Author: Joel SobelPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Durable Goods Monopoly with Entry of New Consumers
Author: Joel SobelDurable Goods Monopoly with Uninformed Consumers
Author: Joseph Emmett HarringtonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Durable Goods Monopoly with Uninformed Consumers
Author: Joseph Emmett HarringtonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Durable Goods Monopoly with a Finite But Uncertain Number of Consumers
Author: David W. MajerusPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 15
Book Description
Pacman Refutes the Coase Conjecture
Author: Mark BagnoliPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 18
Book Description
Price and Quality Discrimination in Durable Goods Monopoly with Resale Trading
Author: Praveen KumarPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We examine a durable goods monopolist's optimal dynamic price and product quality strategy when buyers are rational, have diverse tastes, and can trade used durables among themselves. Our analysis makes four main points. First, in contrast to the well-known time-inconsistency problem of the durable goods monopolist, intertemporal quality discrimination introduces a time-inconsistency problem of not raising prices against the high-valuation consumers who may delay purchase in hope of quality upgrades. Resale trading ameliorates this time-inconsistency problem and allows the monopolist to effectively discriminate, especially when the buyers are patient. Second, the monopolist's optimal price and quality offers in the new good market may have complex dynamic patterns that depend crucially on the discount factor. In particular, for low discount factors, new good prices can fall as product quality improves even in the absence of any entry threats or learning economies. Third, initial quality distortions will be followed by steady-state quality allocations that are always efficient for the high-valuation buyers, and sometimes also for the marginal consumer-types. Finally, both the resale trading frequency and the price discount for secondhand goods is driven by the pace of strategic quality obsolescence in the new good market.
Quality, Upgrades, and (the Loss of) Market Power in a Dynamic Monopoly Model
Author: James J. AntonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Book Description
We examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth in a durable goods monopoly market. The monopolist generates new quality improvements over time and can sell any available qualities, in any desired bundles, at each point in time. Consumers are identical and for a quality improvement to have value the buyer must possess previous qualities: goods are upgrades. We find that the upgrade structure, quality growth, and the fact that consumers are always in the market can lead to an almost complete loss in market power for the seller even though all consumers are identical. This is true for all discount factors. We show that subgame perfect equilibrium payoff for the seller range from capturing the full social surplus all the way down to capturing only the current flow value of each good and that each of these payoffs is realized in a Markov perfect equilibrium that follows the socially efficient allocation path. We also find that equilibria may be inefficient.
Monopoly Production and Pricing of Finitely Durable Goods with Strategic Consumers' Fluctuating Willingness to Pay
Author: Vera TilsonEntry Deterrence in Durable-goods Monopoly
Author: Heidrun C. HoppePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Barriers to entry (Industrial organization)
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Durable Goods Monopoly and Futures Markets
Author: Ronald W. AndersonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description