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Dynamic Investment with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Dynamic Investment with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard PDF Author: Miguel Cantillo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Book Description
This paper develops a dynamic model of capital structure and investment. In a world with low and high ability managers, the former mask as the latter, but to do so have to overstate both earnings and investment. Debt is a mechanism that eventually separates investors' abilities, at the cost of intervening unlucky high productivity managers. Immediate separation is counterproductive, as it generates costs and no expected payoff. The security design that asymptotically implements optimal investment includes the use of excess non-operating cash, of proportional cash flow compensation, and of "golden parachutes". Relative to a first best case, high ability managers will underinvest. Low ability managers will generally overinvest, except when their firm is close to bankruptcy, in which case they will loot the company by underinvesting and overstating their earnings.

Dynamic Investment with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Dynamic Investment with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard PDF Author: Miguel Cantillo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Book Description
This paper develops a dynamic model of capital structure and investment. In a world with low and high ability managers, the former mask as the latter, but to do so have to overstate both earnings and investment. Debt is a mechanism that eventually separates investors' abilities, at the cost of intervening unlucky high productivity managers. Immediate separation is counterproductive, as it generates costs and no expected payoff. The security design that asymptotically implements optimal investment includes the use of excess non-operating cash, of proportional cash flow compensation, and of "golden parachutes". Relative to a first best case, high ability managers will underinvest. Low ability managers will generally overinvest, except when their firm is close to bankruptcy, in which case they will loot the company by underinvesting and overstating their earnings.

Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection PDF Author: Alex Gershkov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description


Financial Development and Dynamic Investment Behavior

Financial Development and Dynamic Investment Behavior PDF Author: Inessa Love
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Book Description


Moral Hazard, Investment, and Firm Dynamics

Moral Hazard, Investment, and Firm Dynamics PDF Author: Hengjie Ai
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 61

Book Description
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. Owners of the firms delegate investment decisions to managers, whose consumption and investment are private information. We solve the optimal incentive compatible contracts and characterize the implied firm dynamics. Optimal risk sharing requires managers' equity share decrease with the firm size. This in turn implies that it is harder to prevent private benefit in larger firms, where managers have lower equity stake under the optimal contract. Consequently, smaller firms invest more, pay less dividends, and grow faster. Quantitatively, we show that our model is consistent with the Pareto-like size distribution of firms in the data, as well as the pattern of the relationships between firm size and firms' investment and dividend policies.

Essays on Investment and Adverse Selection

Essays on Investment and Adverse Selection PDF Author: Shaojin Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 266

Book Description
Relative used capital price, the measure of irreversibility, is fixed in almost all the investment literature. This dissertation introduces investment models with state-dependent irreversibility and tests whether these models outperform fixed irreversibility cases, at both the macro and micro levels. Since there is currently no historical data available on the issue of used capital prices, the first chapter uses an indirect inference procedure to estimate the cyclical property of irreversibility at the micro-level. In the second chapter, I propose a dynamic investment model with endogenous irreversibility arising from the lemons problem in the used capital market and examine the cyclical implication of irreversibility. Data evidence shows that capital reallocation, or used capital expenditure, is pro-cyclical. In a general equilibrium framework, the third chapter reveals that the investment model with state-dependent irreversibility explains this phenomenon while the model with fixed irreversibility does not.

The Theory of Entrepreneurship

The Theory of Entrepreneurship PDF Author: Chandra S. Mishra
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137371463
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 520

Book Description
The Theory of Entrepreneurship examines the interiors of the entrepreneurial value creation process, and offers a new unified and comprehensive theory to afford empirical investigations as well as delineate a broader view of the entrepreneurial contextual milieu.

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance PDF Author: Amy Finkelstein
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231538685
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 161

Book Description
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

Financial Development and Dynamic Investment Behavior

Financial Development and Dynamic Investment Behavior PDF Author: Inessa Love
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Book Description
The authors apply vector autoregression to firm-level panel data from 36 countries to study the dynamic relationship between firms' financial conditions and investment. They argue that by using orthogonalized impulse-response functions they are able to separate the "fundamental factors" (such as marginal profitability of investment) from the "financial factors" (such as availability of internal finance) that influence the level of investment. The authors find that the impact of the financial factors on investment, which they interpret as evidence of financing constraints, is significantly larger in countries with less developed financial systems. The finding emphasizes the role of financial development in improving capital allocation and growth.

Financial Integration, Entrepreneurial Risk and Global Dynamics

Financial Integration, Entrepreneurial Risk and Global Dynamics PDF Author: George-Marios Angeletos
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437980244
Category : Reference
Languages : en
Pages : 42

Book Description
How does financial integration impact capital accumulation, current-account dynamics, and cross-country inequality? This paper investigates this question within a two-country, general-equilibrium, incomplete-markets model that focuses on the importance of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk -- a risk that introduces, not only a precautionary motive for saving, but also a wedge between the interest rate and the marginal product of capital. This friction provides a simple resolution to the empirical puzzle that capital often fails to flow from the rich or slow-growing countries to the poor or fast-growing ones, and a distinct set of policy lessons regarding the intertemporal costs and benefits of capital-account liberalization. Illus. A print on demand report.

Handbook of the Economics of Finance

Handbook of the Economics of Finance PDF Author: G. Constantinides
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 9780444513632
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 698

Book Description
Arbitrage, State Prices and Portfolio Theory / Philip h. Dybvig and Stephen a. Ross / - Intertemporal Asset Pricing Theory / Darrell Duffle / - Tests of Multifactor Pricing Models, Volatility Bounds and Portfolio Performance / Wayne E. Ferson / - Consumption-Based Asset Pricing / John y Campbell / - The Equity Premium in Retrospect / Rainish Mehra and Edward c. Prescott / - Anomalies and Market Efficiency / William Schwert / - Are Financial Assets Priced Locally or Globally? / G. Andrew Karolyi and Rene M. Stuli / - Microstructure and Asset Pricing / David Easley and Maureen O'hara / - A Survey of Behavioral Finance / Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler / - Derivatives / Robert E. Whaley / - Fixed-Income Pricing / Qiang Dai and Kenneth J. Singleton.