, which is underestimated in Gould (2003). Chapter 2 examines household dynamic labor supply after introducing bargaining between husbands and wives, which has not been thoroughly studied previously in literature. Here bargaining between husbands and wives determines the amount of husbands' earnings that are transferred to wives for their private consumption. A household search model that incorporates the intrahousehold bargaining is developed and estimated using panel data from the year 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). My results show that the portion of household income shared by husbands for private consumption is responsive to their employment status, suggesting the existence of the bargaining between the U.S. couples. My findings also imply that the labor supply of women will increase with higher women wage and lower money transfer from husbands to wives, showing that the income effect dominates for wives. Moreover, the wage frontier of husbands is positively correlated with wives' wages and negatively correlated with husbands' earnings transferred to wives, highlighting that husbands are subject to both the income effect and intra-household bargaining, and their decisions depend on which effect dominates. In the third and the last chapter, I study household unemployment duration. Previously, most studies have addressed the topic of job search at the individual level. This chapter studies job search patterns of married couples and in particular compares couple's unemployment duration given their spousal earnings. A household search model is introduced, which includes the bargaining between husbands and wives. I use the year 2001 panel data Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to estimate the structural model of family decisions. Our findings reveal that there exists a gender asymmetry in job search of the U.S. household: The more husbands earn, the longer wives search for a job; but the more wives earn, the sooner husbands find a job.
Author: June Carbone Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0199382980 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 267
Book Description
There was a time when the phrase "American family" conjured up a single, specific image: a breadwinner dad, a homemaker mom, and their 2.5 kids living comfortable lives in a middle-class suburb. Today, that image has been shattered, due in part to skyrocketing divorce rates, single parenthood, and increased out-of-wedlock births. But whether it is conservatives bewailing the wages of moral decline and women's liberation, or progressives celebrating the result of women's greater freedom and changing sexual mores, most Americans fail to identify the root factor driving the changes: economic inequality that is remaking the American family along class lines. In Marriage Markets, June Carbone and Naomi Cahn examine how macroeconomic forces are transforming our most intimate and important spheres, and how working class and lower income families have paid the highest price. Just like health, education, and seemingly every other advantage in life, a stable two-parent home has become a luxury that only the well-off can afford. The best educated and most prosperous have the most stable families, while working class families have seen the greatest increase in relationship instability. Why is this so? The book provides the answer: greater economic inequality has profoundly changed marriage markets, the way men and women match up when they search for a life partner. It has produced a larger group of high-income men than women; written off the men at the bottom because of chronic unemployment, incarceration, and substance abuse; and left a larger group of women with a smaller group of comparable men in the middle. The failure to see marriage as a market affected by supply and demand has obscured any meaningful analysis of the way that societal changes influence culture. Only policies that redress the balance between men and women through greater access to education, stable employment, and opportunities for social mobility can produce a culture that encourages commitment and investment in family life. A rigorous and enlightening account of why American families have changed so much in recent decades, Marriage Markets cuts through the ideological and moralistic rhetoric that drives our current debate. It offers critically needed solutions for a problem that will haunt America for generations to come.
Author: Aloysius Siow Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The paper surveys the Choo and Siow (2006a; CS) marriage matching model and its extensions. CS derives a behavioural marriage-matching function. The collective model of intra-household allocations can be integrated into this framework. Spousal labour supplies respond to changing marriage market conditions. Marriage market tightness, the ratio of unmarried type i men to unmarried type j women is a sufficient statistic for marriage market conditions for those types of individuals. The hypothesis that spousal labour supplies vary to equilibrate the marriage market has overidentifying restrictions. The framework extends to a dynamic marriage-matching environment. Empirically, this paper shows how the famine caused by the great leap forward in Sichuan affected the marital behaviour of famine-born cohorts. Marriage market tightness is shown to be a useful statistic for summarizing marriage market conditions in the United States. Marriage market conditions in the contemporary United States primarily affect spousal labour force participation rather than hours of work.
Author: Shoshana Grossbard Publisher: Springer ISBN: 146141623X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 210
Book Description
While this book contains numerous facts and empirical findings and touches on policy issues, its main contribution to the existing literature lies in the theoretical perspective it offers. The core of this book is a general equilibrium theory of labor and marriage presented in Chapter 2, which provides the conceptual framework for the rest of the chapters. Two major implications of the theory are sex ratio effects and compensating differentials in marriage. The book demonstrates how a few core concepts, linked via economic analysis, help explain a multitude of findings based on statistical analyses of data from a wide variety of cultures. It is hoped that readers of this book will improve their understanding of how marriage works to help us design better economic and social policies as well as help people live better and happier lives, making the book of interest to not only economists but sociologists and anthropologists as well.
Author: Asefeh Salarinezhad
Author: Asefeh Salarinezhad
Author: Eugene Choo
Author: Hans-Peter Blossfeld
Author: Jing Liu
Author: June Carbone
Author: Aloysius Siow
Author: Seble Worku-Yergou Belay
Author: Shoshana Grossbard
Author: Andrew Shephard
Author: Charles Kingston